Gal 10 M b.

FREEWILL, FOREKNOWLEDGE, AND FATE.

A FRAGMENT.

By EDWARD SEARCH, Esq;

K.

Unde hæc est Fatis avolsa Voluntas. LUCRET.

Hunc Naturam vocas, Fatum, Fortunam: omnia ejusdem Dei nomina sunt, varie utentis sua potestate.
SENECA de Benef.

Others reason'd high of Knowledge, Fate, and Will;
Fixt Fate, Freewill, Foreknowledge absolute,
And found no end, in wandring mazes lost.
MILTON.

LONDON:
Printed for R. and J. DODSLEY, in Pall-Mall.
MDCCLXIII.

20

MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

TO

The READER.

ON reviſiting *Alma Mater Oxonienſis* after a long abſence, among many noble edifices entirely new to me, I obſerved an elegant range of chambers at *Magdalen*, on either end of which there projected two rows of rough ſtones from top to bottom ready to faſten in with future walls that might be run up againſt them; and chimnies were worked between for the accommodation of future chambers that might hereafter riſe out of the adjacent ground. But as the ſaid adjacent ground was ſmoothed into a neat parterre, and I ſaw no preparation for further erections, I could look upon the projector as having deſigned only to exhibit the fragment of a building.

Being at St. *Mary*'s one *Sunday*, I heard a learned and excellent diſcourſe on three

out of five ſub-diviſions of the ſecond head of a treatiſe in defence of the Proteſtant Cauſe. I was told the firſt head had been delivered three years before, and it might probably come to the Preacher's turn to give the two remaining ſub-diviſions about three years hence: ſo conſidering how fluctuating a body the congregation conſiſted of, and ſuppoſing the Preacher knew their taſte, I concluded it cuſtomary to preſent them with the fragment of a Diſſertation.

Every body knows the prodigious demand for Magazines, which are little elſe than bundles of various and diſcordant fragments; and compoſitions of all kinds, not excepting Dictionaries, find greater vent when broken into numbers, than when delivered entire.

Having ſuch precedents, as well of learned as ſimple, to keep me in countenance, I need no farther apology for exhibiting a Fragment to public view; eſpecially ſince it can ſcarce be called ſo, when conſidered in itſelf: for I have purſued my ſubject as thoroughly as I was able, and brought it to a concluſion; ſo

that

that I flatter myſelf it will appear rent and torn only with reſpect to certain ſtrings of connection and alluſions bearing a reference to other matters of my production, which I keep ſtill in reſerve. Nevertheleſs it will be expected that I ſhould give ſome more particular account of my dealing out this piece of a performance, than barely the allowableneſs of ſo doing, after the example of other people.

The *Searches*, from whom I claim to be deſcended, were a very ancient family, as old almoſt as the time when curioſity firſt began to prevail in the world. But as this quality, while left to follow its natural bent, would catch indifferently at every thing novel or engaging, of what kind ſoever, our line have always endeavoured to confine it to objects from whence ſomething uſeful might be gathered, either for improving the knowledge or promoting the ſervice of mankind. But as many of us have but moderate capacities, we often labour to little purpoſe, and fail of producing the good expected from our endeavours; yet we ſtill continue thoſe endeavours, like other Projectors, in hopes

of better ſucceſs by and by, or for the chance that what little we produce may occaſion others to improve upon it, and ſo be made to yield better fruits when cultivated by abler hands. But there is one benefit we cannot well fail of, the having employment for our time, together with the ſoothing ſatisfaction of knowing that our aim is juſtifiable, and of being engaged perpetually in purſuit of ſomething that carries the appearance of uſe and importance. For perſeverance and good intention are characteriſtics of the *Searches*, and direct them ſeverally to thoſe courſes of enquiry wherein their particular turn of mind or opportunities render them moſt likely to proceed with effect.

It has been my fortune, or my humour, to lay out much of my thoughts upon moral Philoſophy, and the rules of Pruduce for the government of our conduct, which I find generally made to conſiſt of detached tenets or maxims variouſly underſtood, having little dependance upon each other, but oftentimes appearing to claſh; from whence great diſputes and perplexities unavoidably enſue. For men proceed

ceed upon different principles, which they ſeverally eſteem ſelf-evident, and therefore will not ſuffer them to be queſtioned. But it ſeems to me, that many things are received as principles, which are not truly ſuch, but deductions from ſomething elſe; tho' men eſteem them ſelf-evident, as having forgotten the inducements recommending them to their reception, or having imbibed them from their teachers or companions, without knowing of any other original they ever had. Therefore I conceived it might be expedient to take our principles themſelves under examination, not with deſign to overthrow them, for they may be true as concluſions, though not ſelf-evident as principles, but in order to trace them down to the foundations whereon they ſtand. And it ſoon appeared that human underſtanding can build ſecurely on no other foundation than experience and obſervation of ourſelves, and that part of nature lying within our cognizance; nor can any abſtract reaſonings be depended upon which do not ground ultimately upon that bottom.

Under this perſuaſion I ſet myſelf carefully to conſider the nature of the mind, her manner of acting in the common occurrencies of life, the ſources of good and evil ordinarily befalling her, what Ideas naturally occur from contemplation of things external, and what concluſions might be drawn from thence for regulating as well our theory as our practice. For I conceived, that if ſomething of a ſyſtem could be formed upon this baſis, it muſt carry a mutual dependance in all its parts, which would contribute, ſo far as it extended, to render our opinions conſiſtent and uniform: becauſe our premiſes being taken from common experience of things obvious to every body's obſervation, whatever could be plainly deduced from thence muſt meet with every body's approbation; and if we could be brought to try our ſeveral notions by that touchſtone, and model them according to that ſtandard, it muſt tend towards a general reconcilement; an object more ſuitable to my taſte than oppoſition or victory.

Therefore without intereſting myſelf in the diſputes which have divided the world,

I endeavoured to ſtrike out what lights I could from experience, without prejudice or partiality, yet with ſuch deference to the opinions of others before me, as to preſume them well grounded, until I ſeemed clearly to diſcern wherein the error lay; and rather deſirous of putting ſuch conſtruction upon them as appeared reaſonable, than forward to reject them.

This attempt has furniſhed me more employment than I imagined at firſt ſetting out; for I found, in the progreſs of my enquiries, that one diſcovery gave birth to another, that to a third, and ſo on to a length I could ſcarce have thought capable of being traced out, much leſs that I ſhould be ſo lucky as to trace it. And I began to fear, that what with unavoidable avocations, what with my natural ſlowneſs, and ſome bodily infirmities rendering me unfit for long and hard labour, the work I have drawn upon my hands, though not likely to prove very voluminous, was more than could be compleated while I have ſtrength and ſpirits to go through it. This made me think of giving out what I had gotten ready, without ſtaying until the whole were

were finiſhed, had I judged it ſafe or prudent ſo to do. But as I have endeavoured all along to proceed with a perfect freedom, and at the ſame time to avoid a licentiouſneſs or wantonneſs of thought, my freedom has led me to maintain ſome poſitions which might give offence, or be thought of dangerous conſequence: and tho' when it ſhall be ſeen what uſe I ſhall make of them, I truſt they will not only be found innocent, but to corroborate thoſe received opinions they ſeem at firſt ſight to ſubvert; yet my caution with-holds me from uttering any thing that might appear poiſonous, until I had prepared the antidote.

For truths are not to be ſpoken at all times indiſcriminately; becauſe the moſt uſeful of them ſtanding ſometimes connected in men's minds with error, it would do hurt to undeceive them in the latter, without having provided means of diſſolving the connection.

The little Diſſertation here preſented to view ſeemed the only part of my productions proper to be ventured abroad alone, as being leſs complicated than others with the reſt, and not ſo much a new

ſuper-

ſuperſtructure raiſed upon grounds before laid down, which when detached from its foundation might appear like a caſtle in the air, as a clearing the way for other buildings. For it contains no more than an attempt to reſcue the doctrine of univerſal Providence, as maintained in the preceding chapter, from an objection ordinarily occurring againſt it, as if it ſubverted human liberty, by leaving us nothing in our power to do: an attempt which ſurely cannot give offence to the moſt ſcrupulous, whether Divine or Philoſopher. And yet I foreſee that ſome exceptionable conſequences may be drawn from this doctrine in the latitude whereto it is here extended; but they will probably be overlooked, by thoſe eſpecially whom they might be moſt likely to ſtagger; therefore I ſhall not be ſo indiſcreet as to point them out, until in my further progreſs I ſhall have gotten matters ready for obviating them.

It would be departing from the honeſty and ingenuouſneſs of the *Searches* to deny, that perhaps the true reaſon of my exhibiting a part of my face in open view may be no other

other than an impatience of appearing in print, and reviewing my labours in a fairer character than I can give them with my own ſcribbling hand. But if this be my motive, it is more than I know myſelf; for it is not uncommon with every body for imagination to ſuggeſt ſolid and ſubſtantial reaſons in ſupport of any thing they have a mind to; and ſuch are not wanting, which to my thinking determine me upon the preſent occaſion.

For by ſubmitting this ſpecimen to the judgement of any who ſhall think it worth his peruſal, I may receive ſome admonitions for my conduct in proceeding further. A man is no competent judge of his own performances; for being the product of his own thoughts, they muſt tally exactly with his ways of thinking; which upon reviſal may give them a face of neatneſs and proportion they will not carry in the eyes of other people: ſo that after all his care to make his arguments connected and compact, others may find them abounding in gaps and ſuperfluities; the explanations he gives as clear and full may be thought obſcure and imperfect by them; obſervations that

that look ſtriking and appoſite to him, they may pronounce flat and unavailing; and matters he judges momentous, may to them appear trifling. Nor can one ſafely depend upon the judgement of intimates; for however impartial and diſcerning they may be, ſtill the knowledge of the perſon raiſes a curioſity upon what he produces, which will keep up their attention in places where a ſtranger might have fallen aſleep: beſides that there is always ſome ſimilitude in the way of thinking between perſons who converſe often together. Therefore whatever precautions one may take at home, there is no knowing how one may be received in public without making the trial.

My manner of handling the ſubjects I treat of is what I am moſt ſuſpicious of reprehenſion upon; for they being generally unentertaining and dry, I have endeavoured to embelliſh them with a diverſity of ſtile, in order to relieve the Reader, and keep his attention awake; intermingling ſometimes poetical and rhetorical figures, ſometimes familiar and vulgar images among abſtruſe ſpeculations; ſometimes giving the reins to a playful fancy in the tranſitions, ſeverally intro-

introducing them; and ſometimes talking to my Reader as if we were ſitting together over a bottle. In theſe particulars I am willing to ſtand under correction, as not knowing myſelf whether all this be an agreeable variety or a motley mixture; whether an ornament ſetting off the ſubſtance, or a diſfigurement rendering it hideous.

Whatever information I can pick up, either with reſpect to matter or form, will not be utterly loſt upon me; for though I cannot promiſe to work a thorough reformation, it being difficult to depart from a track one has long habituated one's ſelf to, and that enthuſiaſm ſometimes poſſeſſing a writer not lying always under controul; yet neither am I of a temper to perſiſt obſtinately in a fault which I find in my power to mend.

As for gaining applauſe for my performances, it is what I neither expect nor deſire; for the *Searches* were never remarkable for a fondneſs of fame; the point they conſtantly drove at was to ſecure a ſelf-approbation in the juſtneſs of their undertakings, and of the meaſures they took to

purſue them; but being diffident of themſelves, they could never poſſeſs this ſolace compleatly, until they had it confirmed to them by the ſanction of others. I ſhall think it ſufficient encomium, if any body ſhall ſay the ſame of me as *Horace* did of *Lucilius*, that when he run incorrect, yet there was ſomething you would think well worth your while to pick up: and whether this ſomething can be found or no, I ſhall reap an advantage from the diſcovery either way. For if I have been labouring all this while to no purpoſe, it will be expedient for me to know it. I ſhall then be delivered from the fatigue of toiling any longer after an *ignis fatuus*, a mere notion of being important without the reality: I ſhall have more time to ſpare for innocent amuſements, and may enter into them with a quiet conſcience, upon being convinced of an unfitneſs for things uſeful. For I am luckily placed in a ſituation that binds me down to no particular taſk; I may either work or play, as I ſee proper; and my life would paſs more pleaſurably in the latter, could I once lay aſide the thought of obligation to the former. On the other hand, ſhould that

Some-

Something be found in the little ſample I deal out, which might prove of ſervice to any body towards clearing up his doubts, or caſting a light upon matters he judges of ſome moment, it will raiſe a hope and alacrity that will ſupport me under my future labours, and enable me to purſue them more effectually; and may acquit me of ſome omiſſions in private life, which ſeem to call for an excuſe.

For my friends and neighbours find it difficult to draw me out of my retirement, or get me to conſort among them when near, or correſpond with them when diſtant: which I am apprehenſive they may aſcribe to an unſociable ſulleneſs of temper, or a ſelfiſh fondneſs for idle ſpeculations, in diſregard of what is owing to perſons around me, though they are more polite and good-natured than to charge me openly with theſe blemiſhes. Now I have too great a value and deſire of their good opinion to reſt eaſy under the thoughts of having forfeited it: therefore am willing to ſhow them that I do not ſit idle while retired within myſelf, aſſuring them at the ſame time that I am detained in my hermitage

mitage by ſomething bearing the air of buſineſs and obligation, and that it did not appear to me the indulgence of an unſociable humour to be employed in reſearches after what might prove beneficial to ſociety. But if I ſhould obtain a teſtimonial from any body who has in anywiſe received benefit from my ſpeculations, or ſhall pronounce them worth the pains I have taken in purſuing them, this will avail me more than any proteſtations of mine; becauſe the beſt intentions perſiſted in without producing ſome good effect, while they juſtify the heart caſt a ſlur upon the underſtanding. And leaſt it ſhould be thought that the little I have to ſhew might be diſpatched at leiſure hours, without interruption to other engagements; I beg leave to obſerve, that a great deal more is requiſite to be done than appears to ſuch as have not experienced it; for though I have endeavoured as far as in me lies to attain an eaſy manner of conveying my thoughts, yet we have it upon Mr. *Addiſon*'s authority, that there is a great difference between eaſy writing, and what any one may eaſily write, eſpecially in handling ſuch knotty

ſubjects as I have fallen upon. I am ſure it has coſt me infinite pains to ſave pains to my Reader; and I have been forced to run over in my thoughts as much as would fill ten ſheets, before I could furniſh out a ſingle one in a manner that might afford a tolerable expectation of being ſatisfactory to him. Add to this, that the weakneſs of my ſpirits diſables me from performing great matters at a ſitting; but I muſt do my work by ſnatches, morning or afternoon, as I find myſelf in a cue for it: this makes me unwilling to multiply thoſe engagements which take up a great part of the day; for if I am not allowed liberty to catch at every favourable gale as it riſes, I ſhall make no progreſs in my work, nor can hope to finiſh it before the time comes wherein I can work no more. It was an old obſervation, that art is long but life ſhort; and this may be applied to nobody with more truth than to myſelf, for inſtead of wanting employment for my time, as is the caſe with many people, I want time for my employment: therefore I hope my good friends will indulge me in being parſimonious, in conſideration of my poverty,

and

and permit me to leave the larger conſumptions of it to thoſe who have leſs to do, or better fund of ſtrength and ſpirits to ſupport the expence.

The gentle Reader may expect, that in compliance with general cuſtom, I ſhould beſpeak his favourable attention, by expatiating upon the importance and excellence of my ſubject; but our family having never yet given into the cuſtom, I ſhall not begin it now, but leave him to find them out as well as he can; and only preſent him with the deſign I have aimed at in all my labours: which is none other than to recommend mutual Good-will to mankind, and a hearty Zeal for one another's benefit. I ſuppoſe there is nobody who is not willing to promote his own intereſt, or would be leſs willing to promote thoſe of other people, if it could be ſhewn that he ſerves himſelf moſt effectually by doing his utmoſt to ſerve them. Now it ſeems to me not impoſſible to make it appear, from the contemplation of nature external and internal, together with certain inferences juſtly drawn in order therefrom, that every man's private intereſt ſtands neceſſarily connected

with the general good, ſo that whatever advances or hurts the one, muſt in like manner affect the other: and the dominion of Providence defended in this chapter, is a principal link in the chain employed for that connection.

With reſpect to the particular part preſented in the following ſheets, I ſhall ſay no more than this, that although Preſcience, Fate, and other matters herein contained, are generally eſteemed diſmal and dangerous ſubjects, apt to diſtract the brains of ſuch as have entered deeply into them; and though the natural coldneſs of my conſtitution renders me very ſuſceptible of alarms; yet in the manner wherein I have brought them to lie in my thoughts, I ſee nothing terrifying or gloomy in them, but rather a comfortable proſpect in finding that chance and human frailty, which we muſt acknowledge to have a great influence upon all our proceedings, ſtand under controul of Wiſdom and Goodneſs. If upon the ſcene here exhibited, they ſhall appear to lie in the ſame manner to the Reader, my purpoſe is anſwered: only I beg leave to advertiſe him, that as I found it no eaſy matter

matter to bring them into this train, ſo he muſt expect to find ſome pains and attention requiſite in following it; for we ſhall be unavoidably compelled to ſpin very fine in ſome places, and without gentle and cautious uſage the thread will break in his hands. Therefore he muſt not go to work in a hurry; for diſquiſitions of this ſort are not to be run off like a novel, where one has little elſe to do than to drive on poſt haſte to ſee how it ends; but he muſt take care to digeſt one thing well before he proceeds to another; for here, as in the human body, an error in the firſt concoction is not to be rectified afterwards. Particularly I would recommend to him to ſettle well his ideas of Liberty and Free-will in the ſeveral lights here repreſented, and to fix thoroughly in his mind the diſtinction between the two kinds of Poſſibility before he goes on to things beyond, which without this caution will ſcarce appear clear or intelligible. If what he reads ſhould give him ſcope for further reflection, and put him upon running over the arguments again in his own way, I would wiſh him to dwell as little as poſſible upon

mere abſtractions, but to judge of the abſtract in the concrete: and when he has fixed upon particular inſtances, wherein he conceives either Fate or Freewill to have operated, firſt to examine each of them ſingly, and then compare them together, in order to form his general inferences therefrom.

There are ſome expreſſions, particularly that in the introductory ſection, of riding upon the rays, that will appear myſterious: but this muſt always be the caſe with the middle of a Compoſition, wherein things are alluded to with which the Reader has not yet been made acquainted. Therefore he muſt acknowledge I have acted fairly, by giving him notice in the Title Page, that he was not to expect a Work, but the Fragment of one; for he may chooſe whether he will meddle with ſuch broken wares or no; but if he does condeſcend to deal in them, he muſt not blame me for ſome little inconveniencies unavoidable in a traffic of this ſort.

But thoſe expreſſions he may look on for the preſent as excreſcencies, not interrupting the chain of reaſoning, of which I have

have cut him off a length he may examine by itſelf independantly on the matters alluded to: which whoever will take the trouble to do, ſo as to make himſelf maſter of the argument as here purſued, will be qualified to give me his advice thereupon: and if he ſhould find himſelf inclined to ſay ſome civil things of me, I will tell him the grounds upon which I conceive they might be expected. One of the exceptionable poſitions advanced in former chapters, which perhaps may draw both Divine and Philoſopher upon my back, is this, that things are not laudable in themſelves, but merit commendation or cenſure, according as either would be moſt uſeful; the one being applicable as a ſpur, ſtimulating men to perſevere in what they have done well; the other as a bridle, reſtraining from the repetition of what they had better have let alone. Therefore if my Reader chances to be in the ſame way of thinking, he will give me more or leſs encouragement in proportion as he wiſhes to ſee more of my handy work, or to have any body elſe turn their hand to the like employment.

PREFACE

OF

The ANNOTATOR.

THEY ſay ſimilitude conciliates affection; but then it muſt have ſome diverſity mingled amongſt it; as *Ovid* ſaid of the three Ladies, that they all had one and the ſame ſet of features, and yet not the ſame, ſuch as may be expected among ſiſters. For equal talents turned upon purſuit of the ſame object, are apt to beget a rivalſhip and jealouſy, but ill compatible with perfect friendſhip. Now there is this diſſimilar ſimilitude which wonderfully well adapts me for an attachment to my worthy friend and relation Mr. *Edward Search*. For the *Comments* are an under branch of the *Searches*, having the like family-turn for the uſefully curious; but being unable to ſtrike out any thing of their own, they delight

delight to rummage among other folks works, examining, comparing, digeſting, explaining, illuſtrating, expatiating, and doing any other little office they think may render them more ſerviceable. Some of us indeed, to our ſhame be it ſpoken, have undertaken things above our pitch, nor ſpared even the Bible itſelf; which they have overwhelmed with ſuch a variety of expoſitions, and found ſo many contrary ſenſes in the ſame text, that it is become difficult to ſee any ſenſe at all, through their envelopements. For my part, I never would attempt any thing of this ſort without conſulting my Couſin *Search*, who has dropped a hint, that in his next volume he may poſſibly allow me the liberty, after having prepared ſome inſtructions for my conduct. In ſhort, we ſeem cut out for one another; he pleaſes me, by furniſhing me with matter to ſpend my thoughts upon, and I pleaſe him with the fondneſs I ſhow for his ſpeculations. So we are grown hugely intimate; we communicate every thing, and know one another as well as we do ourſelves; nay, we ſtrive to enter into each others ſentiments more carefully than

perhaps

perhaps moſt people do into their own: for *Search* has obſerved ſomewhere, that there are many latent deſires and imaginations in the human breaſt unknown even to the owner. 'Twas I, that firſt put him upon this publication: for, good Couſin, ſays I, may not it be expedient to cut off a ſample from the loom before you finiſh your piece, in order to ſhow it about amongſt the Mercers for their opinion of the deſign? This ſeems adviſeable for one who works out of the common track, intermingling figures of the moſt oppoſite caſt among one another. Some people have blended jeſt with topics of Religion, in order to turn them into jeſt; others have conveyed precepts of Morality and common Prudence, in fables, figures, and allegories; but few ſince *Plato* have attempted to interſperſe humour and gaiety among cloſe argumentations, metaphyſical refinements, and diſſertations upon the moſt ſerious ſubjects. Humour and Religion are both very delicate things, and though agreeable in themſelves may ſuffer by their commixture, as tea and ſnuff laid in the ſame drawer ſpoil one another's flavour, nor without dexterous

dexterous management can they be ſo joined as that one ſhall not loſe its dignity, nor the other its livelineſs. Now you know we have worked all along by ourſelves, and how much ſoever we may have pleaſed our own fancy, can never know how we ſhall pleaſe others without making the experiment. Troth, Couſin, ſays he, I believe your advice is good. But what would you have me do? I cannot publiſh my work imperfect, the deſign being connected in its ſeveral parts; ſome of which ſeparated from the reſt might be liable to miſconſtruction, and make me thought aiming at concluſions furtheſt in the world from my intention. I was ſenſible of this, ſays I, therefore never preſſed you before. But methinks the chapter you have juſt now finiſhed, contains an entire pattern that may be ſhown without diſguſting the eye for want of other figures to join with it. Perhaps ſo, ſays he. But there are many alluſions to former chapters, which without being let into the matters alluded to, muſt appear unintelligible and myſterious. Oh! ſays I, you don't conſider how fond the world is of myſteries. They

are never ſo well pleaſed as with blanks, initial letters, and innuendos, which it may be have no meaning, and therefore cannot poſſibly be underſtood. True, ſays he; yet ſtill they love to have a chink to peep at the myſtery, though not enough to unveil it. Why, is it impoſſible, ſays I, to have a few chinks opened ſome how or other by proper Annotations where neceſſary? He ſaw my drift, and replied, I am too earneſt in running off my principal work to do any ſuch thing. You know I begun late in the day, having employed the former part of my life in laying in a ſtock of materials, and bringing my thoughts into ſome regular train. You have ſometimes compared me to the ſilk-worm, that devours voraciouſly for a while, and then applies wholly to the buſineſs of ſpinning herſelf out. My day is far ſpent, and I have a long web to ſpin, which I fear I ſhall ſcarce be able to compleat before night; eſpecially as there are ſome of my brother worms, who being no ſpinſters themſelves, delight perpetually to crawl over me and interrupt my work: ſo I muſt not ſtop to reviſe, remark, or explain.

explain. But if you have a mind to undertake the job, I ſhall take it kindly. You know the particulars alluded to, as well as I myſelf; and have leave to open the chinks as wide as you judge proper. With all my heart, ſays I. But that I may not exceed my commiſſion, let me know the extent of it. As you ſay you run off your work without reviſing, I may chance to find ſomething obſcure or liable to be miſunderſtood, or omitted in an argument that might have been purſued further; may I ſupply what you ſeem to have forgot? By all means, ſays he. And you will probably find room enough for this ſubſtituting office: for the ſtate of my brain correſponds but too much with that of the weather: ſo where you perceive the effect of eaſtern chills, you may do me good ſervice, by ſuggeſting what I ſhould have done had the air been milder. We have lived long enough together in intimacy for you to know all my thoughts, and may uſe your diſcretion upon them. Have a care, ſays I, what you do. It may be dangerous to give me an unreſerved liberty with all your thoughts. What if I ſhould happen

happen to touch upon ſome of the peculiarities in them? You have ſo long accuſtomed me to a habit of Sincerity and Plain-dealing, I ſhall not know how to palliate or cover them over with plauſible colourings. No matter for that, ſays he, I deſire no colourings. I know you are an honeſt fellow, and will not do me an injury by miſrepreſenting me. Only take care not to throw out what might do hurt to ſqueamiſh palates. If you do not offend other people, you cannot offend me.

So having obtained full permiſſion, I went to work upon a lining for his brocade; which he being pleaſed to ſay was not unſuitable to the pattern he had cut off, we reſolved to puſh them both out upon the ſhop-window: wholly uncertain how they might take with the paſſengers, any further than as it will probably be ſaid, They are an Original.

CUTHBERT COMMENT.

From my Apartment in *Search-Hall*, 4th *October*, 1762.

ERRATA

Pag. 40. l. 19. *for* forborne *read* forborn
102. l. 13. *for* gout to, which *read* gout, to which
124. l. 20. *for* it is my option, and I know *read* it is in my option, and know
174. l. 15. *for* proceedings *read* proceeding
188. l. 9. *for* reſiſtable *read* reſiſtible
265. l. 22. *for* volocity *read* velocity
ult. l. ult. *for* ſerve *read* ſervice

CHAP. XXIV.[a]

FREEWILL, FOREKNOWLEDGE, and FATE.

SECT. I.

BEHOLD us now arrived at the moſt intricate part of our journey, an impracticable wilderneſs, puzzled with mazes, and perplext with errors, where many mighty have fallen, and many ſagacious loſt their way; for ſhadows, clouds and darkneſs cover it; or what flaſhes of light break out from time to time, preſent the image of truth on oppoſite ſides, the winding paths lead round the diſappointed travel- Tranſition.

B

[a] The Reader is not to conclude from the high number of this chapter, that the Author has huge piles of his labours in ſtore: for there is but one more chapter ſo long as this, and many of them will run off in ſeven or eight pages.

traveller to the ſpot from whence he ſet out, or involve him in difficulties wherein neither Proteſtant nor Papiſt, neither Divine nor Philoſopher has yet found an opening, and which the ſacred muſe of *Milton* pronounced inſuperable, even by the Devil himſelf.

In this dangerous road we may be allowed with better reaſon than the Poets, to call in ſome ſuperior power to our aid; but what Muſe, what Spirit, what God ſhall we invoke? For here are no private tranſactions unſeen by mortal eye, no dreams of *Rheſus* broken off by the ſleep of death, no ſecrets of nature lying beyond our reach to be diſcovered: we need not dive into the bowels of the earth, nor aſcend to mix among the dances of the planets, nor diſſect the human frame to find all the curious threads of its organization. But our buſineſs lies with the common actions of life, familiar to every one's and every day's experience: we want only to know, whether a man may act freely who makes his choice upon motives ſuggeſted by external objects, whether

ther he may know beforehand what his neighbour will do, or offer inducements which will infallibly prevail on him to one particular manner of behaviour, without infringing upon his liberty. Queſtions that one would think could ſcarce admit of a diſpute; nor do they with common underſtandings, until men of uncommon refinements have, by their abſtractions, ſpun them into a ſenſe not naturally belonging to them, and introduced a confuſion into their ideas, by an inaccuracy of language. Therefore upon this ſubject I conceive we ſhall have more to do with words than with things, nor find ſo much difficulty in aſcertaining the facts to be taken under conſideration, as the proper import of the expreſſions employed in ſpeaking of them.

Come then thou ſolemn power Philology, pioneer of the abſtruſe Sciences, to prepare the way for their paſſage, enwrap me in thy cloſe-bodied leathern jacket, that I may creep through the brakes and brambles of equivocation without their catching hold

of me; lend me thy needle-pointed pencil, that I may trace out the hair-breadth differences of language; aſſiſt me with thy microſcope to diſcern the minute changes of ideas paſſing to and fro among the ſame words, as they change their places in different phraſes.

If any one will follow me while I travel under thy guidance, let him look for other-guiſed entertainment than when beſtriding Pegaſus [a] we bounded along the rapid rays of ſolar or ſtellar light, to viſit the *Athenian* [b] and *Samian* [c] Sages, to behold the

[a] The Author ſome time ago was favoured with a Viſion, wherein he was rapt in extacy out of his body, and tranſported to the intermediate ſtate lying between death, and the final conſummation of all things; where he ſaw ſurprizing things not yet lawful to be uttered. Pegaſus is only a figurative term to expreſs the flights of imagination: for the Author did not ride upon a flying horſe, but was dragged along by one of the old inhabitants, who was expert in walking upon ſuch moveable ground as the rays of light.

[b] *Plato* and *Socrates*, with whom the Author converſed in his excurſion.

[c] *Pythagoras*, from whom he received a very ſcientific lecture, containing many curious matters, partly orthodox, and partly heretical.

the wonders of the vehicular ſtate [d], and boundleſs glories of the mundane ſoul [e].

For thou, Goddeſs, conſorteſt not with the Muſes nor the Genii, the flights of imagination affright thee: figure and ornament are thy abhorrence, for they blend together in wanton aſſemblages thoſe ideas which thou art moſt ſollicitous to keep aſunder: familiar example [f] alone, of all the flowery train, thou admitteſt to ſhed his luſtre upon the print of thy mincing

[d] Inhabited by *Woolaſton*'s vehicles, that is, departed ſouls, carrying with them an inner tunicle, or fine organization of corporeal ſubſtance, inconceivably ſmall, but infinitely more active and lithſome than our groſs bodies.

[e] A created Being, of unlimited power, underſtanding and excellence, commenſurate with the univerſe, whereinto the ſpirits of men are abſorbed on their departure from the vehicular ſtate.

[f] This ſprightly Gentleman has proved very ſerviceable to our Author, who is fond of his company as often as he can get it; as will appear by the ſequel: for he has a marvellous knack at opening the paſſages through briars, rendering abſtractions viſible, and fixing them upon the memory. It is recommended to all dealers in profound ſpeculations to take his aſſiſtance; for he is a younger ſon of Experience, employed in diſpenſing his father's ſtores upon particular occaſions as wanted.

feet, and render the marks of them more eaſily diſcernible to the ſtraining eye. But induſtry, and ſcrupulous exactneſs, are thy conſtant companions; labour and vigilance thy delight, thorns and briars the favourite plants of thy garden. Whoever undertakes to accompany thee there muſt prepare himſelf for toil and attention; he muſt obſerve the path exactly in which thou leadeſt him, mark all the outlets on either hand, paſs and repaſs the whole length again and again before he ventures into another turning, that he may fix ſo perfect an idea of it upon his memory, as never to miſtake another ſimilar alley for the ſame.

But ſay, Goddeſs, by what avenue ſhall we enter the wilderneſs? Does not thy methodical prudence direct, that upon every queſtion we ſhould firſt know preciſely the terms concerning which the queſtion is propoſed? Where then can we better begin an enquiry into the Freedom of Action, than by aſcertaining the proper import of Freedom?

2. Liberty,

§. 2. Liberty, ſays Mr. *Locke*, is a power, and ſo is will; therefore they cannot be predicated of one another, for it would be abſurd to affirm of a power that it has a power. But with ſubmiſſion to the authority of ſo great a Maſter, I conceive Liberty a more complex term than he has made it, and though it includes an idea of power, it contains other ideas beſide. And as I apprehend it to be a negative term, implying no more than a denial of reſtraint and force; for when we ſay a man is free, we mean nothing elſe than that there is no hindrance againſt his doing or forbearing what he has a mind; therefore it will be expedient to conſider how we come by the notion of Reſtraint or Force. Liberty.

We find ourſelves poſſeſſed of ſeveral powers of action, we can walk, or ſpeak, or think, or can let them alone: ſometimes diſeaſes or other accidents deprive us of our powers, and then we can no longer perform the functions of them; but at other times, though we remain poſſeſſed of our powers entire, yet we cannot exert

them, by reaſon of ſomething ſtronger counteracting them. Thus a man in the ſtocks has not loſt his power of walking, the vigour of his muſcles is not abated, nor is he leſs able to bear the fatigue of a journey on foot than he was before; nevertheleſs, he cannot walk at all, becauſe the cloſeneſs of the wood reſiſts the motion of his legs, therefore he is under a reſtraint which hinders him from uſing the power nature has given him. So if he be puſhed along by another ſtronger than himſelf, he muſt move forward whether he will or no, not that he has loſt the natural command of his limbs to put them in motion or keep them at reſt; but becauſe he is under a force greater than he can reſiſt.

Thus Reſtraint is a compariſon between ſome power and an impediment preventing it from performing its proper function, as Force is the like compariſon between the power of forbearance, and ſome external impulſe which renders action neceſſary, but forbearance impracticable; and Liberty denotes the abſence of the other two; for when

when we pronounce a man free, we underſtand thereby that there is nothing either impelling him to do what he would not, or reſtraining him from doing what he would. So that all three include the idea of Power, Reſtraint and Force, as well as Liberty, nor can either of them ſubſiſt where there is none; for the bars of a priſon are no reſtraint to a paralytic, nor will you give him liberty by unlocking them, neither can you force a man to fly, or a horſe to ſpeak.

We may obſerve further, that Liberty is ſo far from being the ſame thing with Power, that it may be reſtored by the loſs, and leſſened by the acceſſion of it. Were an act of parliament made to prohibit me from going out of *London* for a twelvemonth, I ſhould think it a grievous reſtraint upon my liberty; but ſhould I be rendered unable to ſtir abroad by gout or palſy, or ſome other complaint which I could not hope to get rid of in the time, the reſtriction would no longer be ſuch to me, and I ſhould remain as much at liberty, as if the ſtatute had

had never been made[a]. On the other hand our cloaths are made to fit our bodies, ſo that we can move all our limbs freely, notwithſtanding the many ligatures and coverings wherewith we are enveloped; but ſhould it pleaſe God to cauſe a pair of wings to ſprout out from our ſides, we ſhould find our cloaths a troubleſome reſtraint upon us,

[a] If it be ſaid the law extends to every body without exception, ſo that women and children are bound by the game acts, as well as the unqualified ſportſman. I ſhall obſerve, that it is proper the law ſhould ſpeak in general terms, becauſe it would be troubleſome to diſtinguiſh conſtantly between the able, and the unable; and entirely needleſs, the reſtraint being barely nominal with reſpect to the latter. And ſo it would appear, if a law were to be made againſt what no man can do. As ready as we are to cavil at the miniſters, if one of them were to procure an act to paſs, laying a grievous penalty upon any who ſhould fly about in the air; however we might ſuſpect his intellects, we ſhould never ſuſpect his having deſigns upon our liberty, nor grumble at the reſtriction, which we ſhould ſee was not a real one. Indeed I have heard the Teſt Act complained of as a hardſhip, by ſuch as had no chance of ever riſing to preferment; but this is, becauſe they think it diſagreeable to have a mark of diſtinction ſet upon them: and ſo is every thing diſagreeable that ſhows a diſlike, although we ſuſtain no immediate damage by it.

us, and we muſt ſend for our taylors to cut ſlits in them for letting out the wings, in order to reſtore us that liberty we had loſt by the ſuperaddition of a new power.

Hence we ſee that liberty is ſo far from being inapplicable to power, that it is properly applicable to nothing elſe; nor is it an abſurd queſtion to aſk, whether a power be free, for it implies no more than to enquire how ſuch power ſtands circumſtanced with regard to any force or impediment which might compell or obſtruct the exertion of it. And when we apply ſuch queſtions to the agent, they bear a reference always to ſome power he poſſeſſes, therefore a man may be free and reſtrained at the ſame time with reſpect to different powers of action; for he that is locked faſt in a room may be free to think or ſpeak, though he is not to go abroad; but a power to do ſome particular act cannot be free while conſtrained, nor the contrary.

Indeed there are degrees of freedom, not incompatible with a partial reſtraint, but rather implying it, as when we find ſome impediment

impediment obſtructing us, though not ſo great as that we cannot ſurmount it; for a man with heavy jack-boots on can ſtill walk, though not ſo freely and alertly as in a neat pair of ſhoes: ſuch obſtacles do not debar us the uſe of our powers, but render it difficult and laborious, or limit them in compaſs.

§. 3. Let us now caſt back our eye upon the path we have trod, in order to diſcover what equivocal outlets there may be to miſlead the unwary traveller. We get our idea of power, ſays Mr. *Locke*, from the changes we ſee made in ſubſtances by one another: therefore the word Power originally and properly denotes a quality or property in ſomething to cauſe thoſe changes, and is ſynonimous with ability, and we have hitherto uſed it in that ſenſe. But it often carries a larger ſignification, comprehending other circumſtances beſides ability; ſo that according to the various lights wherein we place it, a man may have power when he has it not; that is, he may

may have it in one ſenſe while he wants it in another.

Suppoſe a perſon of full health and vigour bound down in his bed by a multitude of threads wound all over him; another ſeeing him lie motionleſs, but not knowing the occaſion, fancies him ſtruck with ſome ſudden diſtemper that has taken away the uſe of his limbs; he laments his unhappy condition, in being at once deprived of all his powers of action: muſt not we pronounce this complainant miſtaken, for that the man has loſt none of his powers, but they all remain entire as ever, though he cannot uſe them until the ſtrings that tie him down be looſened? If a ſecond perſon comes into the room who takes the caſe differently, aſcribing the man's inactivity to a fit of lazineſs with which he upbraids him, ſhall we not plead in his excuſe, that it is no fault of his that he does not riſe, for that the bandages hold him down ſo tight, he has no power to ſtir either hand or foot?

Thus

Thus we ſee that power may be truly affirmed or denied in the ſame inſtance, according to the manner wherein the queſtion is propoſed, or thoughts of the perſon propoſing it; and a man may have ability ſufficient for performing a work, which yet he is not able to do, by reaſon of ſome obſtacle, want of ſome inſtrument or material, or other circumſtance ſtanding in the way.

We may preſume Mr. *Locke* underſtood Power in this extenſive latitude, when he made it the ſame with Liberty; for where he obſerves that a man on the ſouth ſide of a priſon has power to walk northwards but not ſouthwards, this were not true, if ſpoken of natural ability; for the ſame vigour of limbs which might carry him one way, would ſuffice to carry him any other; therefore if he want power to walk ſouthwards becauſe the walls of the priſon obſtruct his paſſage, the term muſt be ſo conſtrued as to include Liberty; and in this ſenſe it would indeed be as abſurd to aſk, whether

whether a Power be free, as whether Blueneſs be blue, or Hardneſs hard.

§. 4. We may remark further, that Knowledge is often confounded with Power; for ideal cauſes[a] being requiſite to direct us in the choice of proper actions, we can no more proceed without them than we can without ability. If I have a paper in my cuſtody which I have miſlaid, upon being urged

[a] The Author has a chapter upon theſe, and makes them a ſpecies of ideas, as he does motives, or final cauſes, an under ſpecies of them. The diſtinction between theſe three may be explained by the following inſtance. A man walking in the fields may ſee birds flying, or cattle grazing, which ſtrike ideas upon him, but ſuch as are no cauſes of any thing he does; for he would walk in the ſame manner if they did not appear. The ſight of his path, together with the windings and turnings of it, and his remembrance or information of the right way, where it parts into two, are ideal cauſes without which he could not proceed; for if he had them not, he might ſtumble againſt a ſtone, or wander out of the way. But health, buſineſs, or diverſion, are final cauſes; becauſe without theſe, or ſome other purpoſe in view, he would not walk at all. Thus ideal cauſes are that part of our knowledge, which does not inſtigate us to action, but directs us how to ſhape it.

urged to produce it inſtantly, I ſhall be apt to alledge that it is out of my power ſo to do, not becauſe I have not the key of the drawer where it lies, nor ſtrength in my fingers to take it out as well as any other paper, but becauſe I know not where to look for it. So if a countryman wants to ſpeak with a perſon living at the further end of the town, he may ſay it is out of his power to find the houſe; not that he wants pliancy in his joints to carry him through all the turnings leading thither as well as any citizen, but becauſe he ſhould loſe his way for want of knowing the right. But this idea does not enter into diſputes concerning freedom, for ignorance is eſteemed a defect of power rather than an abridgement of liberty.

It has been ſhewn in Chap. II. that what we generally call an Action [b], is not one, but a ſeries of many actions; and when we go about to do a thing, we proceed to

[b] And it is expedient for common uſe that we ſhould call it ſo; for were we to enumerate all the minute motions we make upon every occaſion, we ſhould

to the accompliſhment of it by ſeveral intermediate ſteps, each whereof requires a particular exertion of power to perform it. Now if there ſtand an impediment any where in the way, we cannot do the thing propoſed; nevertheleſs we remain ſtill at liberty to take the ſteps lying on this ſide the impediment, and at all events can uſe our endeavours, how ineffectual ſoever they may prove. Thus if a man be hindered from going to *London* by floods out in the road, he may yet go up to the edge of the flood without obſtacle: if he be locked into a room, he may puſh againſt the door; and if his fingers be bound round with a packthread, he may try to expand them, being at full liberty to give his muſcles the inflation proper for ſpreading them open.

It is obſervable likewiſe, that reſtraint is often confounded with impotence, nor can we eaſily avoid doing ſo; for reſtraint

ſhould make no diſpatch in our converſations with one another. But when we go to examine the nature of the mind, and ſcrutinize her manner of proceeding, we ſhall often find it neceſſary to analyze action into its conſtituent parts.

being a compariſon between our powers and any thing that might obſtruct their exerciſe, may ceaſe upon their increaſe, or may be generated by a diminution of our powers, rendering that an obſtacle to our motions which was none before. Thus *Sampſon*, after being ſhorn of his ſtrength, was brought under confinement by the ſame cords which were no infringement of his liberty aforetime, and if they had remained on him until his hair had grown again, he would have been reſtored to liberty by the return of his ſtrength, without any alteration in the ſtrength of the bandage.

Therefore we pronounce upon the ſame caſe, as being a defect of power or of liberty, according to the light wherein we place it: the laws prohibiting the alienation of church lands, are called ſometimes diſabling, and ſometimes reſtraining ſtatutes; and we ſpeak indifferently of a man being diſabled to go abroad or confined at home by a diſtemper. But in ſtrictneſs, the beginning of a fever works no diſability, for

for there is generally then an unuſual ſtrength and flow of ſpirits, ſo that the patient might do as he did at other times, if it were not for the neceſſary regard to his health, which is a bar againſt his ſtirring out of the houſe; whereas a palſy does not properly confine, for air and exerciſe might be wholeſome, and nothing hinders you from going abroad, but you are not able, the uſe of your limbs being ſuſpended by the diſtemper.

Mr. *Locke* ſays, that active power belongs only to ſpirit: however this be, we certainly conceive it, and in our common diſcourſes ſpeak of it as reſiding in things inanimate; therefore we apply the terms Force and Reſtraint when we perceive them acting or moving in a manner different to that we ſhould expect from their natural properties, as we do Liberty, when nothing hinders their operations: we talk of a free air, a pendulum ſwinging, or a river running freely, where there is no obſtruction againſt their motions; of water being forced up-

wards by an engine, or a ſtream confined within its channel, by raiſing the banks.

Hence it appears, that the force of inertneſs aſcribed by Naturaliſts to matter, and the force of impulſe cauſing its changes of ſtate from motion or reſt to the contrary, does not carry preciſely the ſame ſignification with force in vulgar language; for 'tis the impulſe of gravitation, together with its own inertneſs, or perſeverance in a motion once received, that makes a torrent ruſh violently into the ſea; yet every common man apprehends water to run downwards of itſelf, nor ever eſteems it under a force, unleſs when he ſees it driven upwards by ſome other power, nor under reſtraint, unleſs when ſomething obſtructs the courſe it would naturally take. And though we talk frequently of the force of a torrent, we do not underſtand thereby any force the water itſelf lies under, but that we ſuppoſe it able to put upon whatever may happen to ſtand in its way.

Whoever will examine the language of mankind, may find that we apply expreſ-

ſions

ſions to bodies which belong properly to our own manner of proceeding; and how well ſoever we know the contrary, ſpeak of them as voluntary agents, exerciſing powers of their own: thus it is ſaid the wind bloweth where it liſteth, and we conceive water as having a fluidity or perpetual motion among its particles, unleſs bound up by a piercing froſt.

Nor do the learned abſtain from the like catachreſis, when they talk of the tendencies and nitencies, the *conatus recedendi* of bodies, the ſpontaneous or automatic motions of clock-work, or the laws [c] of matter; and even when they abſtract from the ſecondary properties reſulting from compoſition, they ſeem to conceive reſt as the natural ſtate and choice of body which it exerts its power to preſerve itſelf in, as one may gather from their calling the *momentum* or quantity of motion in any body a force, which conveys an idea ſimilar to

[c] For in ſtrictneſs, law is applicable only to intelligent agents, with-held from uſing their powers by the fear of puniſhment, or obligation to authority.

that of a man carried along againſt his inclination by ſome impulſe he ſtrives in vain to reſiſt.

§. 5. I take notice of theſe niceties, not ſo much for any benefit they may be of towards determining the preſent queſtion, as for a caution to beware of letting ſuch variations of language lead us aſtray: for the proper and genuine ſignification of freedom being the abſence of all obſtruction which might thwart us in the exerciſe of any power we poſſeſs, we are free when upon employing our power it will take effect; but under reſtraint, when ſomething impedes us in the exerciſe of our power, ſo as that although we ſhould exert it, the proper conſequence of ſuch exertion would not follow.

Thus a man is at liberty to walk, if upon uſing his legs they will carry him to the place he purpoſes; but if there ſtand any wall or bar in the way, ſo that with his utmoſt endeavours he cannot move forwards, then he is not at liberty. And

ſo

ſo in all actions we have ability to perform, if they would not enſue upon our efforts, it muſt be owing to ſome hindrance which cramps and prevents them from taking effect.

From hence it appears, that Freedom relates to the event of our endeavours, not to the cauſes of them; for whether any or no inducement prevails on me to walk, I am equally free, provided nothing hinders me from walking, if I ſtand ſo inclined; for Liberty does not depend on any thing prior to the exerciſe of my power, but upon what would or would not ſtand in the way after having exerted it, and therefore is not inconſiſtent with any antecedent cauſes or diſpoſition of Providence influencing me to walk; for how much ſoever they may impell me to go out of the room, I am not at liberty to do it while the door is locked, and when the door is opened I am ſet at liberty, how much ſoever they may with-hold me from uſing it.

But it will be ſaid, all this may be very true, and yet affects not the caſe under

conſideration, as it relates only to freedom of action, concerning which there is no controverſy, not to freedom of will: for no *Arminian* will doubt a man's being debarred of his Liberty by ſhutting him up in a goal; nor will the moſt rigid *Calviniſt* deny, that upon being let looſe he is at liberty to go which way he pleaſes. So the diſpute turns, not upon our freedom to do as we will, but upon our freedom to chooſe out of ſeveral actions in our power: and both ſeem to agree, that whatever act is contained in the plan of Providence muſt be performed, nor can we will the contrary if we would.

Various Wills.

§. 6. Before we enter upon the diſcuſſion of this queſtion, it will be neceſſary to underſtand ourſelves in the propoſing it; for men ſeem to me not always very clear in their idea of the term Will, as it ſtands in either branch of the ſentence.

We learn, upon Mr. *Locke*'s authority, that we are capable of no more than one determination of the Will at once, and

whoever obſerves the motions of the human mind will find her volitions tranſient and momentary; ſhe varies her action perpetually, willing this inſtant what ſhe rejects the next; and if ſhe perſeveres for a time in one purpoſe, it is by a train of numerically diſtinct, tho' ſimilar and correſpondent volitions: therefore to aſk, whether we can will this preſent inſtant, if we will this preſent inſtant, would be an idle and trifling queſtion; it muſt indeed be anſwered in the affirmative, and ſo muſt every other of the like ſort; for I can walk if I walk, ride if I ride, or do any thing elſe you can name, if I do it; and ſuch hypothetical affirmations may be true of things which categorically propoſed were abſolutely impoſſible; for it is as true, that I can lift the houſe if I lift it, or jump over the moon if I jump over it, as that I can take up a pin if I take it up: ſuch propoſitions are merely identical, making a ſhew of ſomething profound, but adding nothing to our information.

Therefore

Therefore the queſtion, to mean any thing, muſt relate to different Times or different Wills, and the drift of it be to enquire either, whether by willing a thing now I can cauſe myſelf to will it by and by; or whether if I happen to will oppoſite things at the ſame time, as to buy a coſtly trinket and to ſave my money, I can by one Will controul the other, or by a third Will chooſe which of the two ſhall have the guidance of my conduct.

To the firſt of theſe enquiries, one cannot give a direct anſwer, it being notorious by every day's experience, that we do determine upon what we will do beforehand, and many times do it accordingly, but at other times do it not, and that upon two accounts; either becauſe we have changed our mind, or becauſe though we continue in the ſame, we find ſome deſire, or terror, or difficulty riſe upon us too ſtrong for our reſolution; but changes of mind create no doubts concerning liberty; for nobody imagines that our reſolving upon a thing lays us under a neceſſity of performing it, although

although good reaſons ſhould occur to the contrary, or our judgement ſhould alter; nor will deny, that how ſtrongly ſoever I have determined to leave *London* ſeven years hence, I may remain perfectly free all the while to determine otherwiſe whenever I think proper.

Which by the way ſhews Liberty not incongruous with prior cauſes; for if I do ſomething becauſe I had reſolved upon it beforehand, and this we practiſe every day of our lives, the volition whereby I perform it muſt be acknowledged an effect of my former determination, nevertheleſs will be counted a free act in every body's eſtimation, provided nothing hinders but that I might omit it; therefore if my firſt determination were contained within the plan of Providence, the performance may make a part of that plan without infringement of my liberty; for even ſuppoſing me influenced to reſolve by ſome irreſiſtible grace, or ſupernatural impulſe, though I was not free in making, I am yet free in keeping the reſolution, nor does there need any

more than to keep off all ſuggeſtions which might alter my judgement, or temptations which might overpower it, and I ſhall execute what was reſolved on by virtue of the freedom remaining within me.

But when we change our conduct without changing our mind, and do not proſecute what we have in our intention, by reaſon of ſome appetite drawing the contrary way, then diſputes and difficulties ariſe; becauſe we conceive our Will ſtill exerting itſelf, but prevented from taking effect by a ſuperior force or impediment counter-acting it, which preſents the genuine idea of a want of Liberty.

Thus this queſtion, whether by our preſent Will we may determine what we ſhall will at ſome future time, becomes reduced into that other, whether one Will may controul or confine another coexiſtent Will.

§. 7. And no wonder we find perplexities in examining metaphyſically a queſtion, the terms whereof have no place in the metaphyſical vocabulary; for there is a philo-

philoſophical, and there is a vulgar language, and if ſtudious men will mingle their abſtractions among vulgar ideas, they muſt unavoidably bewilder themſelves in mazes and darkneſs.

The notion of a diverſity of Wills is unknown to him that carefully ſtudies the motions of the human mind, for her acts are inſtantaneous and tranſitory; nor can ſhe perform any more than one at the ſame time: we have various powers of action, and they all lie under the command of the mind to turn them upon one particular object; her giving them that turn is properly volition, and it is as abſurd to imagine ſhe ſhould exert oppoſite volitions together, as that the wind ſhould blow eaſt and weſt.

We may be reſtrained in the uſe of our powers, becauſe their operation paſſes through ſeveral ſtages; we work upon certain unknown nerves, they inflate the muſcles, the muſcles pull the tendons, the tendons move the limbs, and if there be an obſtruction any where, we have not liberty to perform the action intended, how much

much ſoever we may endeavour it; but the acts of the mind upon the firſt corporeal fibre receiving her impulſe are immediate, ſo there is no room for any impediment to interfere in ſtopping their progreſs: we may indeed imagine her to loſe her power by the fibre becoming incapable, or being removed out of her reach; but we have ſeen that when power is gone, there is no place either for Liberty or Reſtraint.

Nor let it be aſked, whether the mind be free to determine her own acts; for this implies, that one volition is the conſequence of another, and ſo it may be remotely; but we have ſhown in a former place, that the mind never acts upon herſelf, unleſs by the mediation of motives; for there is no one action of our lives which we do not enter upon through ſome motive of judgement or inclination, or preſent fancy; and even if we had an elective power beſides our active, how much ſoever that might determine the latter, it muſt itſelf

itſelf be determined by ſome ſatisfaction apprehended in the choice [a].

But the ſuggeſtion of motives to our thoughts is as much an action, as the moving of our limbs, and if any thing obſtructs their riſing, notwithſtanding our endeavours to call them up, we may be free or reſtrained with reſpect to that action; but in reſpect to our firſt endeavours, we are no more capable of either, in one caſe than the other [b].

There-

[a] There is a long chapter upon this head, wherein it is endeavoured to overthrow the doctrine of a Free-will of indifference, and to ſhew, in confirmation of what Mr. *Locke* had advanced before, that the expectation of preſent ſatisfaction, or eſcape of preſent uneaſineſs, is the thing that determines the Will in her every motion; that remote good never moves her, unleſs by the ſatisfaction taken in making advances towards it; and that when we do wrong, we are miſled by preſent gratification appearing more ſatisfactory than a greater diſtant good.

[b] It having been ſhown in a former place, that the mind never acts upon herſelf, unleſs by mediation of ſome material organ employed to raiſe ideas of reflection before her; which is an action as much as holding up a paper to exhibit the writing thereon to our ſight. Now the mind cannot be reſtrained from touching

Therefore we may agree with Mr. *Locke* in pronouncing Liberty as little applicable to Volition, taken in the philoſophical ſenſe, as Squareneſs is to Virtue, or Swiftneſs to Sleep.

§. 8. But if we liſten to the common diſcourſes of mankind, we ſhall find them ſpeaking of ſeveral Wills, ſeveral agents in the ſame perſon reſiſting, counteracting, overpowering and controuling one another: hence the ſo uſual expreſſions of the ſpiritual and carnal Wills, of the man and of the beaſt, of ſelf-will and reaſon, of denying our Wills, ſubduing our paſſions, or being enſlaved by them, of acting unwillingly or againſt our will, and the like: all which take riſe from a metonyme of the cauſe for

touching the organ, though the latter may be hindered by ſome obſtacle from anſwering the touch. Thus if I am prevented from thinking, either by the fumes of indigeſtion, or the noiſe of people gabbling about my ears, yet nothing prevents me from trying, which is all the mind has to do; but in one caſe the organs are rendered unfit to perform their office; and in the other, the ideas they caſt up are obſcured by thoſe thrown in forcibly by the ſenſes.

the

the effect, for our actions being conſtantly determined either by the deciſions of our judgement, or ſollicitations of our deſires, we miſtake them for the Will itſelf: nor is it a little confirmation of the Will being actuated by motives, to find them ſo intimately connected therewith that a common eye cannot diſtinguiſh them apart.

When in our ſober moods we deliberate and afterwards fix upon our meaſures of conduct; we look upon ſuch determination as our Will, which we conceive not a tranſient act, but an abiding power, exerting itſelf from time to time as opportunities offer, until either the deſign be compleated, or freſh reaſons prevail on us to alter it.

But it often happens, that ſome inordinate paſſion or inveterate habit comes athwart our way, and puts us by from the proſecution of our deſign, without making us change it: this we likewiſe regard as our Will, being ſenſible that what we do by its inſtigation is ſtill our own act, and becauſe we find the ſame deſire prompting

us at different times, we apprehend this too a permanent power lying in us, ready to be exerted upon the proper objects preſenting. Thus we get the idea of two Wills oppoſing, impeding, reſtraining, and maſtering one another.

Sometimes there enſues a conteſt between them, the mind hovering uncertain for a while, until at laſt ſhe ſettles on either ſide: hence comes the idea of a third Will, determining between the other two; and I believe this gave riſe to the notion of an elective, beſides our active power.

But theſe ſtruggles are owing to the fluctuations of ſtrength in our motives, and the victory to ſome one of them catching the idea of Satisfaction away from the reſt: for 'tis well known, that motives as well of reaſon as paſſion, do not always appear in equal colours, nor preſs with equal force, but urge vehemently or feebly by turns, with frequent and ſudden variations: and we may perceive the like wavering in our cooleſt deliberations between two meaſures

of conduct or two diverſions, wherein the mind cannot be ſuſpected of giving a preference, being diſpoſed all along to follow whichever ſhall be found the beſt or moſt entertaining; but both appear ſuch alternately, until at laſt the ballance of judgement or fancy ſettles without intervention of the Will to caſt it either way.

§. 9. Nevertheleſs, men cannot be put out of their accuſtomed manner of talking and thinking, therefore in compliance with their conceptions, let us ſuppoſe a diverſity of Wills, that thoſe Wills exert permanent acts, laſting for hours and days without intermiſſion, and that we may will at one time, what we ſhall will at another. In this light there is certainly room for applying reſtraint and freedom to the Will; for its operations being now conceived paſſing through a length of time before they take effect, may be obſtructed, or turned aſide in their paſſage by ſomething elſe: ſo if I do in the afternoon what I had determined in the morning to forbear, my former Will

ſtill continuing the ſame, I am under a force, and the Will I have at preſent is a different Will from that remaining with me from the morning's determination, and counteracts it.

But it being obvious that we can exert our power only one way at a time, we are apt to entertain a contradictory notion that, while we have a diverſity of Wills within us, one of them only is our own, and eſteem each of them ſuch in turn according as we chance to be in the humour. Sometimes it is the will of inclination, and muſt be ſo taken in all expreſſions relating to ſelf-denial, to curbing our Wills, or to things we do unwillingly, or againſt our will, that is, againſt our liking: but more commonly we underſtand the determination of our judgement to be our Will, becauſe there are none of us without this Will, for I ſuppoſe nobody ever refuſes to do what his preſent judgement repreſents as beſt, provided it give him no trouble in the performance, nor thwart any inclination, or fancy whatever, therefore this is a Will

always

always ſubſiſting in us, though not always taking effect.

As to the third Will, that of Election, this takes place only occaſionally, when there is a conteſt between the other two: for as nobody ever chooſes to act againſt his judgement without ſome inclination drawing him, or uneaſineſs driving him the other way; ſo likewiſe I imagine nobody ever chooſes to abſtain from doing what he likes, when he ſees no reaſon in the world why he ſhould forbear; when Reaſon and Inclination urge the ſame way, or one alone ſollicits, the other remaining totally ſilent, which frequently happens, there is but one object preſented to the mind, who in that caſe has no room to make any choice or election at all.

Therefore the will of Judgment or Reſolution, in common propriety of language, is to be eſteemed our Will, our freedom depending upon the preſence, or abſence of any impediment which might prevent that from directing our motions: and ſo St. *Paul* underſtood it, where he repreſents

the carnal man as omitting to do the things he would, and doing the things he would not, which he juſtly ſtiles, a wretched bondage: nor can that glorious liberty of the Sons of God, which we are exhorted to aſſert, be better expounded than by an exemption from all inordinate deſires and temptations, ſo that we may perform whatever our reaſon and duty recommends with eaſe and readineſs.

§. 10. But there is a reſtraint which our judgement lays upon itſelf, when an action occurs we judge eligible regarded alone, but cannot be done without omitting ſomething elſe we judge more expedient, we think ourſelves not at liberty to do it. Thus if I am aſked to do ſome little good office for a friend, when ſome buſineſs of importance calls me another way, I ſhall excuſe myſelf by ſaying, I would gladly oblige him if I were not under a neceſſity of attending to my buſineſs.

It is this oppoſition of things eligible to the judgement, if conſidered apart, that gives

gives birth to thoſe we have called Motives of Neceſſity[a], to Obligation, to Duty, the command of a Superior, the regard for our Health, our Preſervation, the avoidance of Miſchief, or Damage; all which compel us many times to act otherwiſe than we wiſh, or than our judgement would chooſe, if theſe bars did not ſtand in the way: but this kind of neceſſity is a very unſtable term, the ſame caſe being eſteemed ſuch in one light which is not in another.

A man having a ſeal put forcibly into his hand, and the hand with the ſame violence preſſed down upon wax affixed to a deed, containing a conveyance of his eſtate, will be counted by every body under neceſſity; but then the ſealing is no more his act than it is the act of the ſeal employed therein,

[a] In a former chapter upon that article, wherein Neceſſity is made one of the four claſſes under which all our motives of action may be reduced; the other three being Pleaſure, Uſe, and Honour. For we never ſtir a finger, unleſs to pleaſe ourſelves more or leſs, or for ſome uſe we apprehend therein, or becauſe we eſteem it in ſome degree laudable, or becoming, or becauſe we muſt for avoiding ſome miſchief or inconvenience.

for both act by impulſe without any thing that can be called freedom.

But what if his hands being left at liberty, he be only locked up in a room, and threatened to be kept there without victuals or drink until he ſhall ſeal? Perhaps he has a wife and children who muſt be ruined by the loſs of his eſtate, and being a man of reſolution, he determines bravely to periſh rather than bring them to deſtruction: in this forlorn condition he lolls out at a window, where he ſees an intimate friend of of his, a lawyer, who adviſes him to execute, for that no damage can enſue therefrom: he then calls for the deed, ſets to his ſeal, and obtains his enlargement. This the Philoſopher will not allow to be an act of neceſſity, for it was in his power to have forborn, and he did actually forbear until his friend's admonition having altered his judgement, he choſe voluntarily to ſeal, upon a prudential motive of ſaving his life without detriment to his family. The Grantees bring ejectment for the land in *Weſtminſter-hall*, where the whole caſe appearing

pearing upon evidence as above, the judge and jury pronounce the deed void, for that the man was under *dureſſe*, and his act not voluntary but impoſed upon him by force. Thus we find the ſame act adjudged neceſſary in legal conſtruction, which was free and voluntary in the philoſophical.

Now to change the caſe a little, imagine the confinement were in a public gaol for a lawful debt, which the party has no means of paying, nor credit to procure bail; ſomebody offers to purchaſe a farm contiguous to his houſe, and which it would be greatly inconvenient for him to part with, nevertheleſs he conſiders his health is infirm, and if he remains in priſon it will inevitably prove his death; ſo he accepts the offer as the only poſſible means of extricating himſelf. If he be afterwards blamed for ſo imprudent a bargain, he will alledge the neceſſity of his affairs compelling him to it; and this allegation will be readily admitted as a full excuſe. If upon ejectment brought, he offers to refund the money, and refuſes to deliver poſſeſſion, urging

urging the neceſſity he lay under, I am afraid this plea will not avail him; for the court will ſay, his act was free and voluntary, nor was he under any compulſion when he did it, therefore it muſt ſtand good.

Let us now vary our circumſtances once more, and ſuppoſe the man under no confinement or debt at all; but he has taken a fancy to ſome girl of the town; ſhe wants a ſum of money to throw away upon an extravagance, and will leave him for ſome other gallant, unleſs he will ſupply her, which he has no means of doing any other way, than by ſale of the farm above-mentioned: he is ſo beſotted with her allurements that he cannot live without her; ſo he executes the conveyance, though ſorely againſt the grain, and againſt his judgement; he will be apt to plead neceſſity in excuſe for this fooliſh proceeding; but no indifferent perſon will admit it for ſuch: here then is a neceſſity men deem ſo themſelves, though nobody elſe will call it by that name.

But

But Neceſſity being conſtantly oppoſed to Freewill, the changeableneſs of theſe terms, according to the lights wherein you regard them, gives riſe to as notable diſputes among us, as thoſe canvaſſed of old among the Philoſophers concerning the proper colour of the feathers of a cock-pidgeon's neck, which preſents a different aſpect upon every little motion of the bird.

§. 11. Every body eſteems freedom the baſis of morality; for no man deſerves praiſe or blame for doing what he could not help, or omitting what he was not at liberty to perform: we are juſtified in doing things upon the command of a ſuperiour, which were blameable had we done them upon our own accord; and it is a received maxim, that neceſſity has no law. Nevertheleſs the reſtraints laid upon us by our vices juſtify us not, and the ſlave of ſin is always thought anſwerable for the drudgery he goes through in obedience to his tyrant. On the other hand,

we

we may merit commendation, by complying with the neceſſary obligations of our religion and our duty.

Oftentimes, as has been already remarked, we blend the idea of impotence with want of liberty, or attribute to the one, what proceeds from the other; and indeed the latter in ſome meaſure depends upon the former; for whatever obſtacle ſtands in our way, were our ſtrength increaſed ſo as greatly to ſurmount it, would become none, but we ſhould be ſet at liberty from its oppoſition. A man bound hand and foot with cords, upon having the ſtrength of *Sampſon* given him, would regain his liberty without being untied: and a cobweb wound about our hands makes no abatement in our freedom, though it deſtroys that of a fly; not that it does not oppoſe the ſame reſiſtance againſt our fingers as it does againſt the legs of the fly, but becauſe that reſiſtance is nothing in compariſon with our greater ſtrength.

When ſome fond paſſion captivates the heart, and forces us upon actions our preſent

ſent judgement diſapproves, we are ſaid to labour under an impotence of mind; and the compliance with ſuch temptations as few or none can reſiſt, is attributed to the weakneſs of human nature. When honour, or duty calls a man to ſome very painful enterprize, like thoſe of *Scævola*, *Regulus*, or the Chriſtian Martyrs, he does not want freedom of action to accompliſh it; for his hands will as readily obey the command of the mind to thruſt them into burning coals, as into a baſon of water, if he can but bring his mind to give the command: perhaps ſome of us might reſolve upon ſuch an exploit, but ſhould probably flinch in the attempt; and we many times do enter confidently upon undertakings where we find our courage fail in the execution: here then is an effect of the Will directing her own volitions, which yet are forcibly turned a contrary way by the terrors of the pain; ſo then here, if ever, the Will is not free to follow her own choice and election: nevertheleſs, when

trials

trials of this ſort have been undergone, we do not reckon them inſtances of greater freewill, but greater ſtrength of virtue, and extraordinary vigour of mind.

So if a covetous man intends to give money in charity, but when he comes to take his guineas out of the bag, has not the heart to part with them; he has a will to do a generous deed, and would execute it if not reſtrained by his fondneſs for the pelf; yet we do not ordinarily reckon him deſtitute of Freewill, but that he has not power to give any thing away. Thus we eſteem the ſame caſe a defect of Liberty, or of Power, according as we fix our eye upon the ſtrength of the obſtacle, or feebleneſs of the agent.

Free Agency.

§. 12. The Speculative talk much of a free and neceſſary Agency, terms not in uſe among the vulgar, nor do they loſe any thing by the want of them: for if we go to examine what Free Agency is, we ſhall find it to be no more than the dependency

dency of actions upon volition*, therefore man is a free Agent, becauſe his limbs move according to the directions of his Will,

* It is not clear that my friend Search has hit the exact notion of free Agency, as underſtood by thoſe who commonly employ the term. For according to his definition, we muſt aſcribe it to the Brutes, not excepting the moſt ſtupid of them, the Slugg and the Beetle; becauſe unleſs we ſuppoſe them mere *Carteſian* machines, we muſt allow their motions to depend upon their volition; for when they crawl to the right hand or the left, it is not by impulſe, like a billiard ball ſtruck on either ſide, but they are drawn that particular way by ſome allurement ſtriking their ſenſe, and might as well have crawled the contrary, if the like allurement had invited them thither. Yet we do not hold them for free Agents, nor eſteem them accountable Creatures, or capable of moral good and evil; as we do man, ſolely upon account of his having the privilege of free Agency. So that their Agency ſeems to be of a middle nature, between free and neceſſary: ſomething that partakes of both, and yet is neither.

Now in order to ſettle the idea of free Agency, let us obſerve that man, beſides his power of acting according to the motives in his imagination, has a power over the imagination itſelf, to call up ideas there, which would not ariſe of their own accord. But this power the Brutes ſeem to want; for though they remember, they do not recollect; they have ideas of reflection, but ſuch only as are thrown upon them mechanically; they have combinations and aſſociations, formed by the frequent appearance of objects together, without

Will, but Matter a neceſſary Agent, as having no will, and acting ſolely by virtue of the motion or impulſe imparted to it.

Not

without any endeavours of their own to unite them; and if they ſometimes make inferences, thoſe are ſuch as occur to them ſpontaneouſly, and are not drawn out by ſtudy and meditation. Now this privilege of voluntary reflection, commonly called Underſtanding or Reaſon, is what denominates us free Agents, and renders us accountable for our manner of uſing it. Not but that in ſome of our actions, one can find no difference from thoſe of our fellow animals: for a dog upon turning the corner of a ſtreet, if he ſaw another dog running againſt him, would ſtart aſide, I ſuppoſe, as well as a man upon the like occaſion. Therefore in this inſtance the actions of both are ſimilar: and numberleſs inſtances might be produced, wherein we act under the guidance of ſenſe and imagination, without direction of our underſtanding, or reflection upon what we are doing. Yet how much ſoever we may act in this manner, without uſing our underſtanding, we might always uſe it if we would: therefore this privilege remaining always with us, we eſteem ourſelves always free Agents: and the omiſſion of uſing it, is equally imputable to us, with any wrong uſe we may make of it.

But to bring off our Author as well as we can, it may be alledged, that thoſe actions only which we perform with a reflex act, or conſciouſneſs accompanying them, and with conſent of the mind upon ſome conſideration, how tranſient ſoever, of what we are

about,

Not but upon a man's being puſhed violently down to the ground his fall is neceſſary, but then it is properly no act of his; for though we are apt to ſay he hurt himſelf by

about, are eſteemed the work of our will: but what we do inadvertently, by ſudden impulſe of fancy, or ſurprize of habit, we are ſaid to do accidentally, or mechanically. Therefore theſe actions, being ordinarily not reckoned our own, nor effects of our will, it ſtill remains true, that free Agency is the dependance of our actions upon our volition: taking thoſe terms in the ſenſe wherein thoſe who talk of free Agency underſtand them.

We may obſerve further, that this double power the human mind poſſeſſes, of acting as well upon the imagination as upon the limbs, probably gave riſe to the notion of an elective power, coexiſtent with our active. For her reflex act, introducing new ideas, ſtriking various lights from them, changing the colour of our motives, removing ſatisfaction to a different point, thereby cauſing other actions to enſue, than would have followed upon the motives firſt occurring, and employed as often in adding ſtrength to the ſollicitations of paſſion, as weight to the judgements of reaſon; it is looked upon as the operation of another power, directing that whereby we perform our bodily motions, and ſetting it at work without the intervention of motives, and even contrary to their influence. Whereas in reality theſe are not different powers, but one and the ſame, exerciſed upon different ſubjects, to wit, the mental and corporeal organs;

by the fall, which implies ſomething done by him, yet upon mature conſideration, we never attribute the hurt to him, but to the perſon who threw him down; for in this caſe his motion is ſimilar to that of body, which does not properly act, but only tranſmits the action of ſomething elſe that moved it. When a ſtone ſtrikes againſt a wall it ſerves only as a channel of conveyance for the force of the engine from whence it was caſt, that again of the ſprings and wheels whereby it was worked, and ſo backwards in a ſeries of effects and cauſes, until you come to ſome voluntary agent

nor do they direct one another any otherwiſe, than as when a man reads an advertiſement poſted up againſt a market-houſe, the ſight of what he reads, raiſes a deſire he might not otherwiſe have felt, of purchaſing the wares ſpecified therein, and directs him where to ſeek for them; and ſo gives birth to other actions than he would have performed upon the motives in his thought, before he turned his eyes upon the paper.

But however this be, it affects not the main argument carried on in the text: for whatever idea we entertain of Agency, ſtill our freedom conſiſts in the removal of all impediment againſt its taking effect upon being exerted, but has no concern at all with the cauſes, or inducements prevailing on us to exert it.

giving

giving the firſt impulſe, whoſe act it is, whether he intend the conſequence or no. If a man ſhoots another, the wound made by the bullet is his act, and he chargeable with the murder; or if he ſhot at a crow and happened to kill a man, though he be guilty of no crime, ſtill the ſlaughter is his act, but an undeſigned and accidental one. And if we commonly aſcribe powers to body, it is becauſe we cannot trace them back to the cauſes from whence they originally ſprung.

Upon this view of the matter, we ſee that free Agency has nothing to do with queſtions concerning Liberty, for the one may remain after the other being taken away. A man ſhut up in a priſon ſtill continues a free agent of ſuch actions as he can perform; if he would gladly go abroad but ſits ſtill in his wicker chair, as knowing the doors are locked, his quieſcence is an act of free Agency, not like that of the chair he ſits on, for he might have roſe from it if he would. Or if he be ſhoved along by the ſhoulders, though he muſt

move, being under a force, yet he is a free agent in the motion of his legs, for a ſtatue puſhed along in like manner, being a neceſſary agent, would have fallen upon its face.

Thus how much ſoever we may be abridged or confined in our powers, while there is any thing left that we can do, our free agency ſubſiſts entire, for this relates only to our manner of doing thoſe actions we perform, that is, by willing them; and conſequently in every thing a man does which is properly his act, whether by compulſion, or reſtraint, or free choice, he is in that inſtance a free agent, or in other words, he is ſuch whenever he is an agent at all.

§. 13. But all this will not ſatisfy the curious, for they aſk further, whether a man have free agency to will ſuch a particular exertion of his power as well as to execute it: now this is another kind of Agency from that we have been ſpeaking of hitherto; and for diſtinction ſake we ſhall beg leave to call it free Volency (for the

the Speculative will allow one another to coin a word upon occaſion): ſo the queſtion is not whether man be a free Agent, but a free Volent; for his agency remains the ſame, provided his actions follow according to his volition, whatever laws this latter be ſubject to.

Now in order to raiſe a queſtion upon this head, we muſt ſuppoſe our Volition the effect of ſome prior or other act of the Will beſides the Volition itſelf under examination: but we have ſeen in the progreſs of this work, that the Will is no ſubject of her own operation, but takes her turns from time to time, according to the preſent ſtate of the judgement and imagination, therefore the epithet Free, can neither be affirmed, nor denied, nor any ways applied to Volency; this not being immediately produced by any exertion of our power. 'Tis true, we do often determine beforehand what we will do, and purſue meaſures accordingly, which we ſhould have omitted, had it not been for ſuch determination; and in this ſenſe the Will acts upon herſelf,

but then ſhe does it mediately by fixing ſuch ideas, reſolutions, or propenſities upon the memory and imagination as will ſerve her for motives by and by; and it is plain her agency terminates with the impreſſing ſuch ideas, becauſe if they ſlip out of our head, or ſomething happens to render the determination inexpedient, though we act contrary to it, yet no doubts ariſe concerning our free Agency, either in the firſt determination or ſubſequent volition.

Beſides, ſome of our actions leave room for no more than one operation of the Will; a man turning the corner of a ſtreet ſees ſomebody come haſtily againſt him, and ſuddenly ſtarts back; here the firſt act of his Will is that whereby he moves his limbs, ſo there is no prior Agency whereto the term Free may be applied.

There are ſome who hold two conſubſiſting Wills, an active and an elective, the latter continually directing the former, how truly I ſhall not examine; but upon this ſuppoſition man is a free Agent, and a free Volent; for free Agency is the dependance

of

of his actions upon volition, and free volency the dependance of volition upon his choice; but you cannot go on further to entitle him a free electant too; for I never heard of any body ſpinning the thread ſo fine as to ſuppoſe another election determining that which determines the Will: all who hold an elective power making it either dependant upon motives, or ſelf-moving independent on all cauſes whatever, even on any prior, or other act of the Will, ſo the term Free cannot be applicable to it, becauſe we are free only in ſuch things as will enſue upon ſome previous act of the Will exerted to produce them.

We do indeed often talk in common converſation of a free, and a forced choice; but this relates to the conſequence of our choice, not to the manner of making it, and depends not ſo much upon our being able to chooſe, as to obtain the thing choſen. We ſay indeed, a man has not liberty to chooſe when he knows the thing is not to be had, becauſe he cannot will an im-

poſſibility, for how much ſoever we may wiſh or deſire, we never actually Will without a preſent apprehenſion of ſomething feaſible: but this proves volition dependant upon final cauſes occuring to the imagination, for an unattainable end is no end at all, becauſe it is not a thing wherein our efforts may terminate, nor can the mind raiſe a volition of it by any power ſhe poſſeſſes. Beſides that choice, in vulgar acceptation, lies undoubtedly liable to conſtraint, we meet with numberleſs inſtances every day of our being confined in our choice; which ſhows that choice in this ſenſe is a different thing from the elective power ſpoken of juſt now; for that, the maintainers of it inſiſt upon as a privilege inherent in human nature, which nothing can diveſt us of, nor any external force, or circumſtances of ſituation controul; but that we have always power to will, how much ſoever we may be reſtrained from doing.

§. 14. Thus

§. 14. Thus have I endeavoured to point out ſome of thoſe variations of ſenſe our words are liable to, according to the occaſion introducing them, or light wherein they are placed: and it is this fluctuation of language that makes the labyrinth, and throws up the briars and thorns that entangle us in our reaſonings upon human Liberty. For men ſet out with one queſtion, but ſcarce have gone a few ſteps before they ſlide inſenſibly into another, from thence into a third, and ſo on without limitation: no wonder then they cannot come to a ſatisfactory concluſion upon a ſubject perpetually changing. Free Will.

I know of no other uſe [a] in the diſcuſſion above attempted of thoſe ſeveral changes,

[a] Every common man apprehends himſelf as having the command of his actions, and ſome underſtanding to judge of their expedience. He knows his powers are limited in compaſs, or many times obſtructed by outward impediments from taking effect when exerted, and that his judgement is defective. Yet he can always uſe what judgement he has, and apply his endeavours towards helping himſelf to the thing it recommends. He ſees likewiſe that there are methods to be

changes, unleſs to warn men againſt being beguiled by them, for let them keep their ideas ſteady, and I believe they will find no difficulties. Therefore I hold it wrong to enter upon a debate concerning free Will in general, that being a variable term, as well in our common diſcourſes, as in our abſtract ſpeculations, for the Will is always free,

be employed for improving his judgement, and inculcating motives upon his mind that will invigorate his endeavours in time of action. When he has failed in any of theſe points, he takes ſhame to himſelf for the omiſſion; and when he has done his beſt, feels an approbation reſting upon the deed. All this he can eaſily comprehend, and is comprehenſion enough for his uſe: for in the buſineſs of life, we never talk of free Agency, nor find occaſion to diſtinguiſh between freedom of Action, and freedom of Will, nor to examine how many conſubſiſting powers we poſſeſs, operating upon one another.

Therefore honeſt Ned acknowledges the fine-ſpun diſcuſſions he has attempted, of no uſe to ſuch as can be contented to keep within the compaſs of common ſenſe: but if they will needs launch out into ſubtile refinements, until they find themſelves entangled, he offers his beſt aſſiſtance to extricate them. Only he deſires they will not think of untying all the knots at once; but obſerve where the thread ſticks, and apply his directions from time to time, for diſingaging it, in that particular part where they find the preſent difficulty.

free, that is, always doing ſomething or other while we wake, yet at the ſame time may be confined to one, or a few ways of exerting herſelf: but let them take into conſideration particular acts of the Will, and they will find her ſometimes free, ſometimes under force or reſtraint, and ſometimes neither of the three applicable to her, according to the different lights wherein they regard the matter, according to what they underſtand by the term Will, and what they apprehend to be an act of her's.

But with reſpect to our main point the conſiſtency of human Freedom with Providence, it is not much matter what notions men entertain of Liberty, of Agency, of Will, or Choice, provided they contemplate each inſtance ſingly by itſelf, and do not blend them together, nor change them, by juggling like a conjuror with cups and balls. For they muſt diſcern ſo much ſimilitude in all caſes of Liberty that can be produced, if they will but keep their ideas clear, and under ſuch diſcipline as not to joſtle,

joſtle, or run into one another, that the ſame conſequences will always follow, how variouſly ſoever they may underſtand Liberty in the ſeveral caſes propoſed.

§. 15. Let us conſider a man juſt enlarged out of priſon, who we ſhall ſay has regained his liberty, becauſe he can ſtay at home, or go abroad this way, or that, north or ſouth as he pleaſes. So his freedom conſiſts in the dependance of his motions upon his Will, in his ſtanding ſo circumſtanced as that nothing hinders but that reſt, or motion, or any particular motion he ſhall direct, ſhall enſue upon his willing; it does not at all relate to the inducements he may have for willing, whether ſome prudential motive, or ſudden ſtart of fancy, or impulſe of paſſion, or whether he put it to the caſt of a die, in each caſe he remains at full liberty to do as he will.

Well, but ſuppoſe him under the authority of ſome maſter, who gives him a holiday to divert himſelf at home, or go abroad wherever

wherever he chooſes. I ſhall not diſpute, whether the injunctions of a Superiour be ſtrictly an abridgement of human Liberty, for that they may be diſobeyed by any one who ſhall diſregard the conſequences: let us grant for the preſent, that he could not do the thing whereon his choice ſhall fall, if any prohibition were given againſt it, yet there being no ſuch prohibition, leaves him beſides his liberty of action, a liberty of choice in what manner he ſhall uſe his other liberty: now this liberty, like the former, conſiſts in the dependance of his actions upon his choice; for where he has free choice, nobody can doubt he will do as he chooſes; and where he has not, he may be forced to do what he does not chooſe: but it has no concern with the cauſes of his choice, whether he ſpend his holiday prudently, or fooliſhly, according to his own whims, or the perſuaſions of an acquaintance.

But ſuppoſe he has ſtrong reaſons either of religion, or duty, or reſpect to ſome Relation who may leave him a good legacy

which urge him to go one way, but his companions, or his own jovial diſpoſition, ſollicit him another to the alehouſe, and nobody has any authority to interpoſe, ſo he remains ſtill at liberty to chooſe between them, becauſe he may take either way as his will and his choice ſhall direct. No, you ſay, 'tis not clear that he has a freedom of choice; for though I admit he may do as he chooſes, yet I doubt his being free to chooſe; becauſe his evil habit of tippling may force a choice upon him whether he will or no. Beware, my friend, of the mazes in the labyrinth, for we are now ſtriking into another alley, and ſtarting a different queſtion from that we had under contemplation before.

In common uſage, we apply Liberty indifferently to the power or act performed thereby; for we ſay the choice is free when nothing hinders, but that we may do whatever it ſhall pitch upon, and the act free when it follows in conſequence of our choice, and not of any compulſion oblig-

ing us to perform it. And one of the moſt dangerous ſources of perplexity ariſes from the want of diſtinguiſhing in our enquiries concerning the freedom of a power, whether we regard it as a cauſe or an effect; for while we behold it in a double light, as too frequently is done, we ſhall never ſee diſtinctly where to find an iſſue. According to your preſent ſtating the doubt, we muſt conſider it as an effect, the proper object of ſome power the man has to influence his choice, unleſs the prevalence of habit ſhould give it a contrary bias.

As to caſes of reſtraint they will conduce nothing to our main purpoſe, therefore we will conſider only ſuch caſes wherein you may ſuppoſe a freedom of choice in our preſent ſenſe of the Term, that is, as an effect of ſome power we poſſeſs.

§. 16. Suppoſe a man deliberating in the morning how he ſhall lay out his afternoon: there are no bolts nor bars in his way, no authority of a ſuperiour, nor reſtraint

ſtraint of law, duty, honour, or obligation intervening in the matters under deliberation, ſo we know his afternoon's actions will be ſuch as his Will and Choice ſhall then direct, but neither is there any ſtrong inclination, or paſſion at work, which might drive him upon one way of employing himſelf preferably to the reſt, ſo he ſtands indifferent to chooſe now in what manner he ſhall diſpoſe of himſelf in the afternoon, nor has he any choice until he ſhall determine it by ſome preſent act of his Will.

I do not give this as a philoſophical repreſentation of the caſe, but certain it is, we often do conceive ourſelves in a ſituation (how juſtly 'tis no matter) to will or chooſe what we ſhall will and do by and by [a]: for if

[a] But when we act in conſequence of a previous choice, we do ſo, either becauſe retaining in mind the reaſons inducing us to make it, or becauſe confiding in our judgement that there were ſufficient reaſons, or becauſe the expedience conſtantly found in adhering to a reſolution once taken, without which we could compleat none of our purpoſes, has given us a habit of perſe-

if upon aſking a friend to walk with you in the Park this afternoon, he ſhould gravely reply, Good, Sir, I cannot poſſibly tell you, for the preſent moment only is in our power; my future actions depend upon my future volitions, and the Will cannot act upon itſelf, nor is what I ſhall do five hours hence the ſubject of my preſent option: you would think he bantered you, and be apt to cry, Pr'ythee cannot you chooſe either to walk, or let it alone, cannot you tell me whether you will or no?

Therefore unleſs we will talk in a ſtrain contrary to the language and conceptions of all mankind, we muſt acknowledge that a perſon in the caſe before us has a perfect freedom of choice. But wherein does this freedom conſiſt? where, unleſs in the ab-

perſeverance: all which are motives weighing with the Will, unleſs other motives ſhould ariſe to take off their force. Therefore in caſes of prior determination, we operate upon our own Will no otherwiſe, than we might operate upon the Will of another perſon, by ſuggeſting motives ſufficient to prevail with him; as when we engage a labourer to work for us by the promiſe of good wages for his ſervice.

ſence of all impediment, reſtraint, authority, obligation or force whatſoever againſt his power of chooſing, ſo that his choice will continue ſuch as he fixes it, and his afternoon's actions follow preciſely according to his preſent determination, nor has it any thing to do with the motives or cauſes inducing him to chooſe riding rather than walking, or ſtaying at home before both.

But we have not done yet; for ſome there be who inſiſt upon an elective Power [b] conſubſiſting with our power of Volition, and determining it as well in giving the preference to what we are to do

[b] *King* upon the origin of Evil, and his Commentator *Law*, place the operation of this elective Power in annexing the idea of Beſt, to whatever action we think proper, which then the Will proceeds immediately to perform. Yet they allow the action ſo performed to be a free act: which ſhews Freedom, even according to their notion of it, not inconſiſtent with the influence of motives; for the idea ſo annexed, may ſurely be acknowledged to operate as a motive, influencing the Will to purſue the Action whereto we have united it, as much as if we had found them united by deciſion of the judgement, or repreſentation of the fancy.

hereafter, as in the preſent exerciſe of our bodily powers. Be it ſo, ſince they will have it ſo. Then the freedom of this elective Power depends upon the removal of all force or impediment againſt the Will taking ſuch determination as is elected, but not at all upon the cauſe of ſuch election. Add further, that when we do what we had elected or determined beforehand, nobody will deny our being free in the volitions exerted at the time of execution: which proves Freedom conſiſtent with Precauſation, for otherwiſe either our Election and Predetermination muſt have no avail nor influence upon our future conduct, or elſe muſt put a force upon the Will, conſtraining it to act conformably to them until they were compleated.

§. 17. Thus how many powers ſoever we may conceive in the mind directing one another, the proper and genuine idea of Freedom, with reſpect to each of them, will be the ſame: for in order to diſcuſs the point of freedom, we muſt conſider

ſome operating power as the cauſe, and ſome exertion of the power operated upon as an effect to be produced thereby: if ſuch effect will follow as may be expected from the cauſe, then are we free in the operating power, and our exertion of the operated is our own free act; but if a different effect will follow, then are we under force or reſtraint.

If we enquire further whether we be free to uſe this operating power, this is a new queſtion which muſt be diſcuſſed in like manner with the former, by conſidering the operating power as an effect, and ſome other power not thought of before as a cauſe.

For let the mind have ever ſo much power to act upon herſelf, either by predetermination, or coexiſtent election, ſuch her acting is an action as much as acting upon the limbs, and the freedom of it muſt be tried by the ſame rules: for as I have freedom of action ſo long as there lies no bar or obſtacle againſt uſing my bodily powers in ſuch manner as my Will

ſhall

ſhall direct, whatever cauſes may incline me to employ them one particular way; ſo have I freedom of Will while nothing hinders, but that ſuch volition ſhall take place as I predetermine or elect, whatever may give occaſion to my ſo determining or electing. For Liberty bears no connection with any thing antecedent [a] to the operation of that power

[a] *Chryſippus* and the Stoics, as we find in *Tully de Fato*, placed the freedom of Will in its independance on all external or antecedent cauſes. Yet they claimed this freedom as the natural privilege of man; and held at the ſame time, that all his actions, even the minuteſt of them, were fated. How they reconciled theſe two opinions, it is difficult to gueſs.

Their miſtake ſeems to have proceeded from want of diſtinguiſhing between efficient, and final cauſes, the former whereof, being antecedent, deſtroy free agency, which yet may well conſiſt with the latter. A cannon-ball has no efficacy to beat down a rampart, unleſs what it receives from the powder, which therefore is an efficient antecedent cauſe; and conſequently, the action of the ball muſt be neceſſary. But if you deſire your friend to pull down the window-ſaſh, you give no efficacy to his arm, for he does it entirely by his own ſtrength, therefore his action is free: yet your requeſt was the motive, without which he would not have done it; ſo you are the antecedent, and external cauſe of what he does.

whoſe liberty we enquire into, but ſolely with what ſhall follow after it, and with the removal of all obſtruction which might prevent it from taking effect: therefore may well conſiſt with cauſes prior to ſuch operation, and with the dominion of that Providence whoſe diſpoſal thoſe cauſes lie under.

Thus while we can keep a Diſputant to any one ſettled point, one ſtated caſe of acting, or willing, we ſhall manage well enough with him; but men are apt to dodge about the poſt, alledging, that we may will as we chooſe, and chooſe if we will, without underſtanding themſelves in the uſe of thoſe terms, or ſettling the diſtinction between them; but one moment taking them for ſynonimous, and the next for different acts producing one another. Whereas if we fix the meaning of choice to a predetermination, then in ſuch caſes where our determination ſtands confined to certain limits, or we are compelled to take a courſe contrary to that we determine, our volitions, and conſequently

our

our actions depend upon the cauſes applying ſuch force or reſtraint: but in caſes where we remain perfectly free to proſecute whatever we may determine upon, they depend upon the motives occurring to our judgement, or imagination in making the determination, or upon our former cares in forming the condition of our mind; which cares depended upon the like cauſes, and ſo on as far as the Will was concerned, until you come to ſome firſt determination, or act of the mind to which there was no other act preceding [b].

§. 18. As to the coexiſtent elective power [a], ſelf-moving and independent on all cauſes, whether

[b] Which act muſt depend upon external cauſes; and conſequently ſo muſt all ſubſequent volitions dependant thereon.

[a] Our Author's zeal againſt the freewill of indifference urges him to take every occaſion of aiming a ſtroke at it: but his principal attack is carried on in the Chapter of Satisfaction, where in conjunction with Mr. *Locke*, he has purſued it to every corner, and ſubterfuge under which it might take refuge. But he conceives that the notion of the Will acting without

whether of external objects, motives of judgement and imagination, or prior determinations of our own, if this could once be well eſtabliſhed, then farewell to all prudence, deliberation, and dependance upon our own conduct, and that of other people: for what avails it to contrive a plan

motives, took riſe from there being many of them latent, unknown even to ourſelves; for it is a common remark, that nothing is more deceitful or unfathomable than the heart of man; and from there being many of them ſo tranſient that we cannot obſerve them; beſides that the taſtes and deſires of men being infinitely various, we often find them acting upon inducements, which would not have been ſuch to ourſelves, therefore ſuppoſe they had none for their proceeding.

Nor need we wonder at his zeal againſt indifference, becauſe that doctrine once eſtabliſhed would overthrow his whole ſyſtem; which contains an examination of the ſeveral ſpecies of motives weighing with the mind, the manner of their being generated and introduced to the thought, and the methods of providing ourſelves with ſuch as ſhall be moſt ſalutary, and conducive to happineſs: in all which he apprehends that Science, reported anciently to have deſcended from heaven, the knowledge of ourſelves, to conſiſt. And his theology depends in great part upon the influence of motives: for he conceives 'tis by their intervention alone, that the government of Providence over the moral world may

plan of my meaſures ever ſo wiſely, to inculcate ſalutary maxims upon my mind, to nouriſh ſentiments of honour, or duty, or moral ſenſes for my guidance, if I may afterwards chance to elect the wildeſt, and moſt extravagant actions in defiance of all reaſon, or inclination, or former reſolutions to the contrary? or how can I depend that my beſt and deareſt friend will not murder me, while there is a hazard that he may elect in oppoſition to all the judgement and diſcretion in his head, the ſentiments and deſires in his heart?

may be explained; and our expectations in a future life, upon any tolerable grounds, aſcertained. For we can diſcover nothing in all viſible nature likely to affect us hereafter, nor can we know any thing of the manner wherein we ſhall be diſpoſed of otherwiſe than by ſo much as we may diſcover of the character of that Being, who preſides over all nature, as well viſible as inviſible. But the character of an Agent is denominated by the views and motives wherewith he conducts himſelf. Therefore unleſs we conceive God likewiſe to act upon motives, and take final cauſes under our contemplation, we can gather nothing ſatisfactory, by the light of reaſon, concerning our future condition: but the proſpect will lie dark, uncertain, and diſmal before us.

But

But ſuch terrors as theſe the moſt zealous devotees of an elective power do not lie under; they depend upon men's acting conformably to their characters; if they know a hardened villain, they make no queſtion of his electing acts of violence, injury and diſhoneſty whenever opportunity ſhall ſerve, and confide in themſelves for making juſt and wiſe elections in their future conduct.

What then occaſions the difference between man and man? for there muſt be ſome cauſe of the moral character, ſome account to be given why we know what uſe each perſon will make of his elective power. The difference, ſay they, lies in the Will itſelf, which has a peculiar bent, or ply, or I know not what, different from that of another perſon: the villain has a perverſeneſs of Will, therefore will always chooſe perverſely; and they themſelves a rectitude of Will, ſo of courſe they will chooſe rightly and wiſely. But whence got they this I know not what in their Will? was it innate? was it the natural conſtitution

conſtitution of their mind? Then they ought to bleſs the Author of their nature, who gave them this happy conſtitution on creating them. But no, this muſt not be the caſe; for they will loſe all merit of their rectitude, unleſs it was of their own acquiring; therefore they gave this right Ply to their Wills themſelves by their former cares, and induſtry, and right management of their elective power. Be it ſo; for we are in the humour to admit every thing they pleaſe to aſſume; ſtill we muſt aſk, what moved them to ſuch right management? it could not be the Ply of their Will; for if this were acquired, they could not have it before they acquired it, nor could they derive from thence their choice of the right methods taken in the acquiſition. What then, did they light upon thoſe methods by mere chance? I do not ſuſpect they will ſay this; for this would make Virtue nothing more than a lucky hit, which one Simpleton might ſtumble upon as well as another. If then their choice had a ſource, there remains no other

we

we can gueſs beſides education, example, company, the temperament of their body, ſtate of their mental organization[b], objects ſurrounding them, events touching their notice, and the like; cauſes antecedent and external to the mind electing, under the direction of that power whom they muſt acknowledge to govern all things external.

§. 19. Upon the whole, we may conclude Freedom, in whatever light we place

[b] A kind of technical term, employed by our Author, to denote a ſet of organs compoſed of very fine corporeal ſubſtance, uſed by the mind as her inſtrument in meditation, when retired from all external objects. For he conceives the faculty of thinking, or reaſoning, not a primary property of the mind, but a reſult from her compoſition with a certain ſyſtem of matter; and ſuppoſes pure created ſpirit no more a thinking, than it is a walking, or a ſpeaking ſubſtance. He allows indeed it can always think, whenever united to a proper organization; and ſo it can always walk or ſpeak, whenever united to a body having legs, or organs of ſpeech: but when removed from all matter, it can perform neither function, for want of inſtruments to act with, materials and objects to act upon.

Theſe organizations, detached from their groſs bodies, were the vehicles he found inhabiting the vehicular ſtate, when tranſported thereinto in the viſion.

it,

it, or to whatever power, whether real or imaginary, apply it, by no means repugnant to the operation of prior cauſes moving us to the exerciſe of that power, nor to the dominion of Providence, having all thoſe cauſes and their cauſes at diſpoſal. So that the Plan of Providence may well take effect without infringing a tittle upon our Liberty: events which neither our judgement, nor our appetite would incline us to produce, are placed out of our power, and entruſted in the hands of other agents, ſo come to paſs by neceſſity with reſpect to us; the returns of ſummer and winter do not depend upon our option, becauſe we might be apt to chooſe a perpetual ſpring: but wherever God thinks proper to employ us in executing any part of his plan, there needs only to give us the powers, the talents, the opportunities, the judgements, the motives requiſite, and we ſhall compleat the lines allotted us by the exerciſe of our freedom.

So far as you can penetrate into a man's ſentiments, and deſires, and have the pro-

per objects at command, you may put him upon any work you ſhall require: if money be his idol, and you have enough to bribe him, you may make him do whatever you pleaſe; if he make his belly his god, you may draw him from *Millbank* to *Radcliffe-highway* by an exquiſite entertainment; or if good nature be his ruling principle, you may employ him in any kind office you ſhall want. Your politicians know how to turn the paſſions of men independent on their authority to ſerve their deſigns: and the Divine Politician may do this more compleatly, not only as he knows perfectly the ſecrets of all hearts, but as he gave them that underſtanding, and thoſe appetites which determine the colour of their actions; and we need not doubt of his having given them ſuch as will effectually anſwer the purpoſes intended by them.

In ſome few inſtances where we know the hearts of men, we can effect our purpoſes with them as ſurely as we can with any corporeal inſtruments in our hands: if you want to give a ball, or an entertainment,

tainment, 'tis but ſending an invitation to perſons fond of theſe diverſions, and you will have your company reſort to you of their own free choice, nor could you bring them more effectually, if you had the authority of an abſolute monarch over them; ſo that in this inſtance you govern their motions either to *Hickford*'s, or the *Apollo* near *Temple-Bar*, or your own dining-room, without the leaſt impeachment of their liberty. And we have a preſent example before our eyes of a monarch, who having the love of his ſubjects, can by their free ſervices reſiſt the combined efforts of the mightieſt deſpotic powers upon earth. Nor can Deſpotiſm itſelf do any great matters without aid of Free Will: for rewards, honours, and encouragements, thoſe engines of free agency, contribute more to the valour of armies, than any ſcourges of puniſhment, or peremptory edicts concluding, For ſuch is our Will.

Since then experience teſtifies, that man can make ſo much uſe of liberty towards accompliſhing his deſigns, why ſhould we ſcruple

ſcruple to think the ſame of God in a larger extent? for he not only has all the objects in his power which touch the ſprings of action, but fabricated the ſprings themſelves, and ſet them to receive what touches they ſhall take.

§. 20. But we judge of the workings of Providence by our own narrow way of proceeding; we take our meaſures from time to time as the expedience of them occurs to our thoughts, and then muſt make what uſe we can of the materials or inſtruments before us, be they ſuch as exactly ſuit our purpoſe, or not; and even if we had the making of our inſtruments, yet not always knowing what we ſhall want to do with them, we ſhould often find them inconvenient for our ſervice: nor is it unfrequent that the works we performed yeſterday ſtand in the way of thoſe we are to perform to-day, becauſe new ſchemes and new occaſions of employing ourſelves occur to us perpetually [a]. In

[a] It is not eaſy for us to form any conception of the manner of God's working, unleſs by analogy with our own.

own. Now when we act providently for the future, it is by ſome operation upon the things about us, to produce effects that would not otherwiſe have enſued: for when things fall of themſelves into the train we deſire, there is no room for our activity or prudence to interfere, nor have we any thing more to do, than wait the event. And in this caſe we may ſcarce be able to ſatisfy a by-ſtander, of their lying under our diſpoſal, unleſs by making ſome alteration in their motions, to convince him of our power. In like manner, we look for the manifeſtation of a Providence, in extraordinary events, and ſuch are commonly produced by thoſe who would enforce the belief of one: as if there were not ſufficient evidence in the ordinary courſes of nature, while ſhe proceeds in her uſual channel of ſecond cauſes. But we ſhould conſider that the caſe is different between God, and ourſelves: there are innumerable cauſes in act around us, which we did not ſet at work; nor have our activity and contrivance any other object than what little alterations we can make among them. The woods would grow, and the rivers run, had the earth been never inhabited; but when we ſee the one cut into regular glades, or the other divided into canals, hollowed along through higher ground, we know the hand of man has been buſy among them, and in general, the marks of human induſtry are found only in ſuch works, as would not have been performed by rude nature. But nature could not have begun any courſe, unleſs put into it by the divine appointment; nor could ſecond cauſes have proceeded to act in any manner, without an energy and direction received from the firſt. Therefore their operations are an evidence of his power; and their productions, ſerving the uſes of man, an evidence of his Providence, equally convincing with that of ex-

traordinary events, to an attentive obſerver, taking in the conſideration of final cauſes; without which, neither evidence would have any avail. For what do we ſee in the remarkable changes of wind contributing to bring on the Revolution. The winds vary every day, nor can we gather any thing from the particular variations happening at that time, unleſs we ſuppoſe God to have had in view the deliverance of theſe kingdoms from Popery and arbitrary power. What ſhall we ſay to the many cauſes concurring at the Reformation? The wilful and imperious temper of the Monarch, ſubmiſſive diſpoſition of the people, tired out by long wars between the two roſes, obſtinacy of the Roman Pontiff, quarrels between foreign Princes, allowing them no leiſure to interfere? How is the hand of Providence diſcernible in all this, without the idea of a gracious deſign to reſcue our forefathers and ourſelves from papal tyranny and ſuperſtition? And with ſome ſuch idea we may diſcern the ſame hand in the powers of nature, whereof we have continual experience. For the fertility of ſoils, the riſe and deſcent of vapours, the viciſſitudes of ſeaſons, the curious ſtructure of veſſels and fibres in the tree yielding fruit after his kind, and the herb after his kind, whoſe ſeed is in itſelf, indicate a provident concern and contrivance for the ſuſtenance of animals, exerted at the creation. The progreſs of arts, manufactures, and ſciences; the advancement of knowledge, and thoſe accompliſhments rendering nations more civilized, beſpeak a kind regard for mankind, and an admirably wiſe proviſion, made at the beginning, enabling them, by the uſe of their natural talents, and the materials prepared to exerciſe them upon, to riſe from the rude and ſavage ſimplicity of ancient times,

to

In like manner we vulgarly imagine[b] God acting occaſionally, and taking up purpoſes to their preſent better policied, and better accommodated ſituation. And as theſe advantages ſtill tend to further improvement, they denote the like regard for the future race of men who ſhall ſucceed us while the world endures. Therefore we need not hunt about for ſtrange incidents, and uncommon phenomena, to ſatisfy us of a providence, which rather wants ſuch teſtimonies to awaken our attention, than convince our underſtanding. Even miracles themſelves were in ancient language called Signs and Wonders; and the very word by its derivation imports, ſomething exciting our admiration; nor were we to ſee them worked ourſelves, could we eſteem them inſtances of greater power than appear in the ſtated laws of nature. Neither could we ſuppoſe God employing them as neceſſary means, without which he was not able to have effected his purpoſe: but rather in condeſcenſion to the dulneſs of our apprehenſions, which might have overlooked the purpoſe, had he compleated it by leſs ſtriking means. But it would be better for us, if we could ſo clear our mental eye, as that it might ſee by the common light; for it argues a defect in the optics, not to diſcern objects without an extraordinary glare caſt upon them. Beſides that thoſe who are over fond of theſe glares, run a great hazard of meeting phantaſms and illuſions among them.

[b] And this imagination, though repreſented here in an unfavourable light, does not deſerve to be diſcountenanced, as being the beſt ſuited to common capacity. For the plain man can never totally baniſh the idea of

purpoſes he had not thought of before until a concurrence of circumſtances rendered them expedient: we apprehend him as having turned the numerous race of men looſe into the wide world, endowed them with various powers, talents, appetites, and characters, without knowing preciſely, or without caring what they will produce: we allow him indeed to have formed the main lines of a plan; but left large vacancies between to be filled up by chance, whoſe wild workings lie under his controul to divert their courſe when they would interfere with the ſtrokes of his pencil; for the eye of Providence watches over the motions of human creatures, and when he ſees them running counter to his deſigns, he turns them aſide, or guides them by his ſecret influence to co-operate therewith.

chance out of his ſyſtem, nor underſtand the government of Providence, otherwiſe than by a conſtant vigilance over the workings of ſecond cauſes, and occaſional interpoſitions to rectify whatever happens to run amiſs: neither does he ſee wherein this idea derogates in any-wiſe from the divine Power, or Wiſdom, or Omniſcience.

Now

Now conſidering the vaſt variety of humours, the diſcordant aims and intereſts among mankind, it muſt be acknowledged that the government of the world, in this view of it, could not be adminiſtered without either continual miraculous interpoſitions in the motions of matter, or compulſions and reſtraints upon free Agency, giving our volition another turn than it would take from the motives preſent before us, or cauſing other motions to ariſe in our limbs, and thoughts in our minds, than our preſent volition would naturally produce.

But when we reflect that even the wanton gambols of chance muſt reſult from agents and cauſes originally ſet at work by the Almighty, when we call to mind his infinite Wiſdom and Omniſcience which nothing can eſcape, nothing perplex or overload, it ſeems more congruous with that boundleſs attribute to imagine that no ſingle, nor moſt diſtant effect of the powers and motions he gave was overlooked, no chaſms or empty ſpaces left in his deſign:

but that upon the formation of a world [c] he laid a full and perfect plan of all the operations that ſhould enſue during the period of its continuance.

And what interpoſitions there are (for I would leave every one to his own opinion concerning the frequency, or rarity of them

[c] Not creation of the world, as any other perſon would have expreſſed it. For our author, though far from a Free-thinker, in the modern ſenſe of the word, that is, a lover of oppoſition againſt received tenets, has endeavoured all along to maintain a freedom and openneſs of thought. But it is dangerous truſting to human reaſon, which has unluckily led him into a whimſical and unorthodox notion, that this world we inhabit is not the only one God ever created, nor the ſeveral ſpecies of animals falling within our notice, the only living works of his hands: and that after certain periods, the worlds now ſubſiſting may be diſſolved, and new ones fabricated out of the materials. Nay, his fondneſs for the maxim, Nothing made in vain, will not ſuffer him to admit any waſtes, or vacancies in nature: but he ſuppoſes, in his chapter of the Mundane Soul, that all ſpace, not occupied by body, may be replete with ſpiritual ſubſtance, to whom the particles of matter, floating therein, may ſerve for objects of perception, and ſubjects of action, and whoſe miniſtry may be employed in carrying on the courſes of nature according to the laws preſcribed for them, or perhaps in forming new worlds upon the plans contrived by infinite Wiſdom. Strange! to what wild lengths

them [d]) how much ſoever they may operate ſecretly to us, were not ſudden expedients

lengths of ſpeculation a lively fancy will ſometimes carry people! But my Friend's enthuſiaſm is excuſable, as proceeding from a commendable principle: for he conceives it would give a higher idea of the magnificence of our Creator, to imagine his great kingdom the univerſe fully peopled, to ſuppoſe innumerable hoſts of ſpirits receiving continual ſupplies of happineſs from his inexhauſtible bounty, and praiſing him inceſſantly by that beſt of ſacrifices, more acceptable than the fat of lambs, an active and willing obedience to his commands, and an unwearied diligence in executing his laws, as well ordinary as extraordinary.

On communicating this note to Mr. *Search*, who is ever ſollicitous that none of his vagaries ſhould do hurt to any body, he deſired me to caution ſuch of my Readers as may chance to catch the enthuſiaſm from him, that they give way to it no further than while it may warm their hearts, or raiſe their ideas, in thoſe ſeaſons only, wherein ſpeculation is proper; but to throw it wholly aſide when they enter into the common tranſactions, and common converſations of life; leſt they meet the miſhap of that Aſtronomer who gazing at the ſtars as he went along, ſaw nothing of the ground before him, and ſo plunged headlong into a miry ditch: and above all, to beware of fancying themſelves having an intercourſe, or being in any diſcoverable manner affected, with the ſpiritual ſubſtance wherewith he ſuppoſes them on all ſides cloſely ſurrounded.

[d] Mr. *Search*, from the beginning of his enquiries, has proceeded ſolely upon the fund of natural reaſon;

dients to anſwer unforeſeen emergencies, but contained in the original plan, which was purpoſely ſo framed as to need his interpoſing hand when, and where, and as often

not that he means to depreciate the treaſures afforded by Revelation, but having not had the reading ſufficient for qualifying him to examine the evidences of it, and being deſirous of going to the bottom in every part of his work, as being to deal with perſons who will not ſuffer him to take any thing upon truſt, he thought himſelf intitled to build only upon ſuch ground as he found in his poſſeſſion, to which no man would controvert his right of entry. So he ſet out with the examination of human Nature ;he then proceeded to contemplate the courſes of things around us, ſo far as they fell under our cognizance or obſervation; and from thence to gather what could be diſcovered with reaſonable aſſurance, concerning the Author of Nature. He is now returning downwards from the idea of God to the idea of thoſe of his works remaining to us inviſible: which are not to be counted matters of mere ſpeculation, being ſuch wherein we ourſelves are likely within a few years to have concern. In this part of his progreſs he is arrived at Providence, the title of his laſt preceeding chapter, wherein he entertains ſo large an idea of the divine Skill and Omniſcience, as to conceive it poſſible, in theory, that God might have compleated his univerſe from everlaſting, and reſted ever ſince from all his works; having formed nature once for all in ſuch admirable contrivance, that ſhe might run her appointed courſes for ever, without needing any further touch of his hand; the mun-

often as he predetermined to apply it. But in thoſe parts wherein he has thought proper to employ us as his inſtruments for executing them, to controul us in the exerciſe

dane ſoul, or ſpiritual ſubſtance, being provided with activity ſufficient to repair the continual decays of motion among matter, occaſioned by the colliſion of bodies. On the other hand, he did not find it incongruous with his notions of the Deity, to imagine him, in his firſt work, purpoſely leaving ſomething for himſelf afterwards to do; and laying his ſchemes broken in ſome parts, that there might be room for further application of his power, at ſuch times, and in ſuch manner, as he in his wiſdom judged proper. So the queſtion, Whether interpoſition or none, being equally tenable in theory on both ſides, remains to be decided by obſervation of facts. But he can find no poſitive evidence (bating thoſe recorded in ſacred Writ, which he cannot take into conſideration, as being beſide his plan) to ſatisfy him of an interpoſition, later than the formation of this earth, and the planetary ſyſtem: ſince which, as far as the eye of reaſon can diſcern, God ſeems to have reſted from his works. Yet he does not deſire to hinder others from believing frequent interpoſitions, made every day, or every hour of the day, if they ſee convincing proofs of them: hoping they will indulge him in retaining his own opinion, until he ſhall have ſufficient lights afforded him to diſcern the truth. And he wiſhes every one might be allowed the like liberty, without bringing a diſcredit upon himſelf from thoſe whom the uſe of it carries a different way. For he thinks men by much too haſty and

exercise of our powers would be to defeat his own designs, by disturbing the operation of those causes himself had chosen for the accomplishment of them.

Thus

and severe upon one another in their censures of Prophaneness and Superstition; the same notions being such to one, which are not so to his neighbour, according to their different apprehensions. The series of causes and events has been compared of old to a golden chain, hanging down from heaven, whereon the earth and elements, with all their contents, whether gods, or men, or animals, or vegetables, are suspended. Now we all agree that this chain is upholden by Almighty Power grasping it at the uppermost link; but which is that uppermost link, we greatly differ, and must necessarily do so while one man can see further, to count more links than another. To make the figure more apposite to our purpose, we will suppose the chain branched out into innumerable smaller ones, sustaining their respective weights among the productions of nature, and issues of fortune. Then in proportion as men have accustomed themselves to look at distant objects, they will acquire a more or less piercing sight; and consequently trace all, or some, or a few only of these little chains to the principal. But wherever they lose the connection, they must place a separate finger at the top of what remains, or the weight will have nothing to support it. Therefore the plain man is not superstitious in conceiving a multitude of interpositions, because without them he cannot conceive how the weight should be upholden by Almighty Power: neither is the studious man prophane in rejecting them, because

Thus he governs all things in heaven and earth by power and wiſdom conjointly, matter by neceſſity and impulſe, brutes by ſenſe and inſtinct, the bleſſed ſpirits above by

becauſe he diſcerns the whole ſuſtained by one effort of that power. For prophaneneſs is the reſting in ſecond cauſes without regard to the firſt; and ſuperſtition the calling in omnipotence needleſly; which muſt neceſſarily vary its form among mankind, as one perſon's needs differ from thoſe of another. But it is recommended to every man to remove the finger of God from him as far as poſſible, provided he never let it go out of ſight: for in ſo doing he will diſcern more of the divine Wiſdom, becauſe there is none in doing every thing by dint of force and authority. Were God to maintain us by raining manna from heaven as we wanted it; this would not diſplay his wiſdom, like the various proviſions he has made for ſupplying us with food by natural means. Were he to ſend his angel every morning to declare what each of us was to do for the day, and ſhower down his irreſiſtible Grace, to carry us through temptations that might urge us to diſobey him wilfully; we ſhould acknowledge his power, and his goodneſs, but ſee nothing of his wiſdom. But when he turns his numerous race of men abroad with various and diſcordant paſſions, inclinations, intereſts, talents, views, and opinions, ſo admirably adjuſted together, and diſtributed among them, as that they fullfil his will, in the accompliſhment of his purpoſes, while they think of nothing leſs: whoever has ſenſe and obſervation enough to underſtand this, muſt adore the wiſe contriver of ſo complicated

by ſignifications of his will, which they gladly and freely ſet themſelves to fulfil, man partly by neceſſary agents affecting him, partly by laws, reſtrictions, apprehenſions of miſchief and danger controuling him, and partly by leaving him to his free choice in following ſuch portion of underſtanding

a ſcheme. Now there is a juſtice to be obſerved between the attributes, nor muſt we ſuffer our zeal for one to magnify it at the expence of another. Therefore let us all, according to the ſtate of our reſpective imaginations, caſt them into ſuch ſcenes, as may give us the fulleſt repreſentation of the divine government in all its parts, without diſturbing one another in our manner of laying out the proſpect. Let not the devout religious man judge hardly of the rationaliſt, for aſcribing all to nature and ſecond cauſes, becauſe he ſees God at the birth of nature, planning down her courſes, and giving ſpring to the cauſes that produce events of all kinds, as well certain as caſual. Neither let the latter deny his leſs penetrating neighbour the benefit of a perpetual interpoſition, neceſſary to him for comprehending the adminiſtration of affairs throughout the world; becauſe the powers of nature appear to him as ſelf-moving, and the mazes of fortune ſtruck out every day afreſh by the blind ramblings of chance. And I believe if any perſon of a ſerious turn will recollect the ſyſtem of Providence he entertained in his youth, he will find it abounding in interpoſitions, which as he grew in knowledge and experience have gradually decreaſed.

ſtanding and appetites as himſelf has allotted him.

§. 21. Nor need we fancy ourſelves always in ſhackles, becauſe every moment under the dominion and conduct of Providence, for it has been ſhewn that Liberty has no concern with cauſes antecedent to the exerciſe of our power, but ſolely with what might ſtand in our way upon ſuch exerciſe: if I can do what I will, I have freedom of action, no matter how I came to will this or that particular employment: if I can chooſe as I will, I have freedom of choice, no matter what induced me to make one choice preferably to all others.

What then, are we mere puppets, actuated by ſprings and wires, becauſe it was given us both to will and to do? By no means; for when they are given us, we have as full and free liberty to uſe them both, as if they had fallen upon us by chance, or we had made them for ourſelves. If my father left me a good portion, I can do the ſame with it, and have as free diſpoſal

poſal of it, as if I had made the gold myſelf by tranſmutation with the Philoſopher's ſtone[a]: and if he brought me by the cares of his education, from a laviſh temper to prudence

[a] Ned was led into this thought by one of his own foibles: for you muſt know, he has long ſince gotten a mighty notion of the Philoſopher's ſtone; only inſtead of tranſmuting metals, he wants to tranſmute error into truth with it. For being of a peaceable diſpoſition, he does not love to overthrow, ſo much as to tranſmute. The proceſs whereby he thinks to effect this is, by diſtinctions, illuſtrations, conſtructions, explanations, and other methods known only to Adepts, to pick out the groſs particles from ſome doctrine that has hitherto been found poiſonous, and infuſe others in their room, thereby giving it a contrary quality. The curious Reader may find him exhibiting a ſpecimen of his art by and by upon preſcience, fate, and predeſtination; which from a lumpiſh ſaturnine ſubſtance, that uſed to lie heavy upon the digeſtion, generating black bile, damping the ſpirits, benumbing the active powers, and ſending up frightful phantoms to the brain, he will attempt to turn into an *aurum potabile*, that ſhall ſit eaſy upon the ſtomach, and enliven and invigorate like a ſalutary cordial. It was his reliance upon this art, that made him keep the former part of his works in reſerve: for having picked up ſome baſe metals in his reſearches, he choſe not to iſſue them forth, until he could find means of tranſmuting them properly into current ſterling.

When I have expoſtulated with him upon the folly of hunting after the Philoſopher's ſtone, he juſtified himſelf

prudence and œconomy, this does not impeach my liberty to ſquander it all away.

Nor have we reaſon to diſturb ourſelves with imaginations of a thraldom from ſecret

himſelf by the general practice. For, ſays he, there are multitudes of Traſmutors up and down every where; but the vexation is, they go to work the wrong way, converting gold into baſe metals. The Papiſts, Fanatics, and Methodiſts, have tranſmuted the golden ſtreams of religion into a kind of Mercury ſublimate, that inſinuates throughout the conſtitution, and intoxicates the brain; making men furious or fooliſh, curſing, damning, and worrying one another to pieces, or giving up their perſons, their eſtates, and their ſenſes to the diſpoſal of their leaders; leaving common ſenſe to run after illuminations, and turning the fancies of men into the counſels of God. The Free-thinkers have tranſmuted ſterling reaſon into tinſel witticiſm, productive of ſelf-conceit, and an aſſurance of victory; for when you begin to joke with a Diſputant, you do not deſerve to be talked with any longer; ſo your argument remains unanſwerable, and yourſelf maſter of the field. Our political writers have traſmuted liberty into licentiouſneſs, and the bare ſurmiſe of an infamous peace being intended, into a certain fact, for which a miniſter ought to be hanged, drawn, and quartered, in the judgement of all the zealous patriots of our tea-tables, coffee-houſes, and ale-houſes. Since then, ſays he, theſe operators have met with ſuch ſucceſs in the world, it ſhows there is ſomething in the art: and if they have uſed it perverſely,

cret influences, and unſeen ſprings, when thoſe that are manifeſt and ſeen do not work upon us by conſtraint; for ſometimes we may diſcern the influence that guides us, and yet find no thraldom in following whither it leads.

How much of our employment depends upon the natural appetites of hunger and thirſt? You may pretend indeed that theſe are

verſely, why ſhould not I turn it to better ſervice? Nor, if I can produce a ſingle grain of good metal, out of any droſs, ought I to incur blame for contributing my mite towards enriching the commonwealth of learning.

Beſides, ſays he, I find the Roſycrucian art very convenient for my private uſe: for I want no index expurgatorius. I may read *Spinoza*, *Machiavel*, *Tindal*, or *Weſley*'s Journals, with ſome emolument. For if I cannot do like *Virgil*, who was ſaid to pick up gold out of the dunghill of *Ennius*, yet I may imitate the arch-chymiſt, Sun, who every day tranſmutes that filthy ſubſtance into roſes and lilies, wheat, barley, and wholeſome vegetables. Indeed there are ſome ſtubborn ſubjects eluding all the powers of chymiſtry: ſuch as our weekly Diſſertations, popular Declamations, and retailings of Scandal and Obloquy againſt the Great: for they contain no ſolid ſubſtance at all, and it is impoſſible to make any thing out of whipped ſyllabub, or mere colouring.

are acts of neceſſity, becauſe we muſt eat, or ſtarve [b], but follow men to their meals, and you will not ſee one in a thouſand that eats becauſe he muſt, but becauſe he likes it; which of us ever ſits down to table by compulſion, or feels himſelf conſtrained to cut the joint before him, or perceives his tongue moved by ſtrings like a puppet when he calls for a glaſs of wine?

What ſhall we ſay to the mutual propenſity between the ſexes, another main ſpring in the hand of God, by which he preſerves the race of men upon earth? How many under twigs, what faſhions, contrivances, amuſements, accompliſhments, grow from that ſtem? but wherein does it check or overſhadow human liberty?

[b] In a former chapter, having occaſion to obſerve how commonly we miſtake our motives of action, he ſays, If any body ſhould aſk, why you take your ſtated meals of breakfaſt, dinner, and ſupper, I warrant you would anſwer, Becauſe I cannot live without eating. But if this were our real motive, we ſhould hardly play ſo good a knife, or put about the glaſs ſo briſkly as we do; for we might keep ourſelves alive with a great deal leſs trouble.

Do boys and girls meet together by compulſion, or choice? Is the Miſs under a force when ſhe culls among her trinkets with curious toil to tiff herſelf out in the moſt engaging manner, or teazes pappa for money to buy a new-faſhioned ſilk? Is the Beau compelled againſt his Will to practiſe winning airs before the glaſs, or employ for whole hours all the thought withinſide his noddle to bepowder and becurl the outſide[c]?

How ſtrongly does parental inſtinct operate upon us! 'Tis by this channel that God tranſmits arts and ſciences, education, eſtates, conveniencies of life, knowledge, and old experience from generation to generation. In this we ſee the finger of Providence and feel its potent touches[d], yet feel no limitation in our liberty therefrom: for what parent does not willingly go about the proviſions he makes for his children,

[c] My friend, like other Philoſophers, is a little ſlovenly in his dreſs; which makes him the readier to give a fly wipe at the contrary character.

[d] Honeſt *Ned* ſpeaks experimentally in this place; for nobody is more ſenſible to theſe touches than he.

or

or finds himſelf under any other direction than his own choice and judgement in the application of his cares for their advantage, or perceives himſelf moved by clock-work to procure any little toy, or diverſion for them?

§. 22. Our powers of action ſtand limited to a certain extent of ground, but within the encloſure we may ramble about as we pleaſe to take our paſture, or our paſtime: ſometimes there are reſtraints hanging over us, which confine us to particular walks, obligations and duties to be fulfilled, authority to be obeyed, wants to be ſupplied, neceſſaries of life to be provided, and it behoves us to regard theſe reſtrictions, or miſchief will enſue: but in many of our hours we have no limitations upon our conduct, and then we may move eaſily and lightly without the weight of any ſecret force or impediment encumbering us.

Nor need we fear leſt we may defeat the purpoſes of God, or make any breaches

in the plan of his Providence; for he knew what uſes we would make of our Liberty, and has provided his plan accordingly. Let the Princes run madly into broils, and the *Grecians* ſuffer, the Will of *Jove* is fulfilled by their madneſs, and will be, whatever conduct man ſhall purſue. Therefore we have but our own Will [a] to take care of; only let us not conſult ſolely

[a] Here underſtood, the Will of Inclination. Our Author has ſpent a whole chapter in defence of a doctrine that may ſeem heretical, both in natural and revealed Religion: for his ſubject being the *ſummum bonum*, or ultimate end of action, he places it ſolely in every man's own happineſs. But happineſs is the aggregate of pleaſures; and pleaſures, except ſome few of them, which fall upon us unexpectedly from ſenſation, conſiſt in the gratification of our reſpective deſires; for what pleaſes one perſon, may give pain to another, who has a contrary taſte. So a man has nothing elſe to do, than ſtudy how he may beſt gratify his deſires. Now this looks like an exhortation to purſue every ſudden whim as it ſtarts up in our fancy, and will be ſo taken, until we ſhall ſee how he has tranſmuted it. For he ſays, this is not the way to gratification: he owns, indeed, that deſire is the beſt friend we have; becauſe but for it, our lives would paſs inſipid and irkſome; nevertheleſs he exhorts men not to forget their abſent friends, nor gratify one deſire

ſolely our preſent Will and Fancy, but pay a due regard to what we may will to-morrow; and in our deliberations and execution of the prudential meaſures for procuring

deſire preſent to their thoughts, at the expence of another that may ſollicit by and by. But when they have divers meaſures of conduct lying before them for their option, and ſtand in a ſituation to diſcern all the conſequences reſulting therefrom, let them chuſe ſuch as will procure them moſt gratification upon the whole. If they ſit down to a table plentifully ſtored with high-dreſſed viands, and find in themſelves a ſtrong inclination to eat unmeaſurably; while doing this they add to their happineſs; therefore ſo far they do well. But what if ſuch indulgence will bring on ſickneſs of ſtomach, incapacity for buſineſs, converſation, or other diverſion, hurt their fortune, or their reputation, or ſit heavy upon their conſcience: conſequences they will vehemently diſlike when falling upon them? Or, tho' they do not foreſee theſe effects, yet are warned againſt them by the moral ſenſe, or rules of ſobriety founded upon the general obſervation of their expedience? If they ſtill indulge, they are very ill providers for gratification. A true lover of money will make any ſhift rather than call in what he has ſtanding out at intereſt on good ſecurity: and a true lover of pleaſure will undergo any ſelf-denial, that tends to greater enjoyment. For 'tis the want of knowing the value of money, that makes the young Spend-thrift encumber his reverſions for the ſake of raiſing a ſum in hand: and 'tis the like want of knowing the value of happi-

curing what we ſhall will to have another time, we may proceed with the ſame freedom as if there were no ſuperiour power [b] over us.

neſs, that puts the voluptuous upon mortgaging their future expectations for a little preſent indulgence.

He obſerves likewiſe, that gratification being relative to deſire, there are two ways of attaining it: either by procuring the objects of our deſire, or by turning deſire upon the objects in our power, or which may be convenient for us. If I have port in my cellar, but wiſh for claret; or if I have claret, but have likewiſe the gout, to which it would be hurtful; I ſhall be gratified alike, either by ordering in claret in the one caſe, and getting rid of my gout in the other; or by bringing myſelf to a liking of the liquor I have and may drink without inconvenience. Now men are ready enough of their own accord to purſue the former of theſe two methods: ſo the Moraliſt need only exhort them to the latter. And it becomes the Miſer in happineſs to take that of the two upon every occaſion which he finds the moſt feaſible, or likely to yield him the greateſt income. If he has money enough to ſpare for the claret, or a ſure ſpecific againſt the gout, he will pleaſe his palate: but if he knows not where to get either of theſe, he will enure his mind to enjoy herſelf over a glaſs of common port.

[b] He does not mean, no authority it is incumbent upon us to regard, but no ſtronger power able to controul us in the exerciſe of our faculties.

And the moſt uſeful deliberation we can enter upon, is how to enlarge our freedom, for all are ready enough to allow that Happineſs conſiſts in liberty to do what we will, nor ſhall I contradict them, ſo they do not reſtrain Will to that of the preſent moment. We commonly underſtand by our Will what our Judgement repreſents as moſt eligible, or our Inclination prompts to as moſt alluring; and whenever theſe two coincide, our Will is quite free; therefore ſo far as we can bring deſire to tally with reaſon, we ſhall enlarge the bounds of our liberty; and if we could do this compleatly ſo as to make a virtue of every neceſſity, and a pleaſure of every obligation, we ſhould never have any reſtraint hanging over us, but attain a perfect liberty; becauſe willing always what was right and feaſible, we ſhould always do what we would.

And this perfect liberty would more apparently, though not more really coincide with the plan of Providence than that pittance of it we now poſſeſs; for then we

ſhould fulfill the Will of God knowingly, whereas now we fulfill it, but unknowingly, and many times by ſetting ourſelves moſt ſtrenuouſly to oppoſe it.

Foreknowledge.

§. 23. And now we might think the controverſy ended, and all difficulties got over, the freedom of Will being fully reconciled with the authority and dominion of God: but the buſy mind of man, ingenious in finding new perplexities to involve itſelf in, will not let us reſt quiet ſo; but ſeeing light open upon one ſpot, ſhifts the ſcene to ſome other corner, where it may cover itſelf with clouds and obſcurity; and as if fond of ſlavery, endeavours to derive a title thereto from another quarter, namely, that of Foreknowledge.

For, ſay the fine Reaſoners, if your actions are foreknown, you can do no otherwiſe than it is known you will do; ſo your hands are tied down to one particular manner of proceeding, nor are you at liberty to take any other than that you ſhall purſue.

But

But why ſo? what connection is there between another's knowledge, and my behaviour? it may poſſibly direct his own meaſures, but has no influence at all upon mine. You allow that while my actions remain unknown to every body I may be free; what then if after my being in poſſeſſion of this freedom ſome ſhrewd Politician ſhould diſcover what I will do, how does that diveſt me of it, in what reſpect alter my condition, or by what channel of communication does his diſcovery operate upon me?

No, ſay they, you miſtake the grounds of our objection; we do not aſſign his knowledge as a cauſe of any thing you do, nor pretend it lays any reſtraint upon your liberty; we only produce it as an evidence of another reſtraint hanging over you; for he could not know how you will behave, unleſs it were certain; therefore his knowing is a proof that you will certainly do as he knows; but what will certainly come to paſs cannot fall out otherwiſe; ſo you have

no

no liberty left, becauſe you cannot do what will never be done.

But how does this alter the caſe? wherein is the difference between Certainty and Knowledge? Why yes, the difference lies here, that Certainty is the object of Knowledge, though ſhe may not have caſt her eye upon it; therefore is a different thing, as having exiſted before it; for your diſcovery did not make the Certainty, but preſuppoſes it; for the thing was certain before, though you did not know it.

But what ſort of thing is this Certainty to which you aſcribe ſuch irreſiſtible force? let us know what rank of Beings to place it under? is it a ſubſtance? or if a quality or accident, in what ſubſtance does it reſide? for we generally apply it to propoſitions which are only judgements of the mind. It is no agent, it is no power, nor has any efficacy in its ſtate of pre-exiſtence to knowledge; for were it ever ſo certain the houſe was on fire, this would influence none of my actions until I know it.

§. 24.

§. 24. If Certainties have any active virtue, it is to generate one another; all our rules of logic ſhow us that ſome truths are ſuch in conſequence of other truths: if it certainly will rain to-morrow, it is certain there will be clouds in the air; if it be certain the gun I make tryal of will go off, then the flint will certainly ſtrike fire; and in general the certainty of Events infers the certainty of all cauſes operating to produce them: therefore whatever acts of my Freewill are certain, I muſt certainly have the freedom to do them.

We may indeed frame propoſitions concerning future events, without thinking of the manner how they will come to paſs; but remember your own obſervation, that knowledge does not make certainty, but finds it; much leſs can any form of words make, or the omiſſion of them deſtroy it: therefore whether you ſpeak and think of them or no, the ſame propoſitions may be applied, and the ſame certainty belong to the operating cauſes, be they Force or Free-

Freewill, as to the events, and the certainty of each reciprocally, implies the other.

Suppoſe you under an engagement to meet a perſon at any particular place, and have a ſtrong inclination to go ſomewhere elſe, nevertheleſs you have too much honour to break your word; but perhaps the man will ſend five minutes hence to releaſe you from the engagement, and then you will go where you like: now if it be certain you ſhall go there, muſt it not be equally certain the reſtraint will be taken off, and you ſet at perfect liberty to follow your choice? And if any body had affirmed both a thouſand years ago, he would have ſpoken truth; for while the one remained fortuitous, the other could not be certain: ſo likewiſe in all inſtances of free Agency, the certainty of the action caſts a certainty upon the freedom of the Agent; and the certain Foreknowledge of our voluntary proceedings is ſo far from overthrowing, that it eſtabliſhes human liberty upon a firmer bottom than it has really belonging to it.

For

For we may obſerve further, that this argument unluckily proves too much; becauſe if whatever ſhall happen, it be abſolutely impoſſible that it ſhould not happen; then in ſuch inſtances wherein we have our freedom, the debarring us the uſe of it was from all eternity an abſolute impoſſibility, inſurmountable even by Omnipotence itſelf; ſo that inſtead of being dependant in all our motions upon neceſſary cauſes, we ſhall become independent on the firſt, the ſupreme Fountain of all power and action.

And for ought I know, the Devil might have employed this ſophiſm when he rebelled, to prove himſelf his own maſter; for feeling himſelf in poſſeſſion of freedom, it was always true, that he ſhould be free; nor could Omnipotence itſelf prevent his being ſo: or he might have beguiled himſelf into his fall, and juſtified his diſobedience, by arguing in the following manner. If any one had ſaid before I was made, that I ſhould be, he would have ſpoken truth; therefore it was certain that

I ſhould be, therefore an abſolute impoſſibility that I ſhould not be; ſo God could not help creating me, nor do I owe any thanks to the Almighty for my exiſtence.

§. 25. What dependance or countenance does this argument deſerve? which is ſuch a *Dromocanſir* as to cut down both friend and foe; or like a ſwivel gun, may be pointed upon any quarter, fore and aft, ſtarboard and larboard; and what is worſe, we find it generally, in the hands of ſloth and depravity, turned againſt the lawful authority of reaſon and prudence.

For when men are too lazy to beſtir themſelves, or too fond of a fooliſh thing to be put aſide from it by their cleareſt judgement, they then catch hold of this idle pretence, what will be, muſt be; therefore why need I take pains, or deliberate at all? for my actions will have ſome certain iſſue, and if certain, it is neceſſary, and if neceſſary, the event will work itſelf out ſome how or other, without my giving myſelf any trouble to compaſs it.

But

But who ever argues in this manner, when they have ſome favourite paſſion to gratify? They then can ſtudy and contrive, ſet all their wits to work, and uſe all their might to accompliſh their deſigns: whereas if they think conſiſtently, there is the ſame certainty in matters of inclination, as of prudence and duty; whatever they wiſh, muſt have ſome certain iſſue one way or other, and is either unattainable in ſpite of their utmoſt endeavours, or will drop into their mouths without their ſeeking. And thus they may go on to argue themſelves out of all activity whatever, ſo as neither to take up the victuals from their plate, or move away from the fire when it burns their ſhins.

§. 26. But theſe fantaſtical remoras do not obſtruct us in the familiar tranſactions of life, nor do they ever enter into the head of a common man. If a poor fellow has done me ſome ſignal ſervice, and I call to him — Hark ye, *Tim*; do you ſee that ſack of peaſe in the barn-floor yonder? there

there are a couple of guineas in it ſomewhere; if you can find them they are your own. Now I know well enough he will get the money; for he will take out every pea one by one but he will come at it; but I know as well that he cannot find it without a good deal of pains and rummaging.

Suppoſe one of your profound Speculatiſts were by, and ſhould tell him, Why, *Tim*, you need not put yourſelf in a hurry to go a rummaging; you may as well ſit with your noſe over the kitchen fire; for *Search* knows you will get the money; therefore it is a thing certain, and you muſt have it whether you do any thing, or no. This logic would hardly prevail upon *Tim* to ſtop his ſpeed for a moment.

Or ſuppoſe another ſubtile refiner ſets the matter in a different light: *Tim*, ſays he, is a mere machine in this caſe utterly deſtitute of liberty; for not only his getting the money, but his rummaging the ſack is foreknown; ſo his action is certain and neceſſary, nor can he help rummaging any more than the great clock can help ſtriking.

Tim

Tim being an arch fellow replies, Ay, but Maſter, for all that I could ſtay here and never meddle with the ſack, if I were fool enough to run the hazard of ſomebody elſe getting away the money before me; and if you'll give me three and forty ſhillings to try, I'll ſhow you what I can do.

How many times a day do we foreknow our own actions, and thoſe of other people, yet feel ourſelves and perceive them free in the performance? Our liberty is ſo apparent that the Philoſopher with his microſcope [a], and the Ploughman with his half an eye, can diſcern it diſtinctly through the veil of Certainty and Foreknowledge: 'tis only the half-reaſoner, who hangs between both,

[a] Our Author diſcovered his having a Microſcope while at work on his chapter of Satisfaction, on happening for once to ſpin a thread ſomewhat finer than Mr. *Locke*. He ſeemed mightily pleaſed with it, as finding it aſſiſt him greatly in his tranſmutations; and talked much of it at firſt, but has not mentioned it a good while until now. Yet he ſtill continues to uſe it, as the diſcerning Reader may perceive, by ſome microſcopic obſervations upon Liberty, upon Agency,

both, and uſes a glaſs full of flaws, that hunts for it in vain, or ſees it confuſedly.

§. 27. It is the crinkles in this glaſs making objects appear double, and repreſenting each individual as two diſtinct things, which produces that diſtinction urged by ſome people between human Preſcience and divine, as if one might be compatible with human Liberty, though the other were repugnant.

But why ſo? for it is not the party knowing, but the intrinſic certainty of the fact that lays the reſtraint: now as man cannot know what is uncertain, ſo neither if there were any thing abſolutely fortuitous,

Volency, and Electancy; upon Powers operating, or operated upon, in §. 2, 13, 17, & *paſſim*. He ſays, this little inſtrument is abſolutely neceſſary for a Mathematician or a Philoſopher; but a common magnifying glaſs, ſuch as we buy for children to play with, will do well enough for a Freethinker; becauſe it ſerves to diſcover doubts and objections, that a man with his common ſenſes would never think of, and magnifies them ſufficiently, but ſcarce ever reaches to a ſolution.

could

could it be foreknown even to God [a]; therefore Knowledge, wherever reſiding, is alike evidence of Certainty.

Very true, ſay they, where the knowledge is of the ſame kind; but our's is only conjectural; whereas that of God is abſolute: we all confeſs the human Underſtanding fallible at beſt, nor ever ſo ſure of her hits, but there remains a poſſibility of her being miſtaken, and it is this poſſibility that opens the door to Liberty.

Here, by the way, I cannot help remarking how ready ſome folks are to blow hot and cold with the ſame breath, as either ſerves the turn: if I happen in company to drop a hint like thoſe ſuggeſted in my chapter on Judgement [b], that Certainty, mathematical

[a] There are ſome who hold Eternity a ſtanding point with him, and the future to be equally preſent with the current moment: but in this caſe the Knowledge would not be Preſcience, but direct Intuition, which does not affect the Argument before us.

[b] Where the Author falls into downright Scepticiſm: for after having overthrown all Knowledge, except of one thing, which is that we know nothng, he proceeds to take away this too, and proves demonſtratively,

mathematical Certainty, was not made for man, and that we know no more, if ſo much, than the appearances exhibited this preſent moment to our ſenſes, and the ideas actually in our thought; I am exclaimed againſt for an arrant Sceptic, a Viſionary, a Trifler, advancing things I do not believe myſelf. What! cry they, do not we know certainly that the Judges will ſit in *Weſtminſter-hall* this term; that the Servant will lay the cloth for dinner; that we ourſelves ſhall go to bed to-night? Yet theſe very people, like crafty Politicians, now the intereſts of their argument require it, can take the oppoſite ſide, and ſtrike up a coalition with the fallibility of human

that we dont know whether we know any thing or not. For which *Socrates* in the viſion compliments him, as being a wiſer man than himſelf, who was declared wiſeſt by the Oracle: for he it ſeems had fancied he did know that he knew nothing; whereas our Author's greater ſagacity had diſcovered that he did not know even this.

I need not tell the Reader, he made his eſcape out of this dungeon, becauſe he finds him abroad in open daylight, pretending to know ſeveral things in the very laſt Section.

Under-

Underſtanding in her ſtrongeſt aſſurances. Perhaps the Judges will not ſit, for the hall may be ſwallowed up by an earthquake; perhaps the Servant will not lay the cloth, for he may be ſtruck with an apoplexy; perhaps we ſhall not go to bed, for the houſe may take fire: Were theſe caſualties, which depend upon external cauſes, alledged in diminution of Liberty, they might carry ſome weight; but what efficacy they can have to encreaſe it, I cannot diſcern with beſt uſe of the microſcope.

But waving this, if bare Poſſibility may give opening enough to ſet us free, this ſame Mr. *Liberty* muſt be a very ſlender gentleman, to creep in at ſuch an auger-hole: yet let us conſider whether he does get his whole body through, or only thruſt in a little finger at moſt; for we have ſeen there are degrees of Liberty conſiſtent with a partial Reſtraint. When I put on my great coat and boots, I can ſtill move my limbs, though not ſo freely as before: when in town I have not the ſame liberty as in

the country; I muſt not go out in my cap and ſlippers; I muſt not carry a bundle under my arm; if *Elizabetha Petrowna*, whom I never ſaw nor cared for, happens to die two thouſand miles off, I muſt not wear a coloured coat, for ſo the great goddeſs, *Faſhion*, that *Diana* of *Epheſus*, whom all the world worſhippeth, ordains; yet ſhe graciouſly allows me ſome latitude in my dreſs and motions; for I may go armed with a ſword I know not how to uſe, and ſaunter away the day in coffee-houſes, or ſpend the night in toſſing about a pack of cards, without offence to her delicacy.

Now I believe my Antagoniſts and I, how ſlightingly ſoever we have ſpoken of human Underſtanding, ſhall agree that in ſome inſtances our Knowledge grounds upon evidence, which makes it a million to one we are in the right: and ſince an Event may be probable, as well as certain, though we do not know ſo much, it muſt then contain an intrinſic probability independent on our knowledge or conjecture.

But

But this probability, being ſo near of kin to certainty, that the acuteſt Philoſophers could never find a criterion to diſtinguiſh them, may be preſumed to have the family ſtrength, though not in equal meaſure; and if one totally overthrows liberty, the other muſt faſten a clog upon it proportionable to the degree of the probability; ſo that in caſes of the higheſt aſſurance we ſhould find ourſelves reduced to the condition of a perſon who ſhould have ſo many weights hung about him, that one millionth part added more, would render him uncapable of ſtirring at all.

§. 28. But if this will not do, and they inſiſt upon Probability being totally different from Certainty in kind and efficacy, and that one has no force at all, though the other be irreſiſtible, let them contemplate an object, wherein they muſt needs acknowledge both perpetual Freedom and abſolute Foreknowledge; for I hope they will not deny God to be perfectly free in all his proceedings. If there

be ſuch a thing in nature as freedom, where can it reſide, if not in the ſupreme Author of all powers, to whom there is nothing ſuperior that might controul him? Yet I ſuppoſe they will ſcarce imagine all his meaſures ſudden, and his actions fortuitous, or that he does not know to-day what he will do to-morrow.

But if certainty infers neceſſity, then either he foreſees no better than we do, that is conjecturally, when he will ſtop the torrents of blood that overwhelm *Europe*, the diſtreſſes, the ruins, the havock and deſolation that ſpread over land and ſea, and reſtore peace to Chriſtendom, or his hands in the interim remain tied to do it at one preciſe time, nor is he at liberty to advance the happy event one moment ſooner[a]. Nay, we ſhall not ſtop here; for if a propoſition had been affirmed from everlaſting concerning any work of Providence that has been performed, it would have been true: therefore God from all

[a] This was wrote before any overtures for a treaty of Pacification were publickly known.

eternity

eternity was neceſſitated to create and govern his worlds preciſely in the manner he has done; and ſo, according to the deviliſh fine reaſoning uſed at the end of §. 24. we are not obliged to him, but to the iron-handed goddeſs Neceſſity, for our life, our health, our daily bread, and all the bleſſings we receive.

Perhaps they will alledge the caſe is different here; for the acts of God are ſuch only as he had determined upon himſelf, therefore in performing them he executed his own will: but let them remember, that they placed the neceſſity in the intrinſic certainty of the fact, not in the cauſes operating to produce it; for if they admit theſe, then the cauſe of our free actions being the freedom we have to perform them, will evidence itſelf, inſtead of proving our bondage: but, according to them, when a fact is certain, it is neceſſary, no matter why, or how, it came to be ſo; and equally certain, whether proceeding from the agent's own determination or ſome external cauſe: for if what will be, muſt be, then whatever

God foreknows will be done by himſelf as well as by us, becomes alike certain, nor can even omnipotence prevent it from taking effect [b].

Thus we ſee the ſame ill luck attends the argument wherever we turn it; for if it proves any thing, it proves more than it ſhould; nor can it infringe upon human liberty, without encroaching upon God himſelf.

Neither let them throw in my teeth what I have reported from *Pythagoras* concerning the oath of *Jove*; for this was only a figurative expreſſion, to denote the unchangeableneſs of the divine nature: if God has ſworn, his oath is ſacred, becauſe we know

[b] To this argument might be added another. For I ſuppoſe every pious man eſteems it certain, that God will reward the good and puniſh the evil-doer; that he will maintain the laws of nature, not throw all things into confuſion, nor annihilate the beings he has created. Thus human preſcience extends in ſome caſes to the divine agency. But if certainty inferred neceſſity, then either God muſt not be free to diſpoſe of us in what manner he judges proper, or it muſt remain totally uncertain how he will uſe his power.

he

he will keep it[c], being not liable, like man, to change his ſentiments, or deſign one thing to-day and the contrary to-morrow; but nobody imagines him under any compulſion or neceſſity; in caſe he could be ſuppoſed at any time deſirous of violating it; ſo that when he performs, he acts with the

[c] Being part of the lecture delivered in the viſion. From which oath the laws of nature received their ſtability, and the courſes of events befalling men their certain appointment. *Dacier* would have ſaid, the philoſopher took this hint from the covenant made with *Noah*, that day and night, ſeed-time and harveſt, ſhould never fail. And our Roſycrucian took the hint from *Dacier*, to practiſe with his art chymical upon the ſublime myſteries imparted to him. For the Samian ſage having broached ſo many heatheniſh inventions of a preexiſtence, a mundane ſoul, diſcerptions and abſorptions, tranſmigrations, eternity *à parte ante* of created beings, limited duration of puniſhments, homogenity of ſpirits, their differences reſulting from their reſpective compoſitions with matter, that he was afraid of being thought a bad man himſelf for conforting with ſuch wicked company. So he went to work upon his tranſmuting proceſs, wherein he ſucceeded ſo luckily, that having ventured to read over the whole lecture to a learned divine, a man of very good diſcernment, he cried out at the concluſion, with a kind of rapturous ſurprize: Why *Search!* you have made *Pythagoras* an orthodox Chriſtian.

ſame

ſame pure bounty and unlimited freedom as when he promiſes.

§. 29. When we examine what gave riſe to this notable diſcovery of every thing certain being neceſſary, we ſhall find it ſpring from a mere quibble of words. What you will do, ſay they, you muſt do; for you cannot do both. Who doubts it? Therefore I allow this to be matter of neceſſity, not of prudence; nor would I recommend it to any man to deliberate, or make trial, how he ſhall run and ſit ſtill at the ſame time, or ride on horſeback while he goes in a coach: but for all that, what ails him that he might not omit the thing he has reſolved upon, or will do, and take a contrary courſe? How ſure ſoever I am of going to bed, ſtill I may ſit up all night, if I pleaſe, for neither God nor man hinders me; but I know I ſhall not, becauſe I know it is in my option, and know what I chuſe to do: ſo my knowledge ſtands upon my freedom; for if I had it not, I might be compelled to do what

what I do not chuſe, and my action would be uncertain.

But my Knowledge they ſay is only conjectural. What then? does not God know it too? and does not he know likewiſe, that he has left the iſſue to my option? and whether he has given me ſo much diſcretion as will withhold me from doing a ſilly thing merely to ſhew what I can do? So theſe three points of Knowledge, the Diſcretion, the Liberty to uſe it, and the Event, are ſo far from overthrowing that they ſuſtain and ſtrengthen one another.

The difficulties we make ſpring from our conceiving too narrowly of the divine preſcience; we conſider God as foreknowing an event ſeparately, without knowing, or without contemplating the cauſes giving it birth: in this caſe indeed the Foreknowledge muſt have a ſomething, an inexplicable fatality attending it, for elſe it could not be abſolute, becauſe there might ſome unforeſeen cauſe intervene to render it abortive. But the preſcience of God is univerſal as well as abſolute; when he knows what will

will come to paſs, he knows the cauſes himſelf has provided for accompliſhing it, nor can any body who conſiders the matter at all imagine him ever ignorant or forgetful of either; nay, he knows the one, becauſe he knows the other: for if we could ſuppoſe him ignorant of the cauſes, he would not know their iſſue: therefore in ſuch inſtances where freedom is one of thoſe cauſes, he foreknows that freedom, the motives inclining us to uſe it, and how thoſe motives will operate; and conſequently by the rule inſiſted on, it is as neceſſary we ſhould enjoy that freedom, as in what manner we ſhall employ it.

§. 30. Nevertheleſs they go on ſtill to urge, that we cannot do otherwiſe than we ſhall do, not only becauſe we cannot do both, but becauſe we cannot omit what we certainly ſhall do, and take another courſe: for an event that will certainly happen, cannot fail of coming to paſs, nor can the contrary take effect; but the divine preſcience is an irrefragable evidence of this

cer

certainty, becauſe if the thing were uncertain, the Foreknowledge could not be abſolute. Now there is no poſſibility that God ſhould be miſtaken; therefore none that any thing foreknown by him ſhould not take effect, or the contrary ſhould fall out; then it is not poſſible for us to omit whatever it is impoſſible ſhould fail of being done; ſo our power is gone; or if we have a natural ability either to do or to omit, we have no liberty to uſe it, being confined to that particular way which is foreknown.

Now if they will pleaſe to throw this curious reaſoning into the logical form of a ſyllogiſm, we may chance to ſhew them it has four terms, and therefore concludes nothing. Whatever God foreknows, it is impoſſible the contrary ſhould be done; what is impoſſible to be done, it is out of my power to do; therefore whatever God foreknows, it is out of my power to do the contrary.

I ſhall not deny *major* nor *minor*; but if the word *impoſſible* ſhould carry different ſenſes as it ſtands in either, the whole chain will become a rope of ſand, and the conſequence

ſequence limp lame behind. In order to canvaſs this point, let us have recourſe to our preſent patroneſs Philology, to mark out the ſeveral uſes wherein we employ that term, together with others relative thereto, ſuch as, *muſt*, *may*, *can*, *neceſſary*, and the like, both in our familiar and ſerious diſcourſes.

Poſſible, relates originally and moſt obviouſly to Power; for things are poſſible as far as we have power to perform them, but no farther: and if it be aſked, Whether it is poſſible to tranſmute lead into gold? you will underſtand by the queſtion, whether it is in the power of man, by chymical proceſs, or any other art or contrivance, to effect it.

But we often apply the term where we have nothing of power in our thoughts. Suppoſe, in playing at whiſt, I have only two cards left in my hand, but muſt win both tricks to ſave the game; my partner leads a trump, and the king was turned up on my left hand, in this caſe I ſhall put down the ace with hopes of ſucceeding, becauſe it

it is poſſible the king may be alone. Now by poſſible, I do not mean in the power of any body, or any thing, to make the king alone, or guarded: if chance ever had any power, ſhe has executed it as ſoon as the cards were ſhuffled and cut, nor has ſhe now any further concern in the affair. Therefore here the term denotes only the contingency of what other card lies in the ſame hand with the king, and is relative; for to him who holds the cards it is not poſſible they ſhould be any other than what he ſees them, though to me who do not ſee them, guarded or not guarded are equally poſſible.

On the other hand, whoever conſiders the pains I have taken on this crabbed ſubject, will think it impoſſible I ſhould throw my labours into the fire as ſoon as I have compleated them: not that he thinks any thing of my powers, or ſuppoſes me to plod on until my arm is ſo benumbed that I cannot extend it to the grate, or that I write upon cloth of Aſbeſtos, which will not conſume in the Flames, but becauſe he

thinks there is no chance I ſhould inſtantly deſtroy what I have been ſo earneſt to produce.

Thus Poſſible ſometimes denotes the Power or Liberty we have to do a thing, as Impoſſible does the want of it, and ſometimes only the contingency, or our knowledge or ignorance of an event, without the leaſt reference to the powers producing it. There may be different degrees of poſſibility in what manner I ſhall ſpend my afternoon, according as people know more or leſs of my character, diſpoſition, or ways of employing my time: but my power and my liberty muſt be the ſame, whatever other folks think of me, or though there ſhould be a hundred different opinions or degrees of knowledge about me. If I am under engagement to go with another whither he wants me, and ſomebody aſks which way I am bound, I may ſay, 'tis poſſible to the Exchange, or 'tis poſſible to St. James's, but this leaves me no more at liberty than if it were abſolutely impoſſible that one of them ſhould not be the place. Or if I want

ſpeak with a perſon whom I know not readily where he is, but am ſo ſure of finding him, that I ſay it is impoſſible but I muſt ſee him; this does not abridge or any ways alter the liberty I ſhould have to purſue or forbear my enquiries, were it poſſible my endeavours might prove ineffectual.

It avails nothing to tell us, that our knowledge at beſt can amount only to the higheſt probability of conjecture; for our buſineſs now lies with the propriety of language, and natural import of thoſe expreſſions, wherein we uſe the words Poſſible or Impoſſible: whatever refined notions we may have in our cloſets, we leave them behind, and take up common conceptions when we go abroad upon our common tranſactions; be our cleareſt knowledge ever ſo conjectural, we eſteem it certain upon theſe occaſions: which of us in ſetting out upon a viſit, a diverſion, or an affair of buſineſs, apprehends a poſſibility of not arriving at the place of his deſtination, yet at the ſame time does not apprehend himſelf

at liberty to alter his courſe in any part of his progreſs? but if the impoſſibility of an event failing, implied neceſſity in the agent, the idea of ſuch impoſſibility, however erroneous, yet while entertained, muſt baniſh the idea of freedom; but whether it does ſo, I appeal to the judgement and hourly experience of all mankind. And if our Antagoniſts have found a new ſenſe in the word Impoſſible, unknown to the reſt of the world, they will do well to explain their idea in a manner enabling us to underſtand their peculiar meaning.

To conſider the other words of the like import, we ſay it may rain, or be fair to-morrow; and when we ſay this, we think nothing of any choice in the clouds, or the air to produce either weather, as the word naturally implies; for what we may do lies in our option to do, or to forbear. And it is one thing, when ſpeaking of a priſoner for debt, for whom we have juſt procured a releaſe, we ſay, Now he may go home to his family; and quite another, when ſpeaking of a perſon gone out upon

a tour

a tour of diverſion, we ſay, He may come home to-day: in one caſe, May expreſſes the liberty he has to do as he likes; in the other, it denotes only the chance there is in what manner he will uſe his liberty; for though I ſhould know the releaſed debtor will not go home, ſtill I ſhall think he may if he will; but if I know the traveller's intention to ſtay out longer, I ſhall not think it poſſible he may come home to-day.

Nor ſhould we ſcruple to uſe the word Can upon this occaſion; for if we judge it not poſſible that he may come, it is the ſame thing as believing it certain he cannot come, yet without idea of any imbecillity or reſtraint to prevent him.

So likewiſe Muſt and Neceſſary, conſidered by themſelves, imply a force compelling to one particular action, or an unſurmountable bar againſt all others: if I muſt attend upon a tryal, I am not at liberty to ſtay away; if my health renders exerciſe neceſſary, I muſt go abroad ſome how or other, and in that caſe am neceſſitated

to walk when debarred the uſe of all conveyances. But ſuppoſe a friend has ſome buſineſs with me, which requires no ſort of haſte, but I know he loves to take the firſt convenient opportunity for diſpatching whatever he has to do: upon being aſked when I expect to ſee him, I may ſay, perhaps not to-day, nor to-morrow, nor all this week; but I think he muſt neceſſarily come before the month is out.

Nor do we ſcruple applying the ſame terms to things inanimate, which though really neceſſary agents, we generally conceive and ſpeak of as having powers and liberty. Water compreſſed in a fire engine muſt neceſſarily ruſh through the ſpout, being forced to mount upwards againſt its nature, and becauſe it can find no other vent. But if a careleſs ſervant does not mind to thruſt the ſpigot faſt into the barrel, the beer muſt neceſſarily run all away: in uſing this expreſſion, we think nothing of the force of gravitation impelling bodies downwards, but only the certainty of the miſchief enſuing which we apprehend, for that the liquor

liquor being left to its liberty will follow the natural propenſity it has to deſcend, and will exert a power to drive away the looſe ſpigot obſtructing its paſſage.

§. 31. Any body with a little attention, may recollect a thouſand inſtances wherein the impoſſibility of an event not coming to paſs, implies no more than a denial of all hazard that it may not come to paſs, which is neither an affirmation nor denial of power or freedom in the cauſes bringing it forth to produce the contrary. Therefore in caſes where we need not, or lie under no neceſſity of doing a thing, where we can, and may, and it is eaſily poſſible for us to act differently, yet we may be ſo ſure of our meaſures as that they muſt neceſſarily take effect, that they cannot, there is an impoſſibility they ſhould fail of ſucceeding, or we ſhould omit to employ them; which latter impoſſibility is a foundation ſtrong enough to ſupport the higheſt degree of Foreknowledge, and conſequently Foreknowledge may well be abſolute without

putting a force upon us, or cramping us the leaſt in our liberty.

Thus have I endeavoured to reſcue mankind from ſlavery, from the dread of force, reſtraint and controul hanging continually over them, not like *Epicurus* by pulling Providence from her throne, and ſetting up the Anarchy of Chance in her ſtead; but by ſhowing the conſiſtency of her government with the free uſe of thoſe powers allotted us, and proving human liberty one of the miniſters to execute her purpoſes.

If the foregoing Obſervations upon this dark and intricate Subject ſhall render it intelligible to others, and ſhall have the ſame weight upom them as they ſeem to me to deſerve: then in thoſe ſeaſons wherein, as I may ſay, God gives them a holiday to follow their own inclinations, they will move briſkly and cheerfully, without thought of any other reſtraint than, what I hope they will never wiſh to throw aſide, Innocence and Propriety; and when he calls them to his ſervices, if they do but manage to bring their minds into a proper

diſpo-

diſpoſition, they will find the performance of them a ſtate of perfect Freedom.

§. 32. Nevertheleſs we have not done with our Diſputants yet, for if we can defend our Liberty againſt infringement by univerſal Providence and abſolute Foreknowledge, they change their attack upon another quarter, namely, the juſtice of Reward and Puniſhment in the ſituation of mankind we have repreſented: for, ſay they, if the Will of God be fulfilled on earth as well as in heaven, who hath ever reſiſted his Will? why then doth he puniſh? As to Reward, they find no fault with that being conferred upon them unmerited, ſo the only difficulty remains with reſpect to puniſhment; and in order to anſwer their queſtion, let us examine what is the proper and natural foundation of Puniſhment. Demerit.

Men are apt enough to inflict it for injuries received, with no other view than to wreak their reſentment, and the Righteous, when having moſt compleatly maſtered their

their paſſions, ſtill feel an abhorrence riſe in their breaſts againſt enormous crimes, although no ways affecting themſelves, nor capable of hurting them. What then, is this Reſentment and this Abhorrence innate? Suppoſe they were, yet we cannot aſcribe our paſſions and averſions to the Almighty, or imagine him puniſhing in order to remove a loathſome object from his ſight which it gives him pain to behold. But Mr. *Locke* has long ſince exploded the doctrine of innate Ideas, and if the idea of Injury was acquired, thoſe of Reſentment and Abhorrence, being its offſpring, muſt be younger.

In our chapter on the Paſſions we have traced Anger[a] to its origin, and found it derived from Expedience; for children having often relieved themſelves from whatever

[a] He ſays, we paſs through four ſtages at leaſt in our progreſs to the paſſion of anger: the experience of damage brought upon us by others; of our power to give them diſpleaſure; of the effect of ſuch diſpleaſure to make them alter their meaſures, and of the oppoſition we muſt expect to meet with againſt the exertion of

ever oppreſſed them by a violent exertion of their power againſt the cauſe of it, contract a habit of violence, and practiſe it afterwards without view to the conſequences, ſatisfaction being tranſlated [b] from the end to the means.

The

of this power. Which laſt gives anger its violence, becauſe a ſtrenuous exertion is neceſſary to ſurmount that oppoſition. But after having compleated our progreſs, we loſe ſight of the ſtages leading to it, and then the deſire of revenge riſes habitually upon ſight of injury, without any further thought.

[b] There is a chapter upon Tranſlation; which is the principal channel whereby our motives are derived from one another. For the ſatisfaction apprehended in attaining a purpoſe, is what makes it a motive of action with us. Now when there are means neceſſary to be purſued in order to accompliſh this point, our deſire of the end caſts a ſatisfaction likewiſe upon the means: ſo long as we retain the end in view, that is properly our motive, and we deſire the means only for the ſake of what they will conduct us to: but it very frequently happens, that the ſame means bring us ſo often to our deſired end, that the ſatisfaction thrown from it, reſts at laſt upon them, and we continue our fondneſs for them after the end is dropped out of our thought. Then it is the tranſlation is perfectly made; and the means become an end, or motive, capable of influencing us to action.

This matter is illuſtrated by the inſtance of money, which every body allows would have no regard, unleſs for

The abhorrence of villainy, as well when propoſed to ourſelves, as practiſed by others, is one of the moral ſenſes [c], which we have ſhown in the proper place, iſſue from the ſame fountain: they may indeed be conveyed to particular perſons by education, by precept, by example, and ſympathy,

for ſake of the conveniences and pleaſures of life it procures us. Yet we find it ſo conſtantly tending to this end, that there are few of us who would not take ſome pains, and feel ſatisfaction in getting a ſum, without thinking of the pretty things we could do with it: and in ſome the ſatisfaction is ſo ſtrongly tranſlated, that they will deny themſelves thoſe very conveniences which rendered it deſirable, for the ſake of ſaving their money.

And as ſatisfaction is tranſlated from end to means, ſo is aſſent, or judgement, from the premiſes to the concluſion reſulting therefrom, which being once well ſettled in the mind, we continue to look upon as a certain truth, after having utterly forgotten the evidence by which we were brought to acknowledge it for ſuch.

Thus it is by tranſlation we receive all our ſtores of knowledge, except what is thrown in immediately from the ſenſes: and by the ſame channel we derive all our motives and deſires, except thoſe excited by ſenſation.

[c] Mr. *Search* will not allow them to be given immediately by nature, but either catched by ſympathy from others, or formed by tranſlation; which latter is of two ſorts,

ſorts, as we have ſeen in the preceeding note. For education, precept, and example, operate by information of the judgement concerning the rectitude of the things taught, or ſeen practiſed; but ſometimes he ſuppoſes them acquired by ſatisfaction tranſlated from thoſe deſirable ends to which they have been obſerved to conduce. And he thinks his opinion confirmed by the great difference of moral ſenſes among mankind: one man places his point of honour in revenging an affront; another in making his payments punctually, another in ſuffering no waſte of his time, another in having nothing to do: one eſteems perſecution meritorious; another looks upon it with horror and deteſtation; nor perhaps are there any two men, who ſee the ſame things with equal degree of approbation or abhorrence. But if theſe ſenſes were natural, not acquired, why ſhould they not repreſent their objects in the ſame colours to every body? For all men ſee whiteneſs in lilies, redneſs in roſes, and verdure in the graſs. Nor let it be ſaid that bad company, or vicious courſes, may debilitate or corrupt the ſenſes nature gave us; for the company a man keeps, or vices he practiſes, will not make him blind or deaf, nor ſee different colours, or hear different ſounds from other people. Or if intemperance does ſometimes weaken and vitiate the bodily ſenſes, it does ſo with reſpect to all objects alike: a jaundiced eye ſees every thing yellow, nor does it add a particular brightneſs to ſome colours above the reſt: but the moral ſenſe often diſcerns the luſtre of ſome virtues remarkably well, and ſees none at all, or perhaps a darkneſs in others equally reſplendent. Neither is it an objection that ſome objects appear generally amiable or deteſtable; that we have moral ſenſes of things without any pains or care taken to acquire them; that they

they judge inſtantaneouſly without our knowing why; and ſtrike their notices upon us forcibly againſt our utmoſt endeavours to ſtifle them. For by this rule our knowledge of language may be counted natural; becauſe men in general have ſome language; we learn our mother tongue without care or pains; the meaning of what we hear ſtrikes us inſtantaneouſly with the ſound, though we know not why the words table or chair, were affixed to the things they ſignify; nor can we, with our utmoſt endeavours, diſſociate ſcandal, or unwelcome truths from the expreſſions conveying them.

Nor yet does he think their being derived from expedience any ways depreciates their value: for when our moral ſenſes give their notices ſtrong, it is an evidence, which ought not to be diſregarded, that we ourſelves formerly, or other perſons before us, have found an expedience in the practices they recommend, though we may not at preſent diſcern it. Therefore they deſerve the ſame reſpect as a man, in whoſe judgement we can fully confide, who ſhould give his adviſes, without laying before us the grounds whereon he founded them.

Thus if any body ſhall take offence at the ſuppoſition of there being no immediate natural connection between tranſgreſſion and puniſhment, let it be made known to him that this does not invalidate the rules, nor influence of juſtice: for the chain is often too long for us to bear in mind, which juſtifies us in bringing the two ends to a contiguity they had not in nature. Many evil imaginations of the heart are harmleſs, unleſs as they give the mind an evil turn, productive of bad actions: many ſingle deviations from rule may be innocent, otherwiſe than as they lead into pernicious habits: and in ſome inſtances an act of injuſtice

pathy [d], but whoever acquired them firſt, learned them by obſervation of their neceſſary

injuſtice might be expedient, were it not for ſetting a bad example, or opening a door to licentiouſneſs in ourſelves, by throwing us off our guard upon other occaſions. Nor is it uncommon for men, after ſome years experience over their heads, to diſcern a fatal tendency in irregularities, it would have been impoſſible to have convinced them of in their youth. So that if we were never to proceed againſt offences without aſking, why, what harm do they do? we might not always be ready with an anſwer: and vice muſt go unpuniſhed, our own failings ſtand uncorrected, and the miſchiefs remotely conſequent thereupon muſt be incurred. Wherefore it is right, becauſe neceſſary, to make the tranſlation of odium to wickedneſs compleat, without which the connection could not be preſerved: and a prudent man will teach others, and enure himſelf, to feel an abhorrence of it upon no further view, than its blackneſs. Thus the aſſociation between Demerit and Depravity derives from prudence, not from nature: men being led into into it by the expedience there is in aſſociating them cloſely together without the intervention of expedience.

And in like manner he has laid down upon a former occaſion, that things deſerve honour, not merely becauſe they are uſeful, but becauſe it will be uſeful to place honour upon them.

[d] The ſubject of a ſeparate chapter. By this term, he underſtands that aptneſs we all have, more or leſs, of taking the ſentiments, the ideas, the affections, of the company we conſort with, and in general caſting our imagination into the ſame train with theirs: without

ceſſary tendency to good order and happineſs, and by experience of the miſchiefs reſulting from thoſe practiſes they would reſtrain. The frequent view of theſe good effects caſts a value upon the ſentiments producing them, and the tranſlation being once compleatly made, deſire fixes upon them as upon its ultimate object.

We find judgement does the ſame with reſpect to truth tranſlated from the Poſtulata to the Problem demonſtrated: the equality between the ſquares of the two ſides and hypothenuſe in a rectangular triangle ſerves for a baſis in mathematical and mechanical operations without our running back per-

out which converſation would grow languid, the pleaſures of ſociety loſe their reliſh, and our inclination to good offices its vigour. This is another main ſpring of our motives, and even of our judgements; and performs its work much quicker than tranſlation: for we do not preſently drop our ends out of view, but we often imbibe deſires and opinions from others in an inſtant.

The dexterous management of this engine makes a great part of the Poet's and Orator's arts, for upon it depends the efficacy of exclamation, poſitiveneſs, and ridicule, and of *Horace*'s rule, if you would have me weep, you muſt firſt be grieved yourſelf.

petually

petually through the whole proceſs whereby *Euclid* convinced us of its being a truth. In like manner when our moral ſenſes are grown vigorous, we follow their impulſe without thinking of any higher principle firſt recommending them, and many of us without acknowledging any ſuch principle.

Now I would not by any means leſſen their influence, I rather wiſh it were ſtronger than it is; for we very ſeldom ſtand in a ſituation to diſcern the expedience of our actions, nor where it lies any thing remote have we ſtrength of mind enough to purſue it; but theſe moral ſenſes ſerve as excellent guides to direct, and ſpurs to ſtimulate us towards the attainment of a happineſs that would otherwiſe eſcape us. Nevertheleſs it muſt be owned they partake of the nature of paſſion, having the like qualities, the like vehemence and manner of operation, and may be ſtiled virtuous appetites, as being the produce of reaſon and induſtry rather than of nature. They are to be ranked among the Scyons which *Plato* told us *Urania* grafted upon the

wild ſtocks in *Pſyche*'s garden [e], and which his maſter afterwards put us in mind were apt to run luxuriant, unleſs kept within bounds by a proper tendance.

Therefore it is one thing to conſult our rules of action for ſhaping our conduct thereby, and another to examine the rules themſelves for determining in what manner we ſhall eſtabliſh, or rectify them. For as military diſcipline conſiſts in the ſtrict ſubordination of the ſoldiers to the officers,

[e] In his allegorical deſcription of earthly and heavenly love, under the names of *Thalaſſian* and *Uranian* Venus, related in the Viſion. He repreſents *Pſyche* receiving her firſt notices from external objects and appetites, as ſhe lay helpleſs in the garden of Nature. The gardener, *Selfiſh*, planted certain wild ſtocks producing crabbed fruits, until *Thalaſſio* grafted the accompliſhments, and *Urania* the virtues upon them. The latter accompanied *Pſyche* through the journey of life, and then ſetting her aſtride upon the golden anchor of *Elpis*, wafted her up into the bleſſed abodes.

Plato afterwards recounted ſome converſations he had formerly with a certain native of *Tarſus* in *Cilicia*, the ſubſtance of which he imparted to our Author; dreſſing them up after the philoſophical manner. But unluckily our Author cannot recollect any thing at preſent; though he hopes to do it in convenient time, having ſome confuſed traces of them ſtill in his memory.

and

and the officers to the general, ſo the little ſtate of man is never ſo well diſciplined as when the moral ſenſes have the entire command of our motions, but lie themſelves under controul of ſober conſideration and ſound judgement. While in the hurry of action we have not leiſure to conſult the general, but muſt puſh bravely on whither our immediate officers lead us; nor indeed is conſultation the buſineſs then, but intrepidity, vigour and alertneſs, Therefore the virtuous man acts becauſe it is right and juſt, becoming and laudable, and forbears what appears wrong and baſe, unworthy and ſhocking to his thought: he follows the motions of zeal, honour, ſhame, decency, natural affection, civility, as he feels them riſe in his breaſt; or if doubts ariſe he tries the moral ſenſes by one another, and adheres to that which carries the ſtrongeſt luſtre, and higheſt excellency in his imagination, without conſidering further why he ſuffers himſelf to be guided by their influence, or whence it was derived. For the greateſt part of mankind know not a

why not a *whence*, but take up their principles partly from their parents and tutors, partly from cuſtom and general eſtimation; and thoſe who do inveſtigate them to the fountain, cannot carry their inveſtigations in their head upon common occaſions.

But in ſeaſons of deliberation, when admitted into the general's tent, having the inſtructions and intelligences laid before us, and ſitting in council upon the operations of the campaign, it would be abſurd to take an officer's own teſtimonial of his merit, or give him his orders becauſe they are ſuch as he is moſt fond of executing; we are only to regard the public ſervice, what are each man's abilities, and how he may beſt conduct himſelf to promote it. So if we have ſufficient lights and opportunity to take our moral ſenſes under examination, in order to moderate what extravagancies they may have run into, or determine the rank among them in the command of our powers, it would be no leſs prepoſterous to try their rectitude by what themſelves ſuggeſt to be right, or to ſettle their degrees of authority upon

upon any other foundation than their ſeveral tendencies towards the general happineſs, wherein we ſhall always find our own contained.

§. 33. Now in matters of puniſhment, when we have it in our power, let us regard the heinouſneſs of the offence, together with all circumſtances that may aggravate or abate our abhorrence of it as beheld by our moral ſenſe: but when we are to examine the foundation we have for entertaining this abhorrence, we ſhall find no other than the expedience [a] and neceſſity of pu-

[a] Were the connection between offence and puniſhment natural and neceſſary, there would be no room for mercy; for what nature has joined inſeparably, the will of man ought not to put aſunder, and what is odious in itſelf no circumſtances can make innocent. But our rules of juſtice being imperfect, calculated for general uſe, and impoſſible to be adapted to every particular caſe, the exceptions whereto they are liable open the door to mercy: Which is not to be exerciſed arbitrarily, but guided by rules; ſuch as the firſt offence, or the party being drawn in by ſurprize, or in hurry of paſſion, or upon repentance, which takes away the neceſſity of puniſhment, by anſwering the ſame purpoſe in preventing of future crimes. But mercy is as blamable as injuſtice, when extended without rule or reaſon, or perhaps unleſs when the rigour of the law, according to the vulgar ſaying, would be an injury.

niſhment to preſerve order, and good faith, and honeſty among mankind. Even thoſe who take private revenge, when called upon to juſtify their conduct, always plead that otherwiſe they ſhould lie open to perpetual inſults; which ſhews that the only reaſonable excuſe for reſentment is not ſtrictly the injury received, but the prevention of injuries for the future. Therefore reaſon, as well as authority, enjoins us to forgive our brother not only ſeven times, but until ſeventy times ſeven, unleſs where animadverſion is neceſſary either for our own quiet and benefit, or that of others.

And there is a ſpecies of puniſhment called chaſtiſement, which has no other object beſide the benefit of the party upon whom it is exerciſed. Parents and ſchoolmaſters may not be diſpleaſed at unlucky tricks played by their lads, as ſhewing a ſagacity and ſprightlineſs they delight to behold, yet they will not ſuffer them to paſs with impunity, leaſt it ſhould generate idleneſs and other miſchiefs: here is no abhorrence ſtriking the moral ſenſe, nor are the

boys

boys diſliked the worſe for their ſallies of youth and ingenuity ill applied; ſo the chaſtiſement is not for miſcarriages committed, but for future enormities which might be committed.

'Tis true the judge paſſes ſentence upon criminals by ſtated rules, becauſe he is no more than a miniſter to ſpeak the ſenſe of the law: but the legiſlature, in eſtabliſhing the law, regards no other rules than thoſe reſpecting the public utility; therefore equal puniſhments are appointed for offences of unequal enormity; for the law hangs for ſtealing the value of five ſhillings, but does no more for murder; and ſome go wholly unpuniſhed, ſuch as ingratitude, intemperance, entailing diſeaſes or poverty upon families by gallantries or extravagance, becauſe they cannot be enquired into without cauſing confuſion and worſe inconveniencies. On the other hand, when the title to a throne is ſo diſputable that many honeſt, well-diſpoſed perſons are drawn by mere error of judgment to take part on the unfortunate ſide; they are adjudged and executed as rebels, becauſe it is neceſſary to

maintain the authority of government, and tranquillity of the ſtate.

§. 34. Should it be objected, that this proves the contrary to what we have laid down, becauſe the law, whoſe baſis is utility, does not govern us in our eſtimation of Demerit, for we compaſſionate inſtead of deteſting the deluded malecontent, while we acknowledge the expedience and neceſſity of the law which condemns him, and think the abandoned debauchée deſerving of puniſhment which the law cannot provide for him; therefore we build our judgement upon other grounds than thoſe of utility. I ſhall anſwer, that as the law is not the ſole meaſure of juſtice, ſo neither is it the ſole fountain of utility: for be the polity of a nation ever ſo well regulated, or ever ſo wiſely adminiſtered, the people muſt ſtill do ſomething for themſelves in order to compleat their happineſs, and Providence has reſerved to his own management the putting a check upon ſome enormities which the law cannot reach, nor human ſagacity diſcover or prevent. There-

Therefore that utility which the proviſions of the law cannot totally compaſs, may ſtill remain for the foundation of private animadverſion and cenſure: nor is it a ſmall argument of its being ſo, that we naturally look upon the greatneſs of miſchief done as an aggravation of guilt in the perpetrator. If an unwholeſome potion be given to make a man ſick for a week, it is an injury; if it bring on an incurable diſeaſe, it is a more heinous offence; if death enſue, it is the crying ſin of murder.

Well, but you ſay the miſchief muſt be deſigned, or there will be no crime at all: the greater degree of miſchief is only an evidence of deeper blackneſs in the deſign; ſo that properly ſpeaking, it is not the damage done, but depravity of heart in the doer, which raiſes your abhorrence and wiſhes for vengeance; for when aſſured of the deſign, you pronounce the guilt the ſame, feel the ſame abhorrence and wiſh, although its purpoſe be utterly fruſtrated, and no damage at all enſue.

Why

Why this is the very thing I have been contending for all along, that the true ground of puniſhment is not the miſchief done, or the crime committed, but the prevention of future enormities, productive of future miſchiefs, and this object I think may fairly rank under the claſs of utility.

We have found in the former part of this work, that the volitions giving birth to our actions depend upon the preſent motives occuring to our thought, which are either what our judgement repreſents as moſt expedient, or our imagination as moſt alluring and deſireable; and theſe motives are ſuggeſted by the opinions, the ſentiments, the inclinations and habits we have contracted: when deſire fixes upon practices of pernicious tendency, this is called a Depravity of Mind, or vulgarly, though improperly, a Depravity of Will, by a metonyme [a] of cauſe for effect, becauſe the ſtate

[a] Figures, though very convenient for common uſe, to give a lively tint to our ideas, and gain them an eaſy reception with thoſe to whom we addreſs ourſelves, yet are dangerous things to the ſpeculative, who

ſtate of the mind, and deſires in the heart, influence the will, and of courſe produce actions conformable thereto; for a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can an evil tree bring forth good fruit.

Therefore this depravity of heart being productive of bad effects, whenever the ſeaſon and opportunity ſerves to bring them to maturity, becomes juſtly odious upon account of the poiſonous fruits it bears. But as puniſhment, animadverſion and cenſure, being grievous to the party ſuffering them, tends to diſſociate deſire from the ſentiments whereto they are annexed, and work amendment, or in other words, to give men a diſguſt for the vices rendering them obnoxious thereto; or at leaſt to re-

who perplex themſelves grievouſly by underſtanding figurative expreſſions literally. We have ſufficiently ſeen the miſchiefs of them in the difficulties upon Free-will, Election, and coexiſtent Powers, occaſioned by taking the cauſes of volition, for volition itſelf. Thoſe who uſe the common magnifying glaſs ordinarily puzzle themſelves about the figure, without ever touching the thing ſignified, and make work enough for the genuine Microſcope to rectify the blunders they commit.

ſtrain

ſtrain them from breaking forth into act, and diſcourage others from entertaining the like; it is this uſe which renders the puniſhment merited and juſt: for I appeal to any conſiderate perſon, whether he would puniſh, or aſcribe to a depravity of heart any action, or ſentiment whatever, which could never do the leaſt hurt either to the owner, or any perſon in the world beſide.

§. 35. For this reaſon freedom of action, and ſo much underſtanding as may make the party ſenſible for what the puniſhment was inflicted, are always eſteemed neceſſary requiſites to render him obnoxious thereto; becauſe puniſhment operating upon the Imagination, and through that upon the Will, where either of theſe two channels are wanting, becomes uſeleſs, and conſequently unjuſt. Therefore ſly Revenges which may be miſtaken for accidents, and nobody can know they were the effect of reſentment, though ſometimes practiſed by ſpiteful perſons, have never been held warrantable by the judicious: nor will a righte-

ous

ous man puniſh where the tranſgreſſor had not liberty of choice, nor where the reaſon of his puniſhing cannot be underſtood.

If a brick tumbles down upon you, it would be ridiculous to fall a whipping, or breaking it, becauſe ſuch diſcipline could contribute nothing towards preventing other bricks afterwards from tumbling upon your own, or ſomebody elſe's head; but had our treatment with brickbats any influence upon their future motions, we ſhould form rules of juſtice for our dealings with them as well as with one another. When the puppy dog fouls your parlour you beat him for it; but then you rub his noſe in the filth to make him ſenſible why he is beaten; and you think this ſeverity juſtifiable, without diſcerning any depravity of heart in the beaſt, only becauſe it ſecures your rooms againſt the like diſaſter for the future: but if he has ſtolen a woodcock from the larder, and you do not diſcover the theft till next morning, when your correction can do no good, it would be cruelty to chaſtiſe him.

Miſchiefs

Miſchiefs done by mere accident are judged pardonable: but why? becauſe puniſhment has no influence upon accidents: for in ſome caſes, where better care may prevent them, we do not ſcruple to animadvert in order to ſpur men to greater vigilance: the ſtatute of *Ann* lays a heavy penalty upon ſervants ſetting a houſe on fire undeſignedly; nor did I ever hear that ſtatute complained of as contrary to natural juſtice.

Why are military puniſhments ſeverer than all others? Is there greater depravity in diſobedience to an officer, than to a civil magiſtrate, a parent, or a maſter? Not ſo, but becauſe the ſervice requires a ſtricter diſcipline, and more implicit obedience. Nor can you pretend the ſoldiers conſent upon enliſting, for many of them are inveigled to enliſt by drink, or by the bounty-money, without knowing what they undertake, or conſidering the rules they ſubmit to: beſides that you ſubject the impreſſed man to the ſame ſeverities with the volunteer.

Why is the law of faſhion ſo ſtrict upon little matters, that a man would make himſelf more ignominious by wearing his wig the wrong ſide outwards, than by correſponding with the Pope, or the Pretender? unleſs becauſe cenſure, exclamation and ridicule, being the only penalties you have to enforce it, you muſt lay them on the more luſtily to keep the thoughtleſs world to decency in matters wherein they have no other reſtraint upon them.

Thus whatever ſpecies of puniſhment we fix our eye upon, we ſhall always find it deducible from utility; but the deduction is too long to carry conſtantly in our heads, nor can every head trace it out; neither do we upon all occaſions ſtand in a ſituation to diſcern the conſequences of our puniſhing, or ſparing: therefore the judicious, from their obſervation of thoſe cauſes, ſo far as they can inveſtigate them, ſtrike out rules of juſtice, and diſtinguiſh degrees of wickedneſs, which they hang up in public as marks, or erect as poſts of direction to guide our ſteps in the journey of life, and inculcate

inculcate a moral ſenſe, or abhorrence of evil, to ſerve as a guard to protect us againſt inordinate deſires that might tempt us to injuſtice, and as a meaſure to apportion our reſentment againſt the heinouſneſs of an offence, or depravity of an offender.

Such of us as are well diſciplined look up to theſe marks continually, and ſhape their ſteps accordingly, both with reſpect to what they ſhall avoid themſelves, and what notice they ſhall take of the proceedings and ſentiments of their fellow-travellers, without thinking of any thing further; and much the greater part of us without knowing of any thing further to be thought of: when theſe latter get a ſmattering of philoſophy, you hear them declaim inceſſantly upon the eſſential and unalterable rules[a] of right and wrong, independent

[a] It is difficult to conceive a rule not relating to the action of ſome Beings exiſtent: for a rule reſpecting nonentities can ſcarce deſerve the name of one. Therefore Rules can be no older than the Beings they relate to, nor have exiſtence before theſe were created. Neither can they be independant on God, becauſe depending upon the condition, wherein he placed his creatures.

dependent on God himſelf, having a nature he did not give them, and being an obligation upon him that he muſt not break through.

§. 36. But the all-ſeeing eye of God ſtretches wide and far, beholds all nature and all futurity in one unbounded proſpect, therefore needs no marks nor rules [a] to direct his meaſures, nor moral ſenſes to protect

creatures. For if men had no property, there could be no ſuch rule as, *Thou ſhalt not ſteal*; neither could there be a rule, *Thou ſhalt not bear falſe witneſs*, if men had not the uſe of ſpeech. Our Author has conſidered this matter more at large in his chapter on Rectitude, where he has endeavoured to ſettle the proper import of eſſential and intrinſic, when applied thereto, and ſhow how thoſe words have been abuſed, by extending them to a latitude never thought of by ſuch as firſt employed them.

[a] Nor virtues, nor paſſions, nor affections. Therefore when we ſay he is juſt or merciful, jealous or compaſſionate, angry or grieved, or repentant; theſe are only ſo many forms whereinto we are forced to caſt his wiſdom, in order to bring it ſuitable to our conception. For when he purſues the like meaſures as we are prompted to by thoſe affections, he does it upon a diſcernment of their propriety to effect his purpoſes. Which motive ſometimes carries him in contrariety to

againſt temptations which cannot approach him: for in every application of ſecond cauſes, he bears his ultimate end conſtantly in view, and purſues it unerringly and invariably. What this end may be, perhaps it were in vain for us to enquire, but the utmoſt point beyond which we can conceive nothing further, is the good and happineſs of his creatures: this then we muſt regard as the centre wherein all his diſpenſations terminate, and by the tendency whereto he regulates his meaſures of juſtice.

Now Puniſhment muſt be acknowledged an evil to the ſufferer while under the laſh of it, therefore unleſs we will ſuppoſe the fountain of Goodneſs ſometimes to terminate his views upon evil, we muſt allow that he never puniſhes, unleſs for ſome greater benefit to redound therefrom, either to the offender, or ſome other part of the

theſe affections: for he ſuffers the wicked to paſs with impunity, when he has any good to bring out of their evil, and the righteous to lie under diſtreſſes, when tending to work out a greater weight of glory for them.

creation.

creation. What other benefits may ariſe therefrom we know not, but we know its tendency to check or cure a depravity of heart where it is, to diſcourage the contracting of it where it is not, and conſequently to prevent the miſchievous fruits growing from that evil root.

Therefore as men are conſtituted, this remedy is neceſſary to reſtrain enormities from abounding among them, unleſs you will ſuppoſe a miraculous interpoſition, which is not the uſual method of providence; and it is this neceſſity which juſtifies the puniſhment, and aſcertains the meaſure of it. If we go on to enquire further, why men are ſo conſtituted, this will involve us in another queſtion, which never was, and perhaps never will be determined by the ſons of *Adam*, namely, why pain, diſtreſs, affliction, and uneaſineſs of all kinds, were permitted at all in the world; for moral evil were no evil if there were no natural; becauſe, how could I do wrong, if no hurt or damage could enſue therefrom to any body, and is no greater than the

miſchiefs whereof it may be productive? Therefore it is natural evil which creates the difficulty, and the quantity of this evil is the ſame from whatever cauſes ariſing. "Think ye thoſe eighteen upon whom the "tower in *Siloam* fell were ſinners above all "other *Galileans?*" We are told, nay: yet the pain, the loſs of life, and other damages they ſuſtained, were the ſame in quantity as if they had brought down the ruin upon their own heads by their miſconduct.

Let any man explain to me clearly how the permiſſion of miſchievous accidents is conſiſtent with our ideas of infinite goodneſs, and I will undertake to ſhow him by the lights he ſhall afford me, how the permiſſion of moral evil is likewiſe conſiſtent. The only ſolution of this difficulty I apprehend muſt be taken from the imperfection [b] of our underſtanding, for we have ob-

[b] Our Author in his chapter on Goodneſs, ſuppoſes ſome other Attribute, unknown to the ſons of *Adam*, to ſet the bounds to infinite Goodneſs, that it may not be coextenſive with Omnipotence. And in a diſcourſe he had with an angel in the viſion, on his return

obſerved in a former place, that infinite Goodneſs and infinite Power conſidered in the abſtract, ſeem incompatible[c]: which ſhows there is ſomething wrong in our conceptions, and that we are not competent judges of what belongs, and what is repugnant to goodneſs. But God knows though we do not, and is good and righteous

turn back from the mundane ſoul into the vehicular ſtate, he is ſhown that there muſt be other attributes beſides thoſe whereof we have any conception, becauſe theſe would not ſuffice for the buſineſs of the Creation.

Dacier would have ſaid, he took this hint from *Moſes* being admitted to ſee the back parts of God, but not his whole perſon. But *Search* aſſures me, he thought nothing of *Moſes* while he was with the angel. He had indeed before taken notice of the expreſſion, that no man can ſee God and live; which he expounded, not that the ſight would be ſo terrible as to deſtroy us, but that man, while impriſoned in this mortal body, has not faculties to diſcern the divine Nature, and ſo cannot ſee God while he lives under this veil of fleſh.

[c] Becauſe our idea of infinite Goodneſs ſeems to require, that it ſhould exhauſt Omnipotence, and our idea of the latter, that it ſhould be inexhauſtible. Since then we find ſomething wrong in our conceptions, how can it be expected we ſhould explain an object we have not faculties to comprehend? Therefore our want of underſtanding is no proof againſt its reality.

in all his ways; therefore whatever method he purſues is an evidence of its rectitude beyond all other evidences that can offer to us for the contrary.

§. 37. Juſtice regards ſolely the degree of depravity exiſtent, nor has any concern with the manner how it came to exiſt: a man bribed with a large ſum of money is not excuſed by the guilt of the employer, although perhaps he would never have thought of committing the crime without that temptation; and if evil communication corrupts good manners, the corruption coming through this channel does not exempt it from cenſure. The perpetration indeed of villainies, without any inſtigation or inducement, aggravates their heinouſneſs, becauſe it indicates a greater depravity of heart; but the degree of depravity once aſcertained, always ſets the meaſure to the deteſtation and demerit of the offender, without enquiring into the ſource from whence it was derived; and

we ſhall find it ſo in whatever caſe we conſider maturely and candidly.

Suppoſe you and I delegated by heaven to govern ſome little diſtrict, with abſolute power of life and death over the inhabitants, with perfect knowledge of the ſecrets of their hearts, and were ſitting in council together upon the meaſures of executing our commiſſion, which we were reſolved to do with exact juſtice and integrity. Suppoſe further, what has been ſhown not to be the real fact, but in order to make our caſe the ſtronger for our preſent purpoſe, let us ſuppoſe that men had been hitherto utterly deſtitute of Freewill, but guided in all their motions by an external influence; and their ſentiments and diſpoſitions thrown upon them, without their own act, by the impulſe of neceſſary cauſes; but at the moment when we entered upon our office, this influence and impulſe were taken off, and they were put into the condition of common men, whom we have converſed with in the world: how ſhould we proceed to manage with them.

In the firſt place it may be preſumed we ſhould agree upon a general amneſty for the paſt, in conſideration of the force they had lain under; and in the next, we ſhould contrive meaſures for their future well-being, and finding them in poſſeſſion of powers of action, together with liberty to uſe them, we ſhould ſtudy to turn their Freewill into courſes moſt advantageous to the community. If we ſaw vices and malignancy among them, we might probably feel an abhorrence and deteſtation thereof, for I do not ſuppoſe ourſelves diveſted of the moral ſenſes we had acquired before, but this ſentiment would be like that averſion we have to ſpiders, toads and adders, who did not make themſelves what they are, but received their venom and uglineſs from the hand of nature; yet I hope we ſhould be too equitable to puniſh any man merely becauſe we did not like his looks, unleſs where thoſe looks manifeſted a badneſs of heart, productive of miſchief to himſelf or his neighbours, and then we ſhould apply ſuch puniſhments, notes of infamy,

infamy, or cenſures, as we judged moſt proper for preventing his ill qualities from breaking forth into act, or ſpreading the contagion elſewhere, thinking our proceedings juſtifiable by their expedience, and regulating the meaſure of our puniſhments by their ſeveral aptneſs to anſwer the purpoſe intended.

§. 38. If then we find that human reaſon, when acting moſt conformably to our ideas of prudence and equity, would reſtrain depravity, from whatever ſources ariſing, by adequate puniſhments, why ſhould we arraign the juſtice of God for proceeding in the like manner? For he beholds the works of his hands, and diſcerns whereof they are made, nor is he unacquainted with the operations and uſes of ſecond cauſes: He has made moral evil the general, and, as ſome believe, the ſole [a] fountain of natural

[a] It is a very orthodox tenet, that pain and miſery were brought into the world, as well among the brute as the rational creation, by the fall of *Adam*. And the ancient Mythologiſts give us a deſcription of their golden

ral: He has given man freedom to chooſe between good and evil: He knows that vices

golden age, ſimilar to that of paradiſe, exempt from both evils. Yet though they have made the moral coeval with the natural, they ſeem not to have ſuppoſed them effects of one another; but both co-effects of the ſame cauſe, to wit, the gradual decay of nature in her three changes, from the golden age to the ſilver, from ſilver to braſs, and from thence to iron. The Philoſophers appear to have held natural evil the conſequence of moral; which opinion we may ſuppoſe they founded upon the divine Goodneſs, from whence nothing evil could proceed, but the creatures brought it upon themſelves by the perverſe uſe of their powers. But then they conceived this attribute muſt require, that the natural evil ſhould reſult from the moral of that particular creature upon whom it fell: for they could not underſtand it conſiſtent with goodneſs that any one ſhould ſuffer for the failings of another. This led them into the notion of a pre-exiſtent ſtate, wherein every man, by his misbehaviour, may have rendered himſelf obnoxious to the misfortunes he undergoes in the preſent.

I need not remark the abſurd conſequences that would follow from this doctrine ſupported upon theſe grounds: which muſt with equal reaſon infer a pre-exiſtence for the brute creation too, down to the piſmire, the maggot, the new-found polypus, and ſcarce-perceptible puceron he devours, together with a rationality therein, rendering them capable of moral good and evil. Becauſe though we can account for the diſtreſſes of men, the maimed and diſtempered births of

vices will abound among them, which will influence them to uſe their freedom to pernicious

of children, from the derivation of original ſin: yet that ſin being never extended to the animals, will not account for the ſufferings brought upon them by their tyrannical lord, imperial man, by their fellow ſubjects, by weather, or accidents. I ſay, I need not urge this objection, the doctrine of Pre-exiſtence being now univerſally exploded. For every old woman knows the ſoul of the child was created at the very inſtant when the mother firſt felt herſelf quick. And any body may ſee with half an eye, that if we had all exiſted a hundred years ago, ſome or other of us muſt have remembered it. Beſides, if we would not beat a dog, unleſs for ſome fault he may be ſenſible of, who can imagine we ſhould be puniſhed ourſelves, without letting us know for what? But the moſt ſolid argument againſt Pre-exiſtence ariſes from its uſeleſsneſs: for what is paſt and gone we have nothing to do with, our concern lies only with the future, and it behoves us to ſhape our behaviour in ſuch manner as may make our condition happy hereafter. If we could demonſtrate our Pre-exiſtence ever ſo clearly, we could not expect to know what paſſed with us in that ſtate, nor gather from thence a fund of experience whereon to build obſervations for regulating our future conduct. Therefore this ſubject is not worth our taking into conſideration at all; and without conſidering, we can ſee no proofs of its reality, and without proofs it would not become us to believe it; and what does not become us to believe, there can be no harm in running down with exclamation or ridicule. The like may be ſaid of the

Pre

nicious purpoſes, and has appointed puniſh-
ment as one of the ſprings to operate upon

Pre or Poſt-exiſtence of animals, which if we could diſcover, would neither do us any ſervice, nor enable us to do them any. And the ſame method might be proper in other caſes, by refuſing to puzzle our thoughts with curious ſpeculations, which if inveſtigated to the utmoſt can do no good.

Nor would our author be diſpleaſed to have it practiſed upon himſelf: for there are things uſeful to ſome, which are not ſo, but rather miſchievous to others; and he has been forced ſometimes to enter upon ſubjects that might ſcandalize the ſcrupulous, or hurt the unwary, to whom he hopes to give better content, when he can recover the matters before mentioned to have been communicated by *Plato* from the *Cilician:* but this muſt be a work of time. In the mean while, he would be glad that every one would follow him in the diſcuſſion of ſuch points as they find ſuited to their taſte or liking, paſſing lightly over the reſt, as the wanton rovings of a ſpeculative fancy. For my friend *Search*, to do him juſtice, has an honeſt heart, and would willingly give offence to nobody, but diſpenſe his wares about in quarters where they might at leaſt be harmleſs. But, as he has obſerved in a diſcourſe upon this topic with his vehicular conductor, the antients, delivering their lectures by word of mouth, could adapt their ſubjects to their audience, reſerving their eſoteries for adepts, and dealing out exoteries only to the vulgar; whereas we moderns having no other channel of communication than the preſs, muſt throw out both ſorts to the mercy of every man that can raiſe the pence to buy a copy, or has a friend of whom he can borrow one.

the

the human mind for reſtraining the growth of wickedneſs, and preventing its bad effects. Can we then doubt that he will employ all the ſprings of action in thoſe uſes, and upon thoſe occaſions wherein he in his wiſdom judges them reſpectively proper? or what rule of juſtice does he violate by ſo doing?

Why he permitted moral evil, is a conſideration quite foreign to the preſent ſubject, and can only produce that entanglement naturally conſequent upon blending diſcuſſions of different natures together: for whether we can reconcile that permiſſion with our ideas, or no, ſtill evil being once permitted, becomes a foundation for juſtice to ward off the bad effects that might enſue from it: for juſtice cannot ſtand at variance with goodneſs, nor can one ever forbid what the other recommends.

As the judge paſſes ſentence upon the houſe-breaker and the aſſaſſin, not in animoſity to them, but in regard to the honeſt man, that he may ſleep quietly in his bed, and go about his lawful occaſions without hazard

hazard of his life: ſo God puniſhes the wicked not in wrath and deteſtation, but in mercy and loving-kindneſs, many times to the delinquent himſelf, but always either to him or his fellow-creatures.

Therefore to the queſtion, Who hath ever reſiſted his will? Why then doth he puniſh? It may be anſwered, To ſecure the further accompliſhment of his will, and to effect his gracious purpoſes towards thoſe whom he intended to preſerve from the like wickedneſs, or the pernicious conſequences ſpringing therefrom: views wherein we cannot find the leaſt tincture of injuſtice or arbitrary proceeding.

§. 39. But it is not enough to juſtify the ways of God, unleſs we endeavour likewiſe to obviate the perverſe conſequences men ſometimes draw from the will of God being conſtantly fulfilled. For, ſay they, if that will always take place, then we have no will of our own, being pinned down to one particular manner of proceeding, which it is his will ſhould be taken.

But

But if human action were neceſſary, as indeed it is not, we have ſeen that would not excuſe iniquity from puniſhment, as being an application of the proper cauſe for preventing the growth and miſchiefs of it; and this perſuaſion ſufficiently inculcated, would neceſſarily, if the operation of motives be neceſſary, drive them into a courſe of thinking and acting productive of happineſs; and if they attain the poſſeſſion of this treaſure, 'tis not much matter whether they apprehend themſelves procuring it by neceſſary or voluntary agency[e]: therefore they will

[e] 'Squire *Search* in this place probably had a view to the diſpute that happened upon the road ſome time ago between him and Doctor *Hartley*. The ſquire, it ſeems, in his chapter on the cauſes of action, had aſſigned the mind herſelf for the efficient cauſe of all we do: this the doctor would not allow; for he gave the following account of the matter. The human body, ſays he, is a collection of little threads or fibres curiouſly bound up together; among which the Ether inſinuates throughout every part of our frame, diſpoſing itſelf into ſtrings running croſs-wiſe between the ſides of the interſtices wherein it lies. When objects ſtrike upon our ſenſes, they agitate the fibres of the organ whereon they fall: which agitation puts the etherial ſtrings contiguous to them into little tremours, called

will do well to contemplate the penalties annexed to evil-doing; for it will do them good one way or other, if not as exhortation to work upon a free agent, at leaſt as a ſalutary medicine to rectify the diſorders in their machine.

But

called by him Vibratiuncles. As the ſtrings communicate with one another all over our body, the foreſaid vibratiuncles excite others correſpondent to them in the ſtrings lying about the nerves of our muſcles, thereby agitating thoſe nerves, which produce a contraction in the muſcles, and cauſe them to move the limbs. The tremours in the firſt mentioned ſtrings he ſtiles ſenſory vibratiuncles, and in the latter motory vibratiuncles. Thus the doctor acknowledges all human action neceſſary, being performed by the mechanical running of vibratiuncles from the ſenſory to the motory, without any intervention of the mind to aſſiſt in the operation. He allows indeed that the vibratiuncles, in their paſſage, touch at the ſeat of the mind, where they leave information of the way they are going, and of the external objects exciting them. ſo the mind, having continual notice of what is doing, fancies herſelf the author of all that is done; whereas in reality ſhe ſits an idle ſpectator only, not an agent of our actions; like the fly upon the chariot-wheel, aſcribing to her own proweſs, the mighty clouds of duſt ſhe ſees raiſed around her.

Now, my couſin *Search* not having ſtudied anatomy, thought himſelf no match at argument for the learned phyſician, ſo declined entering the liſts with him, but pro-

But an event being agreeable to the will of another, does not always hinder it from being the choice of our own will too: what I do by the command of a ſuperior, while I pay him a chearful and ready obedience, is done by the will of both. 'Tis lucky, you

propoſed a feigned iſſue to be tried by the country, in imitation of thoſe directed out of chancery, upon the following caſe. Mr. *Jeffery Dolittle*, a gentleman of tolerable capacity and good repute among his neighbours, departed this life in an unuſual manner; for one morning after breakfaſt his perceptive or ſpiritual part was taken from him miraculouſly, without any diſeaſe, diſorder, accident, or diſlocation of any ſingle particle either in the groſſer or finer part of his material frame. The queſtion is, how this defunct or mere machine would behave? Both parties agree, that the pulſe would continue to beat, the lungs to play, the animal ſecretions to be carried on, the vibratiuncles to traverſe to and fro, as before, and that by dinner-time the tongue and palate might come into that ſtate which affects us with hunger; yet the perceptive mind being gone, there would be no uneaſineſs for want of victuals, nor perception of the objects round about. But *Search*, in his declaration, avers, that it would not walk down ſtairs, ſit down to table, carve the meats, converſe with the company, nor give its opinion upon the conduct of the miniſtry, uſefulneſs of the militia, or whether *Nivernois* comes in good earneſt to conclude, or only to amuſe us. The doctor in his plea inſiſts, that it would do all this, and every thing elſe

you ſay, I ſtand ſo diſpoſed, for I muſt have done the thing had I been ever ſo deſirous of the contrary: ſo I am in the condition of a man ſitting in a room where the doors are locked upon him without his perceiving it; he is actually a priſoner, though

that might be expected from a reaſonable creature, and well-bred gentleman. And upon this point iſſue was joined.

But it being difficult preſently to impanel a jury who would conſent to be ſhut up without victuals, drink, or candle, until they ſhould agree upon a verdict, the litigants ſtruck up a compromiſe in the mean time, that each ſhould jog on his own way without interruption from the other. For, ſays *Search*, I ſuppoſe, doctor, we both aim at doing ſome good to mankind by our labours: now if we can effect our purpoſe, 'tis not a farthing matter by what proceſs the operation goes on. Whether we can draw ſuch ſcratches upon paper, as that the rays reflected therefrom ſhall raiſe vibratiuncles in the reader, which ſhall inform him of ſalutary theorems, that will better the condition of his mind, and beget motory vibratiuncles that will put his limbs into a courſe of action moſt conducive to his benefit; or whether, by the ordinary methods of conviction, inſtruction, and exhortation, we can ſpur him on to uſe his own activity in a manner moſt beneficial to himſelf.

Purſuant to this compromiſe, we ſee in the text before us, that our author, ſo he can work a perſuaſion productive of happineſs, does not care whether it operates by free or neceſſary agency.

he

he does not feel his confinement, becauſe he happens to chooſe the only thing in his power, that is, to ſtay where he is.

But what if I do a good office for an acquaintance to whom I owe no obligation, nor have other inducement than good nature? do not I gratify his will and my own at the ſame time? Or what if an artful politician, who can ſee through and through me, leads me dextrouſly to co-operate with his deſigns: although the iſſue ſhould fall out beſide or contrary to my intention, ſtill the ſteps I am made to take by his management were the work of my own will. So when God puts in uſe the proper cauſes for producing an event, we need not fear but he will adapt them ſo wiſely as that they ſhall not fail to accompliſh his will; nevertheleſs, if among theſe cauſes there be the motives fit to work upon a free agent, the act performed is as compleatly the will of that agent, as if his ideas had derived from any other ſource, or been thrown up by the fortuitous declination of *Epicurus*'s atoms.

The fallacy here lies in the ſame equivocation of language taken notice of in the foregoing pages, to which I refer any body who thinks it needful to reviſe what has been already offered: for the Will of God muſt be fulfilled in no other ſenſe than what was abſolutely foreknown, or contained in the plan of Providence; muſt come to paſs, not by compulſion or neceſſity, but by removal of all hazard to the contrary.

§. 40. Another fond imagination may ſtart up in men's heads from the never-failing completion of the divine Will, as if it juſtified them in all the follies they have been guilty of; for, ſay they, whatever we have done muſt have been agreeable to the Will of God, becauſe having taken effect; for nothing has fallen out that was not ſo; therefore wherein have we done amiſs? for who hath ever reſiſted his Will? And they put this queſtion by way of defiance, to give any other than one certain anſwer.

But

But they deceive themſelves by their manner of wording the queſtion; for had it been aſked, who hath defeated his Will? we could not have produced an inſtance, nor yet would it have ſerved their purpoſe, nor furniſhed an excuſe for their miſconduct that we could not: but who hath reſiſted his Will? is no ſuch unanſwerable queſtion; for the Will may be reſiſted without ſucceſs, and then come to paſs notwithſtanding; or it may be miſunderſtood, and in that caſe accompliſhed by the very endeavour to do ſomething contrary to it.

Suppoſe you lend money to a friend upon his note; he being at a diſtance, and fully confiding in your honour, ſends you a letter with the value incloſed, only deſiring you will burn the note, that your executors may not find it to charge him with the debt; but before you can fulfill his requeſt, ſomebody elſe finds the note, who having a ſpite againſt you, throws it into the fire with intention to diſable you from recovering the ſum contained in it; here he acts in direct oppoſition to your Will, his deſign

is nothing elſe than to croſs and thwart you; yet in ſo doing he does the very thing you will ſhould be done, and would have done yourſelf, if he had not been beforehand with you. In like manner we may, and too frequently do, reſiſt the Will of God, but by that very reſiſtance accompliſh it; for we act in the dark, ſcarce ever knowing what is his real Will, or that, its conſtant aim, the good of his creation, with the greateſt part whereof we have no viſible connection, nor the leaſt ſuſpicion of what concern their intereſts have with our proceedings.

We have often heard of a diſtinction between the ſecret [a], and declared Will, the

[a] Great miſchiefs and much enthuſiaſm have ariſen in the world, from pretending to pry into the ſecret Will. The very attempt is highly abſurd; for can we fancy ourſelves wiſer than God, or cunning enough to find out what he purpoſely conceals? Therefore we are conſtantly to eſteem that his Will, to which we are directed by the rules aſſigned us, or lights afforded us: nor can any thing elſe be counted ſuch until verified by the event, and that will not juſtify our having proceeded to accompliſh it. For though whatever has been permitted, was beſt to be done, becauſe Providence

the latter is ſo much as we can diſcover by the beſt uſe of our underſtanding, which being fallible, will ſometimes diſcover to us what is not the truth; yet this is the guide God has given us for our direction, and while we act conformably thereto,

dence orders all things for the beſt; yet is this no plea for the tranſgreſſor: becauſe the merit of an action depends upon the ultimate point in view: whatever lies beyond, which could not be diſcerned, has no ſhare in the eſtimation.

Tully relates a ſtory of one *Jaſon* of *Phereu*, who had an impoſtume upon his ſtomach, that could not be cured by any means or aſſiſtance he could procure. It became ſo troubleſome to him, that he grew tired of life; but having not learned the ſtoical doctrine of Suicide, he determined to diſpoſe of his life for the benefit of his country; ſo he entered into the wars, and put himſelf foremoſt in all dangerous enterprizes. In one of theſe he received a wound with a ſpear, which luckily opened the impoſtumation, and worked a perfect cure. Now had this wound been given in private enmity inſtead of open war, every body would have condemned it as a crying enormity. For the intention whereon the view terminates, muſt denominate the deed: and though it was the Will of God to reſtore health and eaſe by this means to the ſufferer, yet this object lying out of ſight could have no effect to brighten the colour of the action. Nor could the Perpetrator be ſaid to do the Will of God, becauſe he acted in diſobedience to his declared Will, contained in the command, *Thou ſhalt do no murder.*

although the event by diſappointing our endeavours ſhould prove the ſecret Will to have been otherwiſe, nevertheleſs our honeſt, though miſtaken zeal for his ſervice, will ſtand approved in his ſight, and engage his bountiful favour towards us.

Whereas on the other hand, if we perverſely run counter to the admonitions of this guide, it will avail us nothing that our being permitted to take our courſe proves it agreeable to the ſecret Will; for God does not puniſh in anger, nor for having been diſappointed of his purpoſe; a cauſe of reſentment which can never befall him; but with the view of a phyſician who preſcribes a ſmart operation neceſſary to cure a diſtemper that would deſtroy the patient, or infect the neighbourhood: and if we regard our vicious diſpoſitions in this light, which is the true one, we muſt behold them with the ſame averſion we ſhould a loathſome diſeaſe, whether we apprehend it brought upon us by our own miſmanagement, or inflicted by the hand of heaven; which averſion once become hearty and

ſtrong,

ſtrong, may be truſted to take its chance for the effect it will have upon our conduct.

§. 41. For it is not ſo material to give a right judgement upon what is paſt and cannot be undone, as to take right meaſures for the future. Therefore leſt any ſhould encourage themſelves in indolence, or wrong doing, under pretence that ſince the Will of God is always punctually fulfilled, whatever ſhall be done, good or bad, muſt be conformable to that Will, ſo they need not ſcruple to take the courſes they like, being ſure to accompliſh it at all events: let them conſider, that ſince that Will ſhall take effect at all events, they may as well accompliſh it by doing right, as wrong, being equally ſure either way, that what they ſhall do will be the thing that was to come to paſs: if then the Will of God be done in both caſes, and they have their choice[a] in what manner they ſhall accompliſh

[a] For we may place the matter in this light, as having it in our option, with reſpect to events within our power, to determine what ſhall be the Will of God.

If

pliſh it, had they not better chooſe the manner moſt advantageous to themſelves, than one pernicious and deſtructive to them?

For

If at any time we can know the tendency of all cauſes in act, we may know what is the Will of God in that inſtance: therefore where the powers of men are thoſe cauſes, we may know that Will, by knowing the turns that human volition ſhall take; and wherever we can, by our reſolves, give the turn to our own volition, God leaves us at liberty to determine his Will. Nor is there greater abſurdity in this thought, than in conceiving a mother permitting her child to determine which way ſhe ſhall lead him, or a king his deſerving ſubject what title of honour he ſhall confer upon him.

Suppoſe a man ſays to me, I got drunk laſt night; therefore it was the Will of God, becauſe done. Indeed I was bloody ſick this morning: but then it was beſt I ſhould be ſo, becauſe finding a place in the plan of Providence. Very well; but is this a reaſon why you ſhould get drunk again to night? For if you keep ſober, that will likewiſe be God's Will: and if you have no qualms to-morrow, that will be the beſt, becauſe obtaining a place in the ſame plan. Since then either way will conduct you ſurely to that ultimate beſt known only to God, why ſhould you not take the cleaneſt, ſafeſt road, rather than involve yourſelf in the filth and dangers of debauchery? Nor were the caſe different could you ſwallow ever ſo much without being ſick or ſorry: for the notices of your moral

ſenſe,

For our buſineſs is to purſue our own trueſt intereſts; we have nothing to do with the ſecret Will; that will work itſelf out without our ſollicitude to compleat it: the end aſſigned us to work out, is none other than our own happineſs, to be purſued carefully and induſtriouſly, according to the lights afforded us.

Good and evil lie before us; we have powers of action, with liberty to uſe them: if our powers at any time be limited, we have ſtill ſome ſcope to range in; if our paſſions, or evil habits abridge our liberty, ſtill we may ſtrive and ſtruggle againſt them: in all caſes there is ſomething or other wherein we may exert our endeavours; let us then apply them where they may turn moſt to our benefit; but above

ſenſe, and the judgement of conſiderate perſons diſſuading exceſs, are an evidence you have reaſon to confide in, for the reality of miſchiefs you may not immediately diſcern. So you have no concern with that Will which is verified only by the event, but may conſult your own liking; provided you do not confine your regards to your preſent liking, but extend them to the conſequences, which you may vehemently diſlike.

all

all beware of reducing ourſelves to ſuch a deplorable condition, as that even mercy and loving kindneſs muſt lay a heavy weight of puniſhment upon us in order to effect its gracious purpoſes.

Fate. §. 42. There is ſtill another quarter of the wilderneſs we have not yet explored, where the giant Fate ſtalks along with irreſiſtible ſtrides, bearing down the forreſt like tender blades of corn before him, forcing his paſſage through ramparts and rocks; the textures of human contrivance are but as the dewy cobwebs of autumn acroſs his way; nor can Freewill find a place for the ſole of her foot among the heapy ruins wherewith he beſtrews the ground [a].

But

[a] Upon my friend's ſhowing me this tranſition, I recollected that a little before we had read together the poems of *Oſſian* the ſon of *Fingal*. I told him I thought here was an inſtance of that ſympathy he has talked of ſo much, as being one principal channel by which we daily furniſh our imagination with motives, affections, ſentiments, and trains of thought. I know, ſays I, the ſtar from whence you catched this ſpark of the

But before we enter into an examination of the courſes of Fate, let us, according to our uſual cuſtom, endeavour to underſtand what is properly meant by the word. We find it often confounded with Neceſſity, or

the ſublime. Of the Pompeus rather, ſays he. But when we take a freſh ſympathy, it is apt to hang looſe upon us like *Horace*'s purple rag, until incorporated in time among the old trains.

Theſe ſympathies, couſin *Comment*, are helpful to form and improve the ſtile: and it is neceſſary to ſtore in variety of them from different quarters, or elſe we ſhall be ſervile copiers inſtead of bold imitators. You are right, couſin *Search*, ſays I. But may not this variety be multiplied too far? For where will you find readers with the like variety of taſtes? And you have laid down, that when the trains ſuggeſted to an auditor are ſo diſſimilar to thoſe he has been accuſtomed to that they cannot poſſibly run into one another, it generates antipathy inſtead of ſympathy. But as you have managed the matter, there is nobody who will not find ſomething to excite this antipathy. The grave will be diſguſted to ſee you handle the moſt ſerious ſubjects in the air of a novel or a comedy: and the gay will find themſelves grievouſly diſappointed, when you draw them by the lure of amuſement into a metaphyſical ſubtilty. And you know that what nauſeates, hangs longer upon the palate than what is ſuitable to the taſte. So that by aiming to pleaſe every body, you will pleaſe nobody: becauſe there is nobody who will not think you either too profound or

too

or the impulsive operation of necessary causes: so the *Stratonic* and *Democratic* Atheists [b] understood it, when they ascribed all

too playfull. Your remark, says he, Cousin, is just, provided I were to consult Reputation only. But who knows but that by blending the airy and the abstruse, I may show the contemplative that it is possible to be serious without being solemn, to pursue inventions without injury to truth, and give a loose to imagination without losing one's understanding: and if I have carried matters beyond bounds, they may proceed with better discretion. On the other hand, by flourishing about and pretending to amuse, I may bring the thoughtless unawares into a closeness of thinking, which they used to dread, as being incompatible with chearfulness.

Thus the conversation ended, as conversations generally do, each party retaining his own opinion.

[b] They held atoms eternal and uncreated; and out of these, by their various collisions, assortments, and adhesions, the souls of men, and all other productions were formed. *Strato* made his atoms sentient, but in the lowest degree, so as not to be capable of a compleat perception; yet that a multitude of them clubbing forces might produce the brightest Genius or ablest Politician.

Our Author has battled both these people, showing that Perception cannot be made up of what are no Perceptions; nor received by a number of atoms jointly, unless received entire by each of them singly. For a sound cannot be heard by a whole assembly, without being heard by every one of the persons composing

all events to Fate, that is, the actions of matter depending upon one another in a continued ſeries from all eternity: and *Homer*'s *Moira crataia*, ſtrong-handed fate, has been generally tranſlated by the *Latin* poets, *dura Neceſſitas*, inflexible Neceſſity.

poſing it: neither can whiſpers heard by a thouſand men, make together an audible voice. He obſerves further, that exiſtence belongs only to individuals; a compound being a number, or collection of ſubſtances, and having no other exiſtence than that of its parts. For if the king were to incorporate ſix hundred men into a regiment, there would not be ſix hundred and one Beings therefore, one for the regiment, and one for each of the men, inſtead of only ſix hundred there were before; nor were he to break it again would their be a Being the leſs in his kingdom. So neither when a multitude of atoms run together to compoſe a human body, is there a Being more than there was before: nor would there be a Being loſt out of nature upon its diſſolution. But no man can doubt of his own exiſtence, or that he has a perſonality belonging to him diſtinct from all other Beings: for I can never ceaſe to be myſelf, nor become another perſon. Therefore there is one Being the more in nature for my exiſtence; and were I annihilated there would be a Being the leſs. From hence he infers the individuality of the mind, or ſpirit of man, and conſequently its perpetual duration: for nature can only deſtroy compounds by diſſolving their parts, but individuals cannot be deſtroyed without a miracle, that is, an immediate exertion of Omnipotence.

But I conceive theſe two very different things in common underſtanding, if we may reckon Neceſſity as here uſed a common idea, for I rather take neceſſary agency to be terms belonging to the ſpeculative vocabulary; but apprehend that operations whereto they may be applicable, cannot upon that account be ſtiled the work of Fate, in propriety of language. The circulation of ſap in vegetables, the contraction and dilatation of their fibres, the action of the ſun, air and mould, contributing to make them yield their ſeveral fruits, are all neceſſary agencies: yet when a man plants a peach-tree, can you properly ſay it is therefore fated that he ſhall gather peaches and not plumbs or filberds therefrom; or if he ſows oats in his field, does he think any thing of a fatality againſt his reaping wheat or barley? So neither if we knew a collection of atoms having motions among them which muſt form a regular world, ſhould we eſteem every thing

thing fatal[c] that might be produced by them.

But Fate, derived from the *Latin*, *Fari*, ſignifying to ſpeak, muſt denote the word ſpoken by ſome intelligent Being, who has power to make his words good; ſo that whatever he ſays ſhall be done, will infallibly come to paſs; and does not at all relate to the cauſes or manner whereby it is accompliſhed, unleſs thoſe cauſes be made to act in conſequence of the word ſpoken.

As to the *Parcæ*, ſuppoſed in heathen mythology to ſpin the thread of life, and by their ſciſſars to determine the period of it, I ſhould underſtand this thread only to expreſs the ſeries of events befalling every man, not the ſeries of cauſes operating to bring them forth. And the Pagans ſeem unſettled in their notions concerning the author of Fate; ſometimes it is their Jove who fixes it by his arbitrary decree, as in the ill ſucceſſes of the *Grecian* army;

[c] Yet *Chryſippus*, *Seneca*, and the Stoics, ſpeak in this ſtile, thereby extending the word to a ſenſe not belonging to it in common language.

ſometimes he is only an executive power, ſubordinate to the *Parcæ*, compelled by their ſpinning, to do or permit what he does not like, as in the death of *Sarpedon*[d].

However, leaving them to their own imaginations, with us who acknowledge one ſupreme Governour ſubordinate to nothing nor controulable by any other Power, Fate or Deſtiny, muſt be the ſame with the decree of the Almighty; nor can we doubt that whatever he has decreed will not fail of coming to paſs.

§. 43. But this decree works no effect of itſelf, being no efficient cauſe; for if you order your ſervant to do a thing, the buſineſs is done by the efficacy of his action, not of your's; a command given to a ſubordinate, we ſhall acknowledge com-

[d] And ſometimes himſelf ſubjected to their laws: for we learn from *Ovid*, that he remembered a time in the boſom of fate, wherein the ſea, the earth, and imperial palace of heaven ſhould be wrapt in flames: Yet it ſeems he knew ſo little the certainty of that time, that he was afraid the madneſs of *Phaeton* might anticipate it.

 pulſive;

pulſive; therefore if any man knows of a decree iſſued from the Almighty concerning ſomething he is to do, I ſhall never adviſe him to ſtrive againſt it, nor think himſelf at liberty to do the contrary.

But it is not this kind of decrees that are ſuppoſed to generate Fatality, which ariſes from thoſe unknown to us, confining our actions to the courſe ſuited for bringing forth the deſtined event: yet even in this caſe it is not the word ſpoken and never heard by us, but ſomething conſequent upon it that impoſes the Fatality. We are told indeed, that God ſaid, *Let there be Light, and there was Light*; yet we cannot imagine the Light ſprung forth without ſome exertion of Omnipotence to produce it; for when afterwards he ſaid, *Let us make man after our own image*, nevertheleſs man was not made until he moulded the duſt of the earth into a human body, and breathed thereinto the breath of life: therefore when we ſay God created all things by his word, we do not underſtand that they produced themſelves out of non-

entity, in obedience to the order given[a], but intend only to expreſs the facility wherewith the divine operations are performed ſimilar to that of a man in authority, cauſing what he pleaſes to be done upon the word of command.

Very true, you ſay: nobody imagines the ſound of words ſpoken can work any thing. But when God pronounces his decree, he accompanies it with ſome act of power efficacious and irreſiſtible to enforce the execution: or he watches over the tendency of ſecond cauſes, and turns them by his ſecret influence to co-operate towards bringing forth the deſtined event: in both caſes he abridges human liberty; for what is ordained muſt inevitably come to paſs; nor can all the art or power of man turn it aſide; for the Fatality hanging over us confines our choice to one certain train of objects, or by privately counteracting us, baffles our utmoſt endeavours, when turned the contrary way.

[a] Nor that this order was an efficient cauſe of their exiſtence.

This

§. 44. This ſeems to be the ordinary way of conſidering this matter, and the concomitant exertion of power makes the difference between a Decree and a Command, for both are ſuppoſed to proceed from the word of God. We are told, he ſaid, *Let there be Light, and there was light:* we are likewiſe told, that he ſaid, *Thou ſhalt not murther; thou ſhalt not ſteal; thou ſhalt not commit adultery*; nevertheleſs men do ſtill murder and ſteal, and commit adultery, notwithſtanding the word ſpoken. So the word of God operates nothing of itſelf when delivered as a command, nor unleſs when delivered as a decree: becauſe in the latter caſe only, it is accompanied with an exertion of Omnipotence, or a determination to exert it when occaſion ſhall require.

But the idea of a determination, to uſe power whenever requiſite for accompliſhing a decree, ariſes from our narrow conception of the proceedings of God taken from our own manner of proceeding, as obſerved already in §. 20. and the latter part

of §. 29. For when we reſolve upon the compaſſing of any diſtant purpoſe, we can ſcarce ever lay our meaſures ſo ſurely but that they may fail of the iſſue intended; ſo we are forced to watch over and correct them from time to time as we ſhall find occaſion; or accidents may intervene which will require our further endeavours to prevent their defeating our deſign; or many times we know not what meaſures are proper until we have ſeen the tendency of other cauſes, and conduct of other perſons any ways affecting the end we have in view; and then we muſt employ ſuch power and ſkill as we are maſters of, in order to bring things into the train we would have them take. From this experience of ourſelves, we are led to think the ſame of the Almighty, whom we conceive as having deſtined certain particular events, but in general left the powers of nature and free agents to take their own courſe, until they chance to take a tendency contrary to his deſigns, and then he controuls and turns them

them by his ſecret influence, ſo as to make them co-operate therewith.

Now a little reflection may ſhow how injurious this notion is to the wiſdom and power of God, repreſenting him as fixing indeed upon certain purpoſes, but uncertain in what manner they ſhall be brought to paſs, until the tendency his ſecond cauſes ſhall happen to take points out the meaſures neceſſary for turning them into their deſtined courſe; and thus giving chance a ſhare in the government of the world, liable indeed to his controul, but working of herſelf whenever he does not interfere, and even furniſhing employment for his wiſdom and power, by the errors ſhe commits.

§. 45. But when we conſider, that all events, as well thoſe eſteemed fortuitous as others, muſt proceed from certain cauſes, which derived their exiſtence and efficacy mediately or immediately from the firſt; and when we contemplate his Omniſcience, extending to every thing that can be ſup-

poſed the object of knowledge, we ſhall find reaſon to convince us that nothing comes to paſs unleſs in conſequence of ſome act of his; and that whenever he acts, he knows preciſely what he does, together with the remoteſt and minuteſt conſequences to reſult from his doings.

For what bounds ſhall we ſet to his intelligence? If our own lies confined within a ſmall compaſs, it is owing to the ſcantineſs of our organs, thoſe neceſſary inſtruments of our perception. We have but two hands, ſo can touch no more than they will reach to; we have eyes only before us, ſo can behold no further than half the circle ſurrounding us: the tablet of our memory, the chart of our imagination, the line of our reflection, have their appointed meaſures, ſo we can recollect, or calculate, or contemplate no more than the ideas they contain.

But God perceives not by organs, neither meditates by animal ſpirits, or the little fibres of the brain, nor receives his notices by channels, whoſe number or contents might

might be computed, ſo as to determine the preciſe quantity they are capable of conveying. What then is there to ſet the limitation to his knowledge; or by what rule or meaſure can we aſcertain the bounds? Can he comprehend a million of ideas, and no more? Does he clearly diſcover all events to happen within the enſuing century, and no longer? Do the concerns of empires ſo occupy his thoughts, that he has none to ſpare for the peaſant, the labourer, or the beggar? Are the affairs of men ſo burthenſome to his mind, that he has no room to think of the mouſe and the wren, the emmet and the mite, the green myriads of the peopled graſs, the many-tribed weeds of the field, or the dancing motes that glitter in the noontide beams?

Since then we know of no boundaries to circumſcribe the divine Omniſcience, but that it may extend to every thing without overlooking any thing, and diſcern remoteſt conſequences in their preſent cauſes, why ſhould we ſcruple to admit that he gave being to thoſe cauſes with a view to their

their conſequences? and on the formation of a world diſpoſed his ſubſtances, material and ſpiritual, with ſuch properties, powers, ſituations, motions and ideas, as ſhould produce the exact ſeries of events he intended to bring forth?

In this caſe there is no occaſion nor room for controuling or altering the operation of ſecond cauſes, they being already adjuſted to anſwer all the purpoſes they were deſtined to compleat. And if there be ſupernatural interpoſitions (which I neither affirm nor deny) we cannot ſuppoſe them made upon unforeſeen emergencies to ſupply defects in the original contrivance, but comprized therein, as being judged proper for manifeſtation of the divine power and government to intelligent creatures, and worked up into one uniform plan, together with the operations of ſecondary agents.

§. 46. In this view of the œconomy of Providence, we ſee that any abſolute decree or ſecret fatality to enforce the execution of a deſign againſt the tendency of ſecond

ſecond cauſes to turn it aſide, muſt be ſuperfluous, proviſion being already made in perfect wiſdom for every event which is to take effect by diſpoſition of the cauſes proper to give it birth, nor will any of thoſe cauſes deviate into another tendency than that they were calculated to take.

Thus it appears, that all things fall out according to the will and diſpoſition of God, and conformably to the ſcheme of his Providence, working for the moſt part, if not always by the miniſtry of material or voluntary agents: but the methods whereby this miniſtry is conducted are various. Some parts of the plan are accompliſhed by the choice and induſtry of man, inſtigated thereto by appetites, judgements, imaginations, deſires, obligations, dangers, and other motives; other parts are executed by the ſtated laws of nature, ſuch as the inſtinct[a] of brutes, action of the ele-

[a] Which, we have ſeen in a former note, is ſomething between neceſſary and free Agency; but in general eſtimation, ſeems ranked under the former. And what we do ourſelves without reflection, or conſciouſneſs, is commonly ſtiled mechanical.

ments,

ments, powers of vegetation, qualities of ſoils, changes of ſeaſons, and viciſſitudes of night and day; and others brought about by the courſes of fortune dependant upon the ſituations [b] of ſubſtances, and their mutual applications upon one another, to us accidental and uninveſtigable.

But what proceeds from the two firſt of theſe cauſes, we do not uſually aſcribe to the hand of Fate: for nobody looks upon it as a Fatality that laſt winter is now ſucceeded by ſummer; that the days are long, the air warm, the corn and fruits begin to ripen, for all theſe are natural, nor could any body expect things ſhould have fallen out otherwiſe. So neither do we think a parent fated to put his ſon out to ſchool,

[b] The powers of ſecond cauſes belong to Nature; but their concurrence, or coming to where they may operate, lies within the province of Fortune. That flame ſhould burn wood is nothing ſtrange: but that the candle ſhould be left cloſe to the wainſcot was unlucky. So we know well enough there are cauſes in nature capable of raiſing a ſtorm: but that they ſhould be ready at hand to raiſe it with violence, and drive it upon our foreſts, or our houſes, makes the misfortune.

for

for it was his desire to give him a good education, and his choice and judgement directed him to the proper methods for effecting it.

Therefore the last class of causes only remains for the province of Fate, to wit, such whose operations are fortuitous and unaccountable, that is, beyond the reach of human foresight and sagacity to discover; nevertheless they must have some certain springs and issues, as well as the motions of nature or actions of men.

§. 47. Thus the same events lie under the disposal of Fate and of Fortune, and both terms take their rise from our manner of conceiving things. Chance is no agent nor power, but the creature only of imagination, deriving its birth from our ignorance; for when we see causes at work, but know not their tendency, we say it is a chance what they will produce: therefore that which is chance to one man may be none to another, who has better informa-

tion

tion or more judgement to diſcern the train things are taking.

If a die were to be thrown, the caſt would be produced by the motions of the thrower's arm, the ſhape of the box, inequalities of the table, and other imperceptible circumſtances, of which we can make no eſtimate, therefore we deem it to lie under the power of Chance; but were the caſt to determine between two malefactors which of them ſhould ſuffer, we ſhould then think it a matter worthy referring to the ſupreme diſpoſer of all events, for the lot cometh from the Lord; yet ſtill being uncertain what means he will employ, or what effect they ſhall take, we attribute the deciſion to his Will or Decree, ſkipping over that undiſcernible chain of cauſes lying between his firſt appointment and thoſe now in act.

Therefore Fate and Fortune ſeem for the moſt part to claim a concurrent juriſdiction, many tracts lying within the province of both: and under this apprehenſion we expreſs ourſelves upon common occaſions; for

for when we hear of a man falling in battle, we ſay indifferently, it was his Fate, or his Fortune to be ſlain; and of a young perſon intended to be ſent abroad, but uncertain in what buſineſs, or what place he may find opportunities for ſettling, we ſay, it is doubtful where his lot may fall, where fortune may carry him, or his fate or deſtiny fix him.

But to which of theſe powers we ſhall aſcribe the influence, depends upon the objects we take into contemplation: while we regard only the ſecret ſprings and unforeſeen incidents which may affect an event, we deem it in the hand of Fortune: but when we look on further to that intelligent Being, who is the diſpoſer of all events, we conceive that thoſe ſprings will work, and incidents fall out, according to his direction and decree.

Nevertheleſs it is obvious, as we obſerved before, that a decree will work nothing without an application of power to enforce the execution of it, and when ſuch application has been made by proviſion

of

of the proper means for bringing an event to paſs, a decree or declaration of the purpoſe intended becomes needleſs: for the requiſite meaſures being once taken, will have their effect, whether any word be ſpoken concerning them or no. Therefore the iſſues of things proceed, and fortune derives her efficacy, from the proviſion not the decree of the Almighty, from the work of his hand, not the word of his mouth; and this latter, if any ſuch there were, added nothing to the acts of Omnipotence, but muſt be delivered for ſome other purpoſe than to enſure the completion of his deſign.

§. 48. Hence it appears, that in uſing the terms Fate, Decree or Deſtiny, we ſpeak after the manner of men; for it being cuſtomary with us, whenever we reſolve upon ſome diſtant work, to declare our intentions to perſons under our influence, who may aſſiſt in compleating it, and to fix a determination in our minds which may render us vigorous, and keep us watchful

in

in the proſecution, we conceive of God as making the like declared or mental determination with regard to every ſpot he compriſes within the plan of his Providence.

Then again, being ſenſible this determination cannot operate upon the courſes of fortune as a command, yet that ſomething muſt operate to put them in motion, and being unable to trace, or even to conceive a chain of cauſes extending from the firſt formation of the plan to all theſe multifarious events, we cannot help acknowledging muſt come to paſs by the divine appointment, we get an obſcure idea of an irreſiſtible force, a ſomething we cannot explain nor account for its exiſtence, which we call a Fatality, which perpetually hangs over ſecond cauſes, conſtraining their motions, or like an adamantine wall, confining them within their appointed courſe, from whence they would have a natural propenſity to deviate. Thus Fatality becomes disjoined from the decree, and loſes the proper import belonging to it by its derivation, being now no longer a *fatum*

or word ſpoken, but one knows not well what; an emanation from it, like light from the ſun-beams, a power without an agent to exert it; for when God has ſpoken, his action ceaſes, and the Fatality is a conſequence of what he has ſaid.

That this is the ſenſe, if a ſenſe it may be called, that men ordinarily affix to the term, appears by the Atheiſts employing it, who acknowledge no intelligent Being who might *fari*, that is, ſpeak or iſſue a decree: for being called upon to aſſign a cauſe for the laws and eſtabliſhments of nature, they aſcribed them to a blind Fatality, working upon the maſs of matter throughout the univerſe, and driving it into a regular form. But if we regard etymology, a blind fatality is as abſurd an expreſſion as that of a dumb decree, or an unintended deſign. The *Epicureans* alone diſcarded Fate upon a moſt unphiloſophical principle, that events may enſue, ſuch as the declination of atoms, without any prior cauſe whatever to produce them: but all who admitted an eternal Firſt Cauſe, whether intelligent

telligent or unſentient, ſeem to have entertained a notion of Fatality.

This confuſed and indeterminate notion opened the door to judicial Aſtrology [a], for though the ſtars were ſuppoſed by their poſitions to affect the lives of men, I never yet heard it attempted to be ſhown in what manner, or by what mediums they operated: but a conformity being once fancied between the ſucceſſes of human tranſactions and aſpects of the heavenly bodies, it was a ſhort way to talk of a Fatality, though nobody could tell why, or how, or by what channels the connection ſhould be effected.

The like may be ſaid of the *Parcæ*, whoſe ſinging anſwers to the decree utter-

[a] And to the Art Magic, and Prognoſtications by dreams, omens, prodigies, prickings into the bible, ſtrangers in the candle, ſcreechings of owls, influences of a rainy *Friday* upon the following week, and other the like trumpery, maintained by the Stoics in *Tully*'s Divination, and by our modern old women in the nurſery. For all theſe are not eſteemed as Revelations, but as a conſent or ſympathy in things, between which the Philoſopher and Naturaliſt cannot find the leaſt connection.

ed, and could have no other effect than to amuſe themſelves and lighten their taſk; but it was the thread they ſpun which determined the duration and colour of men's lives beyond the power of *Jove* himſelf to alter: yet we never hear of their having any communication with ſublunary affairs, or acting as efficient cauſes upon any thing moving here; nevertheleſs upon their ſpinning, there inſtantly aroſe a ſympathetic energy in the cauſes at work upon earth, drawing them to produce an iſſue conformable to what was ſpun.

§. 49. We ſee from the foregoing obſervations, how the term Fate has ſlid off its original baſis, being departed from its firſt ſignification, that of a decree or reſolve of the Almighty to a ſomething generated thereby, an undefinable influence, reſiding neither in body, nor ſoul, nor ſubſtance, but an abſtract force or activity [a], hovering

[a] Which there is no agent to exert. Not God, for his action was compleated long ago, upon iſſuing the decree: nor ſecond cauſes, for they are ſuppoſed to be turned aſide from their natural operation by the Fatality.

as it were in the air, and operating upon the cauſes of things as they ſeverally begin to act.

Nor yet do men keep always ſteady to this idea of Fate in their common converſation; for we often hear them talk of the Fate of a convict criminal lying in the hand of the Prince who has power to pardon or to order execution; the lover waits for the deciſion of his miſtreſs to fix his Fate; the poet talks of phyſicians iſſuing mandates in arreſt of Fate [b], and an unexpected accident or arrival of a timely ſuccour is thought ſometimes to change the Fate of a battle: whereas if we regard the genuine notion of Fate, it was fixed long ago by the decree of heaven; nor is it in the power of man, or any natural agent, to determine or ſtop, or change, or affect it in any reſpect.

[b] *With looks demure they graſp the golden bait,*
And iſſue mandates in arreſt of fate.
THURSTON,
Who being a lawyer, took his metaphor from the law courts, arreſting or ſtopping judgement after a verdict for irregularities ſhown in the proceedings.

Theſe variations of language do not diſturb us in our ordinary diſcourſes, for the context or occaſion introducing them moulds our words into the ſhape that is proper; but men of thought and abſtraction, deſirous of affixing conſtantly the ſame ideas to their words, find themſelves diſappointed when they light upon a term of vague and unſtable ſignification; for as we generally think in words, and their ſenſe in the various phraſes whereto we join them, is determined by cuſtom; we are led inſenſibly in the progreſs of our reaſonings to underſtand them differently, from whence great confuſion and perplexity muſt unavoidably enſue.

Therefore the ſcience of language, and exact obſervation of ideas adhering thereto, would help us greatly in our diſcoveries of nature; for if men could fix upon terms not liable to variation of ſenſe or miſapprehenſion, their diſputes would be ſhortened, and they might quickly arrive at ſo much knowledge as is attainable by human underſtanding. We have found no

reaſon

reaſon hitherto to diſregard the admonitions of our preſent patroneſs Philology, they having been helpful to us upon ſeveral occaſions; and ſhe informs us, the word Fate carries a very looſe and indeterminate ſignification.

For this reaſon I wiſh it were quite expunged from the philoſophical vocabulary, and Providence ſubſtituted in its room, which I conceive would render our thoughts clearer and leſs intricate, and give them a freer progreſs when turned upon the government of the world; for the proviſions of heaven in the original diſpoſition of adequate cauſes may anſwer all purpoſes, as well thoſe accompliſhed by natural as accidental means, or the motions of free agency.

§. 50. But men find a difficulty in conceiving of abſolute dominion, without a coercive authority or compulſion exerciſed upon the ſubjects under it: which makes us all ſo fond of power as a neceſſary means for bringing our purpoſes to bear againſt the oppoſition of other agents which might

Theſe variations of language do not diſturb us in our ordinary diſcourſes, for the context or occaſion introducing them moulds our words into the ſhape that is proper; but men of thought and abſtraction, deſirous of affixing conſtantly the ſame ideas to their words, find themſelves diſappointed when they light upon a term of vague and unſtable ſignification; for as we generally think in words, and their ſenſe in the various phraſes whereto we join them, is determined by cuſtom; we are led inſenſibly in the progreſs of our reaſonings to underſtand them differently, from whence great confuſion and perplexity muſt unavoidably enſue.

Therefore the ſcience of language, and exact obſervation of ideas adhering thereto, would help us greatly in our diſcoveries of nature; for if men could fix upon terms not liable to variation of ſenſe or miſapprehenſion, their diſputes would be ſhortened, and they might quickly arrive at ſo much knowledge as is attainable by human underſtanding. We have found no

reaſon

reaſon hitherto to diſregard the admonitions of our preſent patroneſs Philology, they having been helpful to us upon ſeveral occaſions; and ſhe informs us, the word Fate carries a very looſe and indeterminate ſignification.

For this reaſon I wiſh it were quite expunged from the philoſophical vocabulary, and Providence ſubſtituted in its room, which I conceive would render our thoughts clearer and leſs intricate, and give them a freer progreſs when turned upon the government of the world; for the proviſions of heaven in the original diſpoſition of adequate cauſes may anſwer all purpoſes, as well thoſe accompliſhed by natural as accidental means, or the motions of free agency.

§. 50. But men find a difficulty in conceiving of abſolute dominion, without a coercive authority or compulſion exerciſed upon the ſubjects under it: which makes us all ſo fond of power as a neceſſary means for bringing our purpoſes to bear againſt the oppoſition of other agents which might

attempt to defeat them. Yet in many inſtances, as has been remarked in §. 19. we ourſelves can make proviſion for deſigns wherein other perſons are to concur, and guide their conduct ſo far as we know what will move them, and have the proper motives in our hands, without pretending to any authority or compulſive power over them. And if there be always ſome hazard of a diſappointment, it is becauſe we can never ſee thoroughly the exact ſtate of their deſires, nor what external accidents, ſuch as weather, diſeaſe, or the like, may diſturb the ſucceſs of our ſchemes: but were there nothing extraneous to interfere, and had we a perfect knowledge of men's minds, much more, were their inclinations and judgements of our framing, we ſhould need no deſpotic juriſdiction nor controuling power to guide them into what courſes of behaviour we pleaſed.

Now there is nothing external to the work of God. The laws of nature bringing forth her various productions were of his

his eſtabliſhment: the workings of chance followed from ſome determinate cauſes, though to us unknown; theſe again from other prior, and ſo on in a continual channel from the ſources firſt opened by the exertion of his power; for no event, however caſual, can happen without ſomething occaſioning it to fall out in that manner: the actions of men proceed according to their apprehenſions and judgements thrown upon them by their conſtitution or temperament, by education, by company and occurrences befalling them in life; all which were conveyed by nature or fortune, and therefore muſt be referred to the origin from whence they derived. For every effect muſt be produced by the action of ſome agent material or ſpiritual, or the concurrence of ſeveral, and muſt follow according to the manner of that action being exerted; which manner was determined by ſome impulſe or motive impreſſed from elſewhere; nor can we ſtop until we arrive at ſome act of Omnipotence.

Thus

Thus the face of things, as well in the moral as natural kingdoms, reſults from the qualities, poſitions*, and motions God

* The ſecondary qualities of bodies reſult from their form, which is nothing elſe than a certain poſition of their component parts: for the ſame ſhillings laid upon a table, will make a ſquare, a lozenge, a ring, or a croſs, according as you place them; and the ſame particles of matter will make graſs, or mutton, or human fleſh, according as they are diſpoſed among one another by digeſtion. The modifications of our organs occaſioning them to impreſs their ſeveral perceptions, can be conceived no otherwiſe than as depending upon their figures or motions: ſo that though Thought be neither figure nor motion, it follows preciſely upon the changes made in either; and this whether we work thoſe changes ourſelves, or have them produced before us by other cauſes.

The ſecondary qualities of ſpirit depend upon its poſition, in ſome organization; for if the ſpirit of a man were placed in his great toe, he would neither ſee nor hear, nor underſtand; and if it were placed in the organization of an oyſter, perhaps he might have no more ſenſe than that ſtupid animal. Motion ſerves only to change poſitions into one another, and what effect it ſhall have depends upon prior poſitions: for the ſame motion of a bullet will deſtroy this man or that, according to the poſition of the muſket, or places they occupy: and the ſame particles of beef are capable, or not, of being moved about by the circulation for our nouriſhment, according to their internal poſition in the joint when it is raw or roaſted, or putrefied.

gave

gave to his ſubſtances at the formation of a world. It remains only, that we aſk ourſelves the queſtion, whether he extended his plan to a compaſs larger than he could comprehend himſelf, or gave birth to cauſes which might produce events unthought of by him, or more numerous than he could graſp in his Omniſcience? If we anſwer in the negative, we muſt needs acknowledge that proviſion was made at the beginning for all that train of events, and accompliſhment of thoſe purpoſes we have ſeen, or ſhall hereafter ſee effected.

But experience teſtifies, that this proviſion leaves many things in our power, and circumſcribes us in many other reſpects; we lay ſchemes, and take meaſures appearing certain to ſucceed, but find them fail in the iſſue, and that by accidents we could not have expected, nor can account for their happening; our reaſon deſerts us in time of need; we commit blunders, and give into follies we could not have thought ourſelves capable of: tempeſts, earthquakes, famines, peſtilences, and deſtructive diſeaſes

eaſes ariſe from no natural cauſes that we can diſcern; and our experience of thoſe things gives us the notion of Fatality. Therefore Fate, if we will needs employ the term in our ſpeculations, is that part of the divine proviſion producing events which would not have enſued by the known laws of nature, nor operation of obſervable cauſes, nor contrivances of man, but are rather contrary to his endeavours.

§. 51. *Seneca*, in *Nat. Quæſt.* Lib. II. cap. 36. defines Fate the neceſſity of all things and actions, which no force can break through: and he ſeems herein to have given Fate the import belonging to it in common propriety of language; for the courſes of Fate are always deemed irreſiſtible and unalterable; nor do we apply the term unleſs to caſes wherein the will and power of man has no concern.

Therefore when a perſon fails in a diſtemper, we ſay it was his Fate to die, becauſe we ſuppoſe his wiſh and endeavours were bent upon preventing it: but if he eſcapes,

eſcapes, we do not ſay he was fated to recover, but at moſt that his Fate was not yet come, that is, has not yet operated upon him; for this was the effect of the cares taken to ſave him.

If we happen to ruin a ſcheme we were extremely fond of accompliſhing through ſome palpable miſconduct of our own, we think ourſelves under a fatal infatuation, becauſe every body is conceived willing to employ his beſt judgement for his own benefit; from whence comes the obſervation, that whom *Jove* would deſtroy, he firſt deprives of their underſtanding: but if we chance to ſucceed beyond expectation by a more than ordinary dexterity of management, we think nothing of a Fatality, becauſe the unuſual clearneſs of judgement and ſucceſs conſequent thereupon, were things agreeable to our wiſh, and effects of beſtirring ourſelves in the exerciſe of our faculties.

So likewiſe a fatal accident is that which brings on an event, we are extremely averſe to: whereas a lucky incident is never termed fatal,

fatal, becauſe tending to further our advancement towards ſomething we deſire.

But if *Seneca* was right in calling Fate a Neceſſity, which no force can break thro', we cannot think him ſo in the extent he has given to its dominion, comprehending all things and all actions: for this ſwallows up the whole province of Freewill, to which Fate and Neceſſity, in every body's underſtanding, are counted diametrically oppoſite: for what is fated to happen does not lie in my power to prevent, and what depends upon my pleaſure and option, is yet undetermined by any Fatality.

Nor let it be thought we injure him, by taking his expreſſion too ſtrictly; for he goes on, in cap. 38. to particularize in matters belonging directly to human management. If, ſays he, it be fated that ſuch a young perſon ſhall become eloquent, it is likewiſe fated that he ſhall ſtudy rhetoric; if that he ſhall grow rich, it is fated that he ſhall trade to foreign parts. In like manner his brother Stoic, *Chryſippus*, inſiſts, in *Tully de Fato*, cap. 13. that when

a

a ſick man is fated to recover, it is confated that he ſhall ſend for a phyſician; to which it might be added, and that the doctor ſhall uſe his beſt ſkill, and the apothecary diſpenſe his recipes properly.

But any common eye may ſee, that theſe Fates do not carry ſuch a neceſſity as the force of man cannot break through: for the ſcholar, if he pleaſes, may neglect his ſtudies, the young trader ſquander away his ſtock in extravagancies and debaucheries, the ſick perſon perſiſt obſtinately in refuſing help, the doctor deſtroy his patient, or the apothecary impoſe upon both by neglecting to provide good drugs, or mixing up ingredients that will do miſchief.

What then! are not eloquence, riches, and health, the bleſſings of heaven? are they not given to thoſe whom God thinks proper, and withheld from whom he pleaſes? Or can any, to whom he deſigns a favour, ever fail of receiving the effects of his bounty? By no means; nor does this conſequence follow from our rejection of

Fatality;

Fatality: for tho' all things are not fated, yet all things are wiſely provided, ſo as to take the train requiſite for compleating whatever events were contained within his plan. Thus the orator and merchant were provided by education, example, and other natural means, with a diſpoſition for improving the talents and opportunities put into their hands; the ſick man is provided with ſenſe to know the value of life, and fondneſs for its preſervation; the medical aſſiſtants with compaſſion to a fellow-creature in diſtreſs, with ſkill and diligence and a deſire to maintain their credit in their profeſſions: and theſe diſpoſitions will infallibly put them upon taking thoſe meaſures voluntarily, which they had full power and free liberty to have omitted.

Thus the will of God is done without employing the compulſive force of Fate, or rigid arm of Neceſſity. But the difficulties that have always perplexed the ſpeculative upon this ſubject, ſpring from their not obſerving the double ſenſe of the word *poſſible*, as it relates to power or to contingency, remarked

in

in the foregoing pages, §. 30, 31; for want of which they could not conceive how any thing could be left to the power and option of man, without inferring a poſſibility that he might defeat the purpoſes of God: but having well ſettled that diſtinction in our minds, and taking along with us that the behaviour of men follows upon their apprehenſions and ſentiments which reſult from the ſeen and unſeen ſprings employed by God in his adminiſtration of the moral world, we may eaſily comprehend how it may be poſſible, that is, in the power of man, in many inſtances to fruſtrate his deſigns; nevertheleſs he may ſo perfectly know what will be the deſires and thoughts of their hearts, that there is no poſſibility, that is, no danger, they ſhould purſue any other than the particular tenour of conduct moſt conducive thereto.

§. 52. The eſſence of Fate lying in its unchangeableneſs and independence on the turns of Freewill, the powers of different perſons being various, and coming or going

ing according as opportunity changes, there is no paradox in aſſerting, that the ſame event may be under the arbitrary diſpoſal of one man, which is fated and neceſſary to another, and may be matter of choice to-day, which was eſteemed the work of Fate yeſterday, and may be ſo again to-morrow.

Suppoſe you and I could give evidence againſt ſomebody of a capital offence unknown to any body elſe; but there being ſome favourable circumſtances in his caſe, we went into a room together to conſult whether we ſhould make the diſcovery or no: this we ſhould be apt to call ſitting to fix his Fate; and any body upon ſeeing us come out, and knowing what we had been about, might properly aſk, well, what is his Fate? is he doomed to die? But though our deciſion be reckoned Fate, with reſpect to the culprit, as being unalterable and inevitable by him, yet we ſhould not eſteem ourſelves under a Fatality or Neceſſity to proſecute, becauſe it would ſtill remain in our power to do it or forbear.

Marriages

Marriages are commonly ſaid to be made in heaven; yet it is of the very eſſence of marriage to have the free conſent of the parties; for the ſolemnization follows upon their will and deſire; but the cauſes influencing their choice were not of their own procurement, but extraneous and fortuitous to them. A man determined to ſettle in the world, but unprovided of his object, may think it in the hand of Fate or Fortune what qualified party he ſhall meet with; but when the acquaintance is made, the liking fixed, and matters agreed on both ſides, things proceed thence forward under the direction of Choice and Freewill: then again, if afterwards ſhe prove a ſhrew, he may chance to curſe his ſtars for ſubjecting him to ſo cruel a Fate.

The fall of *Troy* was ſaid to be written in the book of Fate before its foundation; yet the parties inſtrumental thereto, *Paris* and *Helen*, the *Grecian* Princes, the council of *Priam* refuſing reſtitution, acted by paſſion, contrivance, deſign, and deliberation, thoſe ſprings of free agency: and

during the ſiege, the poor *Trojans* uſed their utmoſt efforts to ward off the ſtroke of Fate, which nevertheleſs fell inevitably upon them.

Thus when Fate has begun his courſe, it opens at intervals to let in Freewill, who having played her part, the ſtream cloſes again, and involves all before it in irreſiſtible neceſſity.

From hence it appears, that in diſquiſitions upon this ſubject our buſineſs is to enquire not ſo much into the nature of things, as the import of expreſſions and ſtate of ideas under contemplation; and we ſhall often find that the ſame event, according to the perſons concerned in it, to the light wherein we place it, or to our conſidering the whole or ſome part only of the chain whereon it hangs, ſhall be either the work of Fate, the effect of Chance, or the product of human Induſtry, Forethought and Option. For Fate and Neceſſity being always oppoſed to free Choice, may be applicable to an Event or not,

not, according to whoſe choice, or what act of the will you refer it.

If I lie under the power of a ſuperiour in what manner to diſpoſe of me, the determination is Fate to me, though matter of choice and deliberation to him. So I may eſteem it in the hand of Fate to determine how I ſhall diſpoſe of myſelf ſeven years hence, if I cannot by any preſent act of mine certainly direct my future reſolves; but when the time of action comes, I ſhall then have it my power and option which way to turn myſelf: then again, after I have executed my choice and fixed my ſituation, if I run back through the whole chain of cauſes bringing me thereinto, the opportunities enabling, and inducements prevailing on me to take the part I did, which were not of my own procurement, I may be apt to call it the work of Fate.

No wonder then that ſo variable and ſlippery a term ſhould often preſent us with double lights, bewildering the moſt cautious traveller, like an *ignis fatuus:* wherefore, as I ſaid before, it were better we

could do entirely without it; for Providence ſeems a much clearer and ſteadier idea; nor are there the like difficulties in underſtanding how that, by the apt diſpoſition of cauſes ſuited to each reſpective purpoſe, may generate the laws of nature, ſhape the windings of fortune, and produce the motives giving the turn to human volition.

§. 53. Let us now conſider how far our conduct and condition in life may be cramped and controuled by this univerſal proviſion. We find ourſelves circumſcribed in our powers, our knowledge, and the ſcope allotted us to exerciſe them. This nobody doubts. The ſeverities of winter ſucceed the conveniencies of ſummer; our weight binds us down to the earth, nor can we ſoar aloft like the ſwallow. Tempeſts, diſeaſes, and iniſter accidents come upon us inevitably, and many things fall out beyond our ſkill or power to prevent them; but want of ſkill and power is not want of liberty. Bars, obſtructions,

and

and reſtraints confine us in the exerciſe of thoſe powers we have; but there is a difference between freedom of action and freedom of will: the latter reſpects only ſuch things as we have a natural ability to perform, and againſt which there lies no impediment to prevent the ſucceſs of our endeavours. But Freewill cannot proceed without inducements to move, and ideas to direct it; therefore that proviſion which ſupplies us with theſe, is ſo far from overthrowing, that it is the baſis and ſupport of our freedom.

Nor would doubts ariſe concerning our poſſeſſion of this privilege, if we did not generally extend it beyond its proper object, which, ſtrictly ſpeaking, is no other than the preſent action in our power; but our preſent endeavours often have a tendency to diſtant purpoſes; and experience teaches us what they have been uſed to produce; therefore we eſteem the conſequences to be effected by them as under our power, and ſubjects of our option: then, if ſuch remote events fall out otherwiſe than expected,

could do entirely without it; for Providence ſeems a much clearer and ſteadier idea; nor are there the like difficulties in underſtanding how that, by the apt diſpoſition of cauſes ſuited to each reſpective purpoſe, may generate the laws of nature, ſhape the windings of fortune, and produce the motives giving the turn to human volition.

§. 53. Let us now conſider how far our conduct and condition in life may be cramped and controuled by this univerſal proviſion. We find ourſelves circumſcribed in our powers, our knowledge, and the ſcope allotted us to exerciſe them. This nobody doubts. The ſeverities of winter ſucceed the conveniencies of ſummer; our weight binds us down to the earth, nor can we ſoar aloft like the ſwallow. Tempeſts, diſeaſes, and iniſter accidents come upon us inevitably, and many things fall out beyond our ſkill or power to prevent them; but want of ſkill and power is not want of liberty. Bars, obſtructions,

and

and reſtraints confine us in the exerciſe of thoſe powers we have; but there is a difference between freedom of action and freedom of will: the latter reſpects only ſuch things as we have a natural ability to perform, and againſt which there lies no impediment to prevent the ſucceſs of our endeavours. But Freewill cannot proceed without inducements to move, and ideas to direct it; therefore that proviſion which ſupplies us with theſe, is ſo far from overthrowing, that it is the baſis and ſupport of our freedom.

Nor would doubts ariſe concerning our poſſeſſion of this privilege, if we did not generally extend it beyond its proper object, which, ſtrictly ſpeaking, is no other than the preſent action in our power; but our preſent endeavours often have a tendency to diſtant purpoſes; and experience teaches us what they have been uſed to produce; therefore we eſteem the conſequences to be effected by them as under our power, and ſubjects of our option: then, if ſuch remote events fall out otherwiſe than expected,

we aſcribe it to a Fatality; whereas the failure was really owing to particular circumſtances we did not attend to, or the interfering of natural cauſes we did not take into account.

More eſpecially we conceive ourſelves maſters of our own ideas, and to have the conſtant uſe of that judgement and diſcretion we poſſeſs; therefore if they fail us at any time in ſome egregious miſconduct, we apprehend ourſelves as having been under a ſecret infatuation; becauſe the proceeding being contrary to our preſent and former will and judgement, which we can ſcarce believe could have varied ſo greatly in the interval, we conclude a force muſt have been put upon our Will to make it act ſo oppoſite to its own deſigns.

But it is well known, that our apprehenſions are not always the ſame, nor does reaſon always operate with equal vigour; imagination varies her ſcenes, diſcretion falls off her guard, fancies ſtart up, deſires intrude, paſſions beguile, and things preſent themſelves in unuſual aſpects, owing

to

to the ſtate of our bodily humours, the mechanical play of our organization, prevalency of our habits, and appearance of external objects; all which are natural cauſes acting with a regularity undiſcernible to ourſelves. So there is no occaſion for recurring to that unſubſtantial Fatality ſpoken of in §. 48. for Fate is ſo much of the order of ſecond cauſes, as our Will has no ſhare in carrying on, and our Underſtanding no light to diſcover.

Thus Fate and Freewill have their diſtinct provinces, nor ever appear to claſh unleſs when we happen to miſtake the boundaries; but if we eſteem events within our power which depend upon other cauſes, we may find ourſelves fruſtrated, not by a force upon our will, but by having undertaken more, and carried our expectations further than we were warranted. For the giant Fate, though enormous in ſtrength and ſtature, never tramples upon Liberty, nor ſo covers the ground as not to leave ſome ſpace for human Agency while employed in its proper offices.

§. 54. For

§. 54. For we have nothing to do with Events lying within the boſom of Fate, nor are we to take our meaſures upon any thing we may fancy contained there: it may affect the ſucceſs, but cannot alter the prudence of our conduct, which conſiſts in the conformity of our actions with the beſt lights of our judgement.

If God has any ſecret purpoſe to accompliſh, no doubt he has provided cauſes to work it out; our buſineſs lies only with thoſe cauſes whoſe exiſtence and tendency we can diſcern; while we make the due uſe of them, ſo far as we have power and opportunity, we ſhall perform our little ſhare in the execution of his plan.

When we have determined upon our point ever ſo wiſely, and projected our ſcheme ever ſo prudently, perhaps there may be a decree to a contrary effect which will baffle all our endeavours; but this can be no guide to us, nor object of our contemplation, until manifeſting itſelf by the completion: in the mean time, if we find things

things take a wrong turn unexpectedly, we are not from thence to infer there is a Fatality[a] upon them, for we cannot expect to penetrate into the ſecret workings of Fate, which are purpoſely concealed from us, but muſt employ our ſkill and induſtry to rectify our meaſures, while there remains any probability of ſucceſs, that is, until we perceive invincible obſtacles ſtanding apparently in the way.

Nor have we the leſs range of action for the ſecret ſprings of events taking their certain courſe by the divine appointment,

[a] Yet if we have often tried the ſame ſcheme unſucceſsfully, this is a reaſon why we ſhould deſiſt from attempting it any more: not as convinced of a Fatality, but of a defectiveneſs in the ſcheme, or of there being ſome natural obſtacles which we do not perceive. For the frequency of an event is an evidence in multitudes of caſes, of there being adequate cauſes to produce it again, though we may not inveſtigate them. Thus if a farmer has ſeveral times planted a field with barley, but never could find a crop at harveſt, he will do wiſely to ſow no more there; being perſuaded there is ſomething either in the ſoil, or ſituation, unfit for that grain, though he diſcerns no apparent difference of either from other grounds. This obſervation would be very uſeful for projectors, who perſiſt obſtinately in ſupporting theory againſt experience.

neither

neither would our liberty be at all enlarged, if they were ſet in motion by the fortuitous declination of *Epicurus*'s atoms. Experience teaches that our ſtrongeſt expectations are liable to be fruſtrated, and our beſt projected ſchemes rendered abortive unaccountably; and we ſhould ſtand equally at a loſs how to ward off the diſappointment whether it were to come by chance or by Fate, for we can as little conjecture what the wild workings of chance would produce, as the ſtated proviſions of wiſdom: in both caſes we can only proceed according to what we ſee, and put in uſe thoſe methods which we judge moſt expedient. Nor would it prove leſs deſtructive of care and induſtry, if we ſhould entertain a notion of luck[b] running againſt us, than of a Fatality.

Predeſtination.

§. 55. There is one ſpecies of Fate reſpecting the condition of each man in ano-

[b] Prevailing much among gameſters, ſometimes doing them great detriment; and which by an eaſy tranſition they often turn into Fatality.

ther

ther life dependant on his conduct in this, commonly called Predeſtination. This, in many people's apprehenſion, carries with it the idea of a Fatality; for they ſay the Saint cannot ſin, nor the Sinner do right: yet it being obvious there can be neither right nor wrong, unleſs in things within our power and option, they ſuppoſe that though we have power to perform, we have none to chooſe, ſo there lies a force upon the will conſtraining it to one particular choice.

But experience does not ſupport this doctrine, for the wicked now and then uſe their power well, and it is too notorious that the righteous often fail of doing the good they might. Did *Peter* act right when he thrice denied his maſter? Or did *Pilot* act wrong in uſing endeavours to get *Jeſus* releaſed inſtead of *Barabbas?* and does not this manifeſt, that neither were under a conſtant fatality, but left ſometimes at leaſt at liberty to depart from their general tenour of conduct?

Then

Then if any pretend that this general tenour, ſo far as requiſite to denominate the party good or bad, is influenced by the fatality of a decree; let them ſearch into the receſſes of the human heart, examine the judgements, deſires, imaginations harbouring there, underſtand perfectly all the natural cauſes anywiſe affecting them, and clearly diſcern that none of theſe are adequate to the effect, before they are warranted to aſſert this. Nor let them build too haſtily upon the dictates of authority, which are beſt explained by experience of facts, and are delivered in a language accommodated to the common conceptions of men, wherein we often aſcribe events to the act of God, which were the reſult of ſecond cauſes eſtabliſhed by him.

Therefore it may be true that God giveth us both to will and to do, without conſtraining our Wills by his immediate and irreſiſtible influence; as it is true, that he giveth us our daily bread, though he ſends it not by ſpecial meſſengers, as he did to *Elias*, but by the proviſions he made for the

the fruits of nature in the ſtructure of plants, fertility of ſoils, kindly warmth of the ſun, ſeaſonable refreſhments of dews and ſhowers, and by the proviſions he made for exerting human induſtry, and fixing an attachment to their ſeveral profeſſions in the farmer, the miller, the mealman, and the baker[a].

§. 56. It muſt be acknowledged that the final ſtate of every man, as well as all other events without exception, depends upon cauſes flowing from ſprings originally provided by the Almighty; and in this light it may be ſaid that none ſhall be ſaved whoſe names were not written in the book of life[b]: but the writing in this book, if we

[a] So are our ſchools, our univerſities, our treatiſes of divinity and morality, our hiſtories, our encouragements for learning and induſtry, our eſtabliſhments of divine ſervices and ſermons, ſo many proviſions made for giving us to will: and though now and then they may give us to will what we had better have let alone, yet we ſhould find great miſs if we were totally deprived of them.

[b] And the like may be ſaid with regard to other events as well as our future ſtate. For none ſhall be a ſcholar,

we will employ the figure, has no efficacy, nor can limit our freedom, being no more than a declaration or record of the cauſes in act, and operations of under-cauſes flowing from them; which are equally matter of record, whether running in the channel of freewill, or of impulſe, force, and neceſſity.

And the proviſions now ſpoken of encroach leaſt of any upon the province of free Agency; a man may have his bones broken, his fortune ruined, his life deſtroyed, by earthquakes, tempeſts, plagues, or other accidents he cannot poſſibly guard againſt nor prevent; but his intereſts in futurity cannot be hurt, unleſs by ſome action he has power and liberty to forbear. Therefore is he free in whatever he does affecting thoſe intereſts, notwithſtanding

ſcholar, a ſoldier, a merchant, a poſtillion, or a chimney-ſweeper; none ſhall get to the *Eaſt* or *Weſt Indies*, nor ſhall build a houſe, or lay out a garden, whoſe names are not written in the book, as deſtined to thoſe purpoſes: that is, for whom cauſes were not provided, enabling and leading them to the accompliſhment.

the entry recorded, or proviſion preordained; for liberty, as we have ſeen before, depends upon the act enſuing the exertion of our power, not upon any thing antecedent, nor upon the motives or cauſes inciting us to exert it: if we have talents, opportunities, underſtanding and diſcretion, we have the ſame freedom to uſe them by what means ſoever they came to us, whether by a ſudden and accidental good fortune, or by a long ſeries of cauſes preappointed for that purpoſe.

But men are led by their averſeneſs to trouble to extend the idea of their power beyond its proper bounds, they want to do ſomething to-day whereby to enſure an indefeaſible title to future happineſs, without leaving any thing for to-morrow, but to take their paſtime in the manner moſt agreeable to themſelves. This is miſtaking their province, for they can never do their work ſo compleatly but there will always remain ſomething further to do: yet this does not affect their liberty to take ſuch meaſures as at preſent are feaſible, for

whatever be predeſtined concerning them, to-morrow they may ſtill do ſo much for themſelves as the actions now in their power amount to.

Therefore it behoves us to ſtand always upon the watch, to obſerve every ſucceeding moment what comes into our power, and to employ it ſo as may turn moſt for our benefit: for Predeſtination rightly underſtood, operates by our hands, and the courſe we ſteer is always that it takes upon every particular occaſion, unleſs when it employs external cauſes not under our controul, and theſe we have no buſineſs with; where indeed we could know the ſucceſs depends ſolely upon ſuch cauſes [b], our cares and

[b] For our future conduct may be determined by them: we can only make our reſolves properly, but whether they ſhall remain in full colour and vigour depends in great meaſure upon the temperament of our bodies, the company we fall into, or temptations aſſailing us: ſo much of theſe, as we cannot foreſee nor provide againſt, it would be fruitleſs to ſolicit ourſelves about, nor have we any thing elſe to do with reſpect to them, than confide in that Providence which orders all things for the beſt. But ſo far as we can help ourſelves

and endeavours were ſuperfluous, but in matters depending upon ourſelves, our opinion or diſbelief of their being predeſtined in the manner above deſcribed by a proviſion of the proper cauſes for enabling, moving, and directing us, how to beſtir ourſelves, makes no alteration in the rule of our conduct. For if a merchant breeds up his ſon to induſtry, inſtructs him in the miſteries of trade, and furniſhes him a competent ſtock, with a certain foreknowledge and determination that he ſhall make a fortune thereby: nevertheleſs the ſame diligence, the ſame circumſpection, and the ſame methods of proceeding will be requiſite as if thoſe advantages had fallen upon him accidentally, and the ſucceſs been abſolutely unknown to every body.

§. 57. But it is not enough to take off the diſcouragements againſt deliberation

ourſelves by any preſent act, either to prevent them, or prepare our minds againſt them, we may uſe the powers and opportunities put into our hands with the ſame freedom, whether we conceive them derived to us by a preappointment, or otherwiſe.

and activity, unleſs we quiet the apprehenſions ariſing in men's minds concerning their future proceedings: for ſome diſturb themſelves with the dread of a predetermination upon all their motions, which may turn them hereafter into the road of deſtruction, notwithſtanding the beſt diſpoſitions they find at preſent in their hearts. But let them conſider, that their preſent actions were as much predeſtined as any they ſhall perform hereafter, yet they find themſelves at full liberty to ſhape them in ſuch manner as they judge expedient; therefore they may depend upon having the like freedom at other times.

Well, but they know not what ideas may then ſtart up in their minds urging them to miſapply their powers. Is there not the like hazard attending the common affairs of life? for other events, as well as thoſe affecting the moral character, are equally predeſtined by the proviſion of cauſes ſuited to bring them forth. Yet who that lives in peace and plenty ever affrights himſelf with the thought that there

there may be ſecret ſprings at work which may deprive him of his health, his limbs, or his ſubſtance[a]? While things go on in a good train, and no danger diſcernible to human circumſpection threatens, we reſt contented with our ſituation, unmoleſted by imaginary terrors, and ſo we may with reſpect to our ſpiritual concerns, for virtue improves itſelf, and good habits grow ſtronger by exerciſe: therefore though our

[a] Yet there are thoſe who in the midſt of affluence affright themſelves with the apprehenſion that they ſhall want: but this is always looked upon as the effect of diſtemper: and ſo are the like terrors of any other kind. Few labour under more than one ſort of theſe diſturbances: he that fancies infections in the air does not think of wanting; and he that dreads the approach of want, is not ſollicitous about his future ſtate. Therefore let each make himſelf conſiſtent throughout, and learn from his eaſineſs under the bare poſſibility of one miſchief, to take courage againſt the like poſſibility of another. Nor may there want room for honeſt artifice in curing diſtempers of this ſort: an alarm raiſed of rogues or fire would probably ſuſpend any doubts of the religious kind. For it is not unnatural that one terror ſhould baniſh another. I believe the old women upon the banks of the *Weſer* or the *Fulda* (if there be any ſtill left unſtarved) have ſomething elſe to think on than Election and Reprobation.

final ſtate remains in the hand of Providence, and we cannot penetrate the ſecret councils of heaven, yet the right diſpoſitions we feel at preſent, are an evidence that proviſion is made for a happy iſſue at laſt, an evidence ſufficient to exclude every thing more than a poſſibility of our failing: nor were it expedient that this ſhould be excluded, as being ſerviceable to keep us vigilant, and guard us againſt a ſupineneſs of temper that might creep upon us inſenſibly.

Beſides, let us examine wherein it would better our condition, if God were to revoke his Predeſtination, and undo his proviſion of cauſes, ſo far as relates to ourſelves: would this enable us by our preſent cares ſo to bind our future conduct as that it could never run amiſs? and if not, how would matters be mended with us? There would ſtill remain a poſſibility that after having begun well we might faint in the midway, and this event would become abſolutely fortuitous: but we ſhould hardly find more comfort in thinking that our

Fate

Fate depended upon the caſt of a die than upon a Predetermination.

So then it might fairly be put to men's choice whether they had rather believe themſelves in the hand of Chance, or of a wiſe and gracious Governour: for the proceedings of wiſdom are regular, and tho' we know not perfectly what belongs to goodneſs, we may form a judgement thereon ſatisfactory to any reaſonable perſon; but the flighty gambols of chance are objects of no ſcience, nor grounds of any dependance whatever.

Nor ſhould we find greater ſecurity in the privilege of indifference ſo much vaunted by ſome, for this being controulable by no motives, it would avail us little to have a ſober underſtanding and virtuous inclinations moving us to take a ſalutary courſe; for our Freewill of indifference might run counter to them all, nor could we have any aſſurance what turns it might take: which muſt throw us again into all the anxieties attendant upon the dominion of chance.

Thus whatever hypotheſis we can frame, leaves as much room for apprehenſions as that of Predeſtination above deſcribed, for while we conceive it operating not by a Fatality, but by an apt diſpoſition of ſecond cauſes, it gives as large a ſcope to human freedom and forecaſt, and induſtry, as we have reaſon from experience to think ourſelves poſſeſſed of, and as good ground of expectation from the ſucceſs of our meaſures as we are warranted in any light to entertain.

§. 58. Nevertheleſs, if the mind appears to have taken a wrong turn, are there not juſt grounds of apprehenſion? Moſt aſſuredly. But this turn manifeſts itſelf moſt evidently in the prevalence of evil habits, and attachment to preſent pleaſures, without regard to the conſequences; therefore thoſe who ſtand in greateſt danger, are leaſt apt to take the alarm, and whoever could raiſe it in them, would do them an ineſtimable kindneſs. On the contrary, ſuch in whom diſquietudes abound, have upon

upon that very account the leſs reaſon to entertain them; for an earneſt concern for the future being the firſt and principal ſpring provided for bringing men into the right way, where this appears ſtrongly, it is of itſelf alone an evidence that proviſion has been made in their favour.

But deſpondencies of this kind are often owing to the indiſcretion of teachers, who inſiſt too ſtrenuouſly upon higher perfections of virtue than human nature can attain, and are found to prevail moſt upon women, or perſons of ſmall ability, and in their contemplative hours rather than ſeaſons of action. For the conſolation of ſuch perſons therefore let it be obſerved, that righteouſneſs does not conſiſt in the quantity of good we do, but in our doing ſo much, be it little, or be it much, as lies in our power. There are pegs and pins in a building as well as beams and columns, nor can we doubt that God diſtributes to every man the talents ſuited to the taſk he is to perform; therefore if we attend only to family affairs, or making broths

broths for the ſick, provided this be all we had ability to do, we have compleated our part.

Let it next be remarked, that our imagination does not lie under our abſolute command to raiſe ideas there, in what ſtrength and vividneſs of colour we pleaſe: the Poet cannot always fill himſelf with inſpiration, nor the Philoſopher with his clear diſcernment of abſtracted truth, nor the religious man with his ardors and tranſports: therefore the want of a fervent faith * and glowing zeal is not ſo much the mark of reprobation, as of a preſent indiſpoſition of the organs.

Let

* If any man ſhall diſquiet himſelf for that he can never riſe at all to this fervent faith, let him conſider that the capacity of entertaining a ſtrong perſuaſion, is one of the talents given for carrying us through good works, and God diſtributes it to men in proportion to the taſks they have to perform. To thoſe whom he calls to perſecution, or arduous trials, he will afford a larger meaſure; but let ſuch as have little to do, content themſelves with what ſuffices for their purpoſe. Strength of mind is no otherwiſe in our power than ability of body: we may improve either by exerciſe, or management, but can never extend them beyond the

Let it further be remembered, that notwithſtanding what may have been inculcated of a conſtant attention to the duties of religion, our buſineſs lies chiefly in action, and the common duties of life: ſo that when perplexities overcloud us, inſtead of foreboding melancholy omens from the gloom they caſt, we ſhould rather take them as admonitions, that it is not now the ſeaſon to puzzle our brains with thinking, but to beſtir ourſelves in ſome active employment, or purſue ſome innocent recreation, which may ſupply us with a flow

the bounds our natural conſtitution has preſcribed to us. Our common labourers acquire a much greater robuſtneſs than others of the ſame make, brought up to an indolent or ſedentary life; but no aſſiduity in labour can bring a ſlender looſe-built man to toſs the weaver's beam of *Goliah*, or carry the gates of *Gaza*. It may be obſerved further, that our vigour, both of mind and body, grows with our growth, and abates upon our beginning to decay; therefore old women and children, plied injudiciouſly with good books, are moſt liable to the diſquietudes we have been ſpeaking of. The one may be taught to expect greater lengths than they can yet attain: and the other not to charge it upon themſelves as a fault, that they grow feeble and poor in ſpirit.

of

of ſpirits for reaſon to work with to better purpoſe afterwards.

For if fear and trembling be a duty, a becoming confidence and juſt repoſe in the divine Goodneſs is a duty likewiſe, nor is fortitude leſs a virtue than prudence, and the proper province of both is aſcertained by their uſefulneſs[b]. Therefore when anxieties ariſe, it behoves us to conſider what purpoſe they may anſwer, while they ſerve to keep us vigilant, and ſpur on our activity in helping ourſelves, we do well to encourage them; but when they tend to no good, nor urge us to any thing we

[b] This ſhows the benefit of trying our principles of action by their reference to uſe: for the concern for futurity is one of the moral ſenſes, apt like the others to grow luxuriant, and run into extremes; but what is an extreme can be determined only by examining whether the giving way to it would do more hurt than good. A man is never the nearer heaven for being confident that he ſhall get there, nor ever the farther from it merely for his apprehenſions that he ſhall not find an entrance. Therefore the former would be the more eligible perſuaſion, were it not likely to make us remiſs and careleſs in our journey; and the latter is recommendable no further than as it ſpurs us to activity and vigilance.

ſhould

ſhould not have done as well without them, we cannot do better than to turn our face from them, and uſe any expedient at hand to baniſh them out of our thoughts.

But Predeſtination, though formerly making much noiſe in the world, is now grown an unfaſhionable topic [c], nor am I ſorry that it is ſo, for though I think it might be ſo explained as to render it neither formidable nor ſubverſive of diligence, yet I fear ſuch explanation would not ſtick with common apprehenſions, but they would ſtill annex to it an idea of Fatality, which muſt unavoidably nouriſh deſpon-

[c] Nor would ever have come into faſhion had it not been for the arts of deſigning perſons, who claim a power of conferring it: for by perſuading mankind that their final happineſs depends upon holding the preciſe form of doctrine taught by themſelves, they inſenſibly infuſe a notion of their having a privilege to admit whom they pleaſe into the number of the Elect, or at leaſt to declare who is one of that number; and impoſe ſuch terms upon the admiſſion as they think moſt for their own advantage. But were Predeſtination really abſolute, no ſubſequent conduct could turn it aſide; nor would it be of more conſequence what a man believes, or whom he follows, than how he lives, or what he practiſes.

dencies

dencies in phlegmatic tempers, preſumption, and fatal ſecurity in the ſanguine.

Concluſion.

§. 59. I have now rummaged every corner of the wilderneſs, and left no thicket untried that I could think of: it has been my endeavour to open the paſſages as I went along, and diſentangle the boughs where they had matted themſelves together, or been interlaced by perſons of an unlucky ſhrewdneſs in perplexing; ſo that the traveller may never be drove againſt the thorns without finding an opening to eſcape them, nor bewildered in mazes, without feeling a clue to direct him.

Yet I do not pretend ſo to have cleared the way, as that he may run careleſsly along, for the boughs will ſtill overhang, the paths remain dark, rugged, and intricate, and the clue put into his hands be apt to ſlip away from him; therefore he muſt not proceed in a hurry, but take every ſtep warily and circumſpectly, putting the twigs aſide that they may not ſtrike againſt his eyes, nor intercept his view of

the ground as he goes along, and keeping good hold of his ſeveral clues while neceſſary for his guidance.

If I have not done my work compleatly to the ſatisfaction of every body, allowance may be made for the difficulty of the ſubject, which has foiled ſo many men of deep thought and learning, that ſhould any thing be found here to render it clearer, I ſhould rather look upon it as a lucky hit, than any claim to extraordinary merit. For I have not pretended to manage the ſame train of argument better than other people, but have proceeded in a method of my own, which if purſued imperfectly, may ſtill ſerve as a hint, that others may improve upon to greater advantage. I have at leaſt to my own content effected a perfect reconcilement between Freewill and Univerſal Providence, and if this could be done to the general content, it would be no ſmall ſervice to the ſerious part of mankind; for neither of theſe points can eaſily be given up, nor has it hitherto been found

eaſy

eaſy to ſhow them conſiſtent with one another.

For our reaſon affords us ſo many grounds of aſſurance, that affairs as well in the moral as natural world, are adminiſtered by the power and wiſdom of God, and yet ſo many important events, ſuch as the riſe and fall of empires, the lives and deaths, the fortunes and diſtreſſes of men, depend upon their behaviour among one another, that we cannot but be perſuaded he governs the thoughts and actions of mankind with as full and abſolute a dominion as he does the courſes of nature. On the other hand, daily experience bears witneſs that our motions lie under our own controul, and we can do this thing or that as we pleaſe, without any force conſtraining, or dominion compelling us to the contrary. Then upon comparing theſe two conſiderations together, while they appear to claſh, we are tempted to diſtruſt either our reaſon or our experience; and according to which part we take, either are thrown off our diſcretion and tenour of conduct by the

the imagination of a ſecret influence and compulſion hanging over us, or loſe our dependance upon Providence, that trueſt ſolace of our minds in time of danger and diſtreſs, and ſureſt direction of our conduct in ſeaſons of eaſe and proſperity.

Whereas were the inconſiſtency taken off, we might then allow both human agency and divine government their full extent, becauſe they might co-operate in the ſame work without interfering with each other: we ſhould ſee no diſcouragement againſt making obſervations upon the things about us relative to our conduct, and taking our meaſures accordingly with freedom, and a decent confidence in their ſucceſs, and we ſhould depend contentedly upon the guidance of Providence for turning the courſes of fortune and actions of perſons with whom we have any concern, ſo as to procure all the good intended to be beſtowed upon us.

Nay further, when we conſider that things viſible and inviſible, lie under the dominion of one governour, connecting

all in one wiſely regulated polity, wherein nothing is eſtabliſhed in vain, and reflect how much of our time is loſt in ſleep and infancy, how many pains, diſeaſes and troubles fall upon us, how many unavailing hours paſs over our heads, and how often we are forced to beſtir ourſelves to very little purpoſe of our own, there is a probable preſumption that all theſe things turn ſome how or other to the account of other beings. So that our little concerns and tranſactions may be of greater importance than we imagine, and ourſelves made unknowingly to work out the advantage of fellow-creatures, whereof we have not the leaſt knowledge, nor even ſuſpicion. Nor need we want hopes from the goodneſs of God, that we ſhall one day reap the benefit of thoſe ſervices wherein we have been made, tho' undeſignedly, inſtrumental[a].

But

[a] I have already let the Reader into ſome of my good Couſin's fancies, which may be reckoned the luxuriancies of a warm imagination and contemplative turn: nor are ſuch peculiar to him, but may be found among the ancient Philoſophers, primitive Fathers, and modern Divines. In my third note on §. 20. I have hinted

But how ſimple and confined, or how extenſive and complicated ſchemes ſoever we

hinted his notion, That all ſpace not occupied by body, may be replete with ſpiritual ſubſtance; and that there may be other worlds created beſides this we inhabit. When he talks of other worlds, he has not ſo much in his thoughts the ſuppoſition of earths and heavens beyond the ſtarry ſphere (though this too he does not deny) as other ſyſtems of creatures intermingled among our own; governed by diſtinct laws, yet ordered in ſuch wiſdom and contrivance, as not to diſturb or interfere with thoſe wherein we have concern.

My friend has ſome phlegm to temper his fire, which witholds him from catching at every plauſible ſpeculation carrying no appearance of benefit, but does not hinder him from embracing, perhaps too eagerly, whatever he conceives tending to diſplay the divine Excellence, or raiſe our idea of the power, the wiſdom, or the goodneſs of our Creator. Now it ſeems to him more glorious to thoſe attributes, that there ſhould be no deſolate ſpot in the empire of God incapable of receiving his bounty, no ſtroke in his plan ſuperfluous, nor work of his hand unproductive of uſes proportionable to the largeneſs of the deſign; than that this immenſe fabric of the viſible univerſe ſhould be conſtructed only for the benefit of a few reptiles crawling about this inſignificant globe; the greater part of whom have not even the benefit of contemplating the wonders it contains. Some perhaps may alledge, that profuſeneſs gives the greater diſplay of magnificence, as ſhowing the inexhauſtible riches of the divine power, ſo that God can afford an immenſe coſt for the better accommodation of creatures whom he deſigns

we may conceive contained within the divine plan, the ſtumbling block of compulſion

to favour. But let us conſider why we eſteem profuſion a mark of magnificence in man; namely, becauſe of his ignorance of the exact wants, and ſeveral likings of the perſons he is to entertain; for could he know the preciſe meaſure of one, and particular objects of the other, he might give proof of his riches, by ſhowing himſelf able to ſupply every man with what he deſires, without heaping ſuperfluities upon the table. Were we invited to the houſe of a great perſonage, where we ſaw preparations larger than could poſſibly contribute to our entertainment, ſhould we not conclude that he had other gueſts to entertain beſides ourſelves? and did we perceive meats cooked up in a manner unſuitable to an *Engliſh* palate, ſhould we not ſuppoſe he expected a company of foreigners, or perſons whoſe palates were differently conſtituted from our own? By the ſame reaſon, when we behold mighty works in nature, which ſerve us only for objects of contemplation, may we not conclude there are other inhabitants whom they ſerve for more needful purpoſes?

As to thoſe called by *Lucretius* the faults of Nature, however ſome righteous people may deny their being ſuch, and inſiſt that all things contribute in ſome ſhape or other, nearly or remotely, to our uſes: my neighbour does not ſcruple to acknowledge there are faults, ſuppoſing man the ſole object deſerving regard. For though it might be difficult to point out a Reformation in any particular which would not be attended with worſe inconveniencies, yet he thinks it too daring preſumption to aſſert, that infinite Wiſdom could not

pulſion upon free Agency being removed, we may conclude that every purpoſe comprized

have contrived methods for avoiding thoſe inconveniencies, and formed a world better ſuited to the accommodation of human life, had that been the ſole point in view. Therefore that this was not done, he looks upon as an evidence that there were other views to be provided for, and other creatures differently conſtituted, for whoſe advantage theſe ſeeming faults were calculated. Nor yet will he controvert, that all things we have knowledge of were made for the ſervice of man, provided it be not added for man alone; for he obſerves, that nature ſerves many purpoſes by one and the ſame proviſion. The air we breathe wafts the birds aloft, ſuſtains the vapours, and aſſiſts in the growth of vegetables: the woods, from whence we draw materials for ſhips, for houſes, for utenſils, for firing, afford ſhelter and pannage to the cattle, habitation and food to the fowls, harbour and nouriſhment to the inſects. Why then ſhould we imagine that multitude of immenſe bodies we ſee twinkle by night, were hung out only as a ſpectacle for us to gaze at? That the vaſt effuſion of light was darted forth on all ſides throughout the heavens, for the ſake of a few rays to fall upon our eyes? That the boundleſs fields of Ether were ſpread out with no other deſign than for our little planets to roll in? To ſay this, he apprehends leſs worthy the divine attributes, and leſs agreeable to his favourite principle, of nothing made in vain, than to ſuppoſe innumerable hoſts of perceptive beings, for whoſe conveniencies, and enjoyments, theſe ſtupendous works were contrived.

He remarks further, that univerſal Nature being the work of one Creator, and dominion of one Governor,

it

prized therein has adequate cauſes provided for its execution, and every cauſe in act,

it is no unreaſonable preſumption to ſuppoſe it formed upon one all comprehenſive plan, nor that the laws reſpecting the different ſyſtems of beings, are to be regarded as municipal, contained under one general polity: ſo that nothing ſtands alone, nor unconnected with the reſt; but as other things were ſo far made for man as that regard was had to him in their eſtabliſhment, ſo man was made for the ſervice of his fellow-creatures, viſible and inviſible, regard being had to them in the conſtitutions of nature or fortune eſtabliſhed for him, and his tranſactions, together with the incidents befalling him, being made productive of ſome advantages to them. He ſeems to ſee this notion confirmed by the conſtitution of things upon this ſublunary ſtage, wherein men and animals, plants and elements mutually affect one another; from whence it may be preſumed the like mutual affection prevails throughout the regions unſeen. And as the profuſion of ſtars, of light, and of ether, almoſt uſeleſs to us, give proof of other natures to whom they might be uſeful; ſo the waſte of time, of thought, and labour, occaſioned by ſleep, by infirmities, error, and ignorance, which make large deductions from our enjoyment, muſt add as largely to it elſewhere.

He takes notice likewiſe, that nature forms her productions by long preparation, and through ſeveral ſteps: the little ſeed grows and ripens gradually in the pod of the flower; when falling into the ground, it ſhoots firſt a bud, then a ſtem, and laſtly a full grown plant; and upon the ſtructure of the embrio ſeed depend the kind, the qualities, the fruits of the future tree. Why then may not there be a like progreſſion of

act, whether voluntary or neceſſary agent, contributes its ſhare towards the completion of ſome purpoſe. There-

of the ſoul through her ſeveral forms of being; each being preparatory to the next, not only as our good or evil conduct here determines our condition either way hereafter, but as our ſeveral ways of living upon this ſtage may fit us to perform different parts upon another? We have paſſed through but one pre-exiſtent ſtate that we know of, I mean that of the womb, and upon what happened to us there, depends in great meaſure our ſtrength, our vigour, our genius, and our talents: nor does there want probability that the ſame in our future birth will depend upon what has happened to us during our preſent ſtate. For our ſenſations paſs through the mental organization in their way to the mind: if I look upon a houſe, I have an image of it in my fancy, as well as when I think of it with my eyes ſhut; and this image is neceſſary to my perceiving it, for were I to ſtare ever ſo much while thinking intenſely on ſomething elſe, I might have no more perception of the houſe than if there ſtood none before me. But matter, however finely organized, can impreſs variety of Perceptions no otherwiſe than by being diverſly modified: whence it follows, that the action of our ſenſes throws the mental organization into different modifications, and by doing this frequently, may bring the fibres of them into a different texture. Accordingly we find our habits, our turns of thought, our taſtes, our ſeveral expertneſs in one way rather than another, formed in us by the objects wherewith we have been moſtly converſant. So that every man's underſtanding and imagination become diverſly modelled according as he has been a ſoldier, a ſcholar, a mechanic, or a labourer. Now my contemplative and ſerious friend, eſteeming it for

the

Therefore the doctrine of univerſal Providence being, as it ſeems to me, well eſtabliſhed,

the glory of God to diſcover new uſes in the ſeveral proviſions of nature, thinks this a preſumptive evidence that the mind, or ſpiritual part, carries off this mental organization upon her departure; and that the profeſſions whereinto we are diverſly led, beſides their uſes in human life, adapt us ſeverally for ſome peculiar functions we are deſtined to perform in our next form of being.

Nor does he ſcruple to imagine, that future puniſhments, may be derived through the ſame channel; human nature being ſo ordered, that the practice of vicious courſes, by working improper mixtures into the organization, may render it diſturbed and diſtempered, breeding the worm that dieth not, and the inward fire that is not quenched. For ſince nature is the work of God, and all her proviſions of his contrivance, whatever miſery ſhall follow by natural conſequence is as much the effect of divine vengeance, as what is inflicted by the miniſtry of devils, or elementary flames.

When he reflects on the exiſtence of evil, that myſtery which the wit of man has never yet been able to unveil, he cannot allow any thing to exiſt neceſſarily, nor unproduced by the creator; therefore ſubſcribes to what he apprehends a ſcripture doctrine, *That the Lord created evil as well as good.* Yet this work of the creation ſeeming repugnant to our ideas of infinite Goodneſs, he thinks we ought to extend it no further than experience and neceſſity oblige us; which juſtifies him in confining it to the embodied and inorganized ſtates: ſo that when the ſpirit can get totally diſengaged from matter, it ſhall become totally exempt

eſtabliſhed, I may go on without further ſcruple to raiſe what ſuperſtructure I can upon this foundation.

exempt from evil. This reduces the quantity of it within a very narrow compaſs, for bodies being extremely ſpongy, the moſt ſolid of them, upon *Newton*'s authority, containing more of pore than ſubſtance, he ſuppoſes that if all the matter within the ſolar ſyſtem were compreſſed together, it would form a maſs no bigger than the body of the ſun. Therefore if all ſpace be replete with ſpiritual ſubſtance, even admitting that ſo much of it as lies immerſed in matter were conſtantly miſerable (which God be thanked is far from the fact) the evil would bear no greater proportion to the good than the magnitude of that body to the whole ſyſtem around it. So that it would be no extravagant figure to cry out with *David*, *Behold how high the heaven is in compariſon of the earth, ſo great is the mercy of the Lord towards them that fear him!* Now to compute that proportion, reckoning the ſun's diameter at 1200,000 miles, which the light, according to its velocity ſettled by *Newton*, would run over in ſeven ſeconds; and taking *Huygen*'s eſtimation of the diſtance of the neareſt fixed ſtar, which would require ſix lunar months for light to travel through: the ſun's magnitude will be to that of his whole ſyſtem, or the proportion of evil to good, as one to the cube of ſo many times ſeven ſeconds as are contained in the ſix months, that is, 8916100448256000000, almoſt nine millions of millions of millions.

Then being perſuaded that God never terminates his purpoſe upon evil, nor ſends it unleſs for ſome greater good to be brought out of it; he proceeds to examine in what manner it may be productive of good.

In order to this he conſiders the nature of the mind, which never moves to action unleſs for avoidance of ſome uneaſineſs, or upon proſpect of ſome ſatisfaction that would be loſt without her endeavours to procure it: therefore a being poſſeſſed of happineſs, and in full ſecurity that nothing could diſturb or abate it, would remain in perpetual indolence, having no inducement to exert its activity. But the apprehenſion of evil ſuffices to move the mind without its actually falling upon her, yet we cannot well conceive ſuch Apprehenſion without actual ſuffering ſomewhere or other, and a very little will do for the purpoſe; for one man's misfortune may give warning to a million, yet we ſhould never have an apprehenſion of bruiſes or broken bones, or other misfortunes, if they were never to happen at all; and perhaps a man who had never felt or ſeen any hurt, would wonder what you meant by admoniſhing him to guard againſt it. Therefore ſome degree of actual ſuffering may be neceſſary to keep activity alive in the ſpiritual ſubſtances for avoiding the ſources of it. He thinks this the beſt account that can be given for the origin of evil: and this affords a reaſon why the heavenly bodies, together with the planetary ſyſtems probably ſurrounding them, were diſperſed up and down to ſuch immeaſurable diſtances, and the fields of ether ſtretched throughout the vaſt expanſe containing them; to wit, that the former might ſerve as a habitation for animals, and the latter as a range for diſembodied organizations; ſo that ſamples of actual ſuffering might not be wanted in any part of the univerſe.

Thus all nature ſtands reciprocally connected: the purely ſpiritual part having concern with the embodied, as exhibiting ſpecimens of evil neceſſary to preſerve them in happineſs. And we having concern with

whatever ſecures the happineſs of thoſe beings, among whom we hope one day to be incorporated.

Theſe ſpeculations, which he thinks helpful to open our minds, to give us a fuller idea of the divine bounty, magnificence, and polity, and a better opinion of that univerſal nature under whoſe laws we live, yet being of too thin and airy a nature to ſink deep in the imagination; he has employed the hypotheſes of vehicles, and a mundane ſoul, to render them more ſenſible and more eaſily retainable. For when a probable manner can be deviſed to ſhew how things may be effected, it gains them a readier reception than bare arguments to prove their reality. Nor are they new inventions of his own making: for many learned men have ſuppoſed an inner tunicle adhering to the mind upon her ſeparation from the body; the antients painted the Soul, or Pſyche, with butterflies wings, to denote her reſemblance with a butterfly coming forth from the chryſalis in a body before formed therein; and St. *Paul* likens the ſpiritual body of reſurgents to the blade ſpringing from wheat, or barley, or it may be ſome other grain, which Naturaliſts tell us is no more than an expanſion of the little germ contained in the ſeed. Nor can it be denied, that many of the old Philoſophers held a mundane ſoul, or ſoul of the world, which though now commonly underſtood of the ſupreme Being, whoever examines their remains, will find they meant by it only a created ſubſtance, whereinto the ſouls of men and animals were abſorbed.

Theſe hypotheſes effectually baniſh the notion of ghoſts, apparitions, witchcraft, and the like. For the vehicles, although there be ſome unlucky malicious creatures among them, yet are too ſmall and feeble to do us any miſchief, or give motion to particles of matter enough to ſtrike any of our ſenſes. And the

mundane

mundane ſoul, although abundantly able to practiſe the art magic, and raiſe ſtorms or earthquakes ſufficient to beat our houſes about our ears; yet is of too important a character to play tricks with us, and too great a lover of regularity ever to diſturb the order of nature, or work any thing ſupernatural without an expreſs direction from above.

Now ſhould any body aſk what uſe all theſe ſpeculations are of, let him declare what he underſtands by uſe; if he means, for directing our meaſures in the common concerns of life, my honeſt Couſin readily acknowledges they are of none; therefore he would have them reſerved for our cloſets, nor ever ſuffered to intrude upon our thoughts when we go about our ordinary tranſactions. But ſo neither are the articles of religion of any uſe upon theſe occaſions: for who ever takes his meaſures in letting a farm, or buying a houſe, or ordering proviſions for his family, from his opinion concerning the formation of the world, or a future ſtate? Were I atheiſt or devotee, I ſhould probably buy my wares at the ſame ſhop, and employ the ſame carpenter to mend the paling of my yard. Therefore let ſuch as reſolve to confine themſelves to the daily buſineſs of their ſtation, or to thoſe courſes of acting and thinking which cuſtom has made current in the world, or who do not find theſe ſubjects ſuited to their taſte, paſs them over unheeded: yet they need not deſpiſe them for all that, until certain they can ſuit the taſte, or uſes, of nobody elſe. And if there be any who ſhall find my Author, or myſelf, have contributed the leaſt towards enlarging or clearing his ideas, or improving his Theory of Providence, he is heartily welcome; nor ſhall either of us think the time we have ſpent for his ſerve ill beſtowed.

FINIS.

MVSEVM BRITANNICVM